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3Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties to share a secret key and re-
alizes a communication with information-theoretic security by combining it with one-time-pad
encryption. Since the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol was proposed, a large number
of researches on QKD have been conducted from both aspects of theory and implementations.
For implementations of QKD, weak coherent pulses (WCP) are heavily used as optical signals
because they are easily generated by typical lasers and attenuators. The security for QKD with
WCP has been also studied along the development of the implementations.
In this thesis, the security analysis of the QKD with WCP is considered and further developed
from two aspects. First, the security of the dierential-quadrature-phase-shift (DQPS) protocol
is proved. The DQPS protocol has essentially the same set up as the phase-encoding BB84
(PE-BB84) protocol, which is one of the most frequently demonstrated protocols. Since the
known proof techniques for the BB84 protocol is not directly applicable, a modified approach
is developed which is suitable for the DQPS protocol. As a result, the advantage of the DQPS
protocol in the key generation rate over the PE-BB84 protocol is shown in the asymptotic limit
where the size of communication data is assumed to be infinite.
Second, a new method for security analysis with finite-key size is proposed as a suitable
method for QKD protocols using WCP. Dierently from the current method based on simple ran-
dom sampling, the proposed method relies on Bernoulli sampling, which is associated with bino-
mial distribution. The security of the BB84 protocol is proved by using the Bernoulli-sampling
method, enabling a simpler analysis with a smaller number of parameters to be estimated com-
pared to the method with simple random sampling. The required number of detected signals to
generate a secret key is shown to be smaller than 104, which is drastic improvement from the
number  107 obtained in the previous result. The proposed method is also applied to the DQPS
protocol, and its advantage over the PE-BB84 protocol is certified even in the finite-key regime.
iAcknowledgement
This thesis has been written based on much support and advice. In particular, I would like
to thank Prof. Masato Koashi, who supervised me throughout my studies in graduate school.
He was always ready to listen to student’s concerns for both scientific and private matters. His
bright insight and accurate advice helped me numerous times. I believe that I have developed an
appreciation for science and a logical way of thinking from him.
In addition, I greatly thank my closest collaborator, Dr. Toshihiko Sasaki. It was always a
pleasure to work with him and to benefit from his wide range of knowledge. He kindly responded
to my research questions, as well as questions about general physics and mathematics. I also thank
him for proofreading this thesis. Any remaining errors and omissions are solely my responsibility.
I have been fortunate to have researchers and discussion partners who are sophisticated in
various fields. Many practical aspects of this thesis were improved due to comments from Dr.
Ken-ichiro Yoshino. Yasunari Suzuki gave me helpful advice on both theoretical and practical
aspects. I also had several discussions with Akihiro Mizutani and obtained beneficial ideas from
him. The time I spent with them was quite valuable.
I thank Prof. Hoi-Kwong Lo and Prof. Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus for providing me with opportuni-
ties to visit their labs and other support. Those experiences broadened my outlook in research. I
am also grateful to their group members. In particular, Dr. Feihu Xu and Dr. Patrick Coles spared
a lot of time for discussions, which have been utilized to write this thesis.
I have been financially supported by the MERIT program, which gave me precious experi-
ences including interactions with students in other fields. I could enjoy a fruitful student life at
the university thanks to its continuous support.
Finally, I thank my family members, Shoko, Junko and in particular, my father, Prof. Norio
Kawakami, who gave me academic advice from the standpoint of a researcher in a dierent field.
ii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background of quantum key distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Contributions of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Organization of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Basic ideas of quantum key distribution 7
2.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 Tools of quantum information theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 Notations in this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 QKD protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Components and assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.3 BB84 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Security definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Security proof of the BB84 protocol 17
3.1 Three types of security proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Tools of security proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1 Replacement of state preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.2 Phase error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.3 Virtual protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3 Security proof of the BB84 protocol with complementarity . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3.1 Description of the actual protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.2 Main theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.3 Construction of virtual protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.4 Proof of the main theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
iii
iv CONTENTS
4 QKD with weak coherent pulses 33
4.1 Photon number splitting attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2 GLLP’s tagging idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.1 Phase-randomizing operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.2 Security analysis of WCP-BB84 with tagging idea . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2.3 PNS attack vs. WCP-BB84 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Practical aspects of WCP-BB84 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3.1 Phase-encoding BB84 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3.2 Decoy-state method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4 Dierential-phase-shift protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4.1 Protocol description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4.2 Security of DPS protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4.3 Round-robin DPS protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5 Security of the DQPS protocol 53
5.1 Protocol and assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2 Security proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2.1 Virtual protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2.2 Alternative definition of tagging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2.3 Phase-error rate for untagged portion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2.4 Upper bound on tagged ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.3 Key rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.4 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6 Simple method of finite-key analysis for WCP-QKD 71
6.1 Sampling problem in finite-key analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.2 Analysis for the ideal BB84 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.2.1 Formalism for key length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.2.2 Bounds on phase errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.2.3 Numerical examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.3 Analysis for WCP-based protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.3.1 The WCP-BB84 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.3.2 Numerical examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.3.3 The DQPS protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.4.1 Summary of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
CONTENTS v
6.4.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7 Conclusion and outlook 93
7.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2 Related works and future outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A Proof of lemma 1 97
B Untagged check-basis outcomes as an unbiased sample 99
C Security proof for DQPS with a general light source 101
D Calibration of light sources 105

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background of quantum key distribution
Quantum information theory not only allows us to understand quantum physics deeply through
classical information theory but also gives us a brand-new applications to the present information
technology. One of the applications with high possibility of realization is quantum cryptography,
which is expected to be a part of the future-cryptographic system. While quantum cryptography
has information-theoretic security, the security of most cryptography used in these days rely on
the computational hardness assumption, in which some mathematical problems are supposed to
be dicult to solve in practical time with the present computational resources and algorithms.
This indicates that even if important information is strictly protected by the present cryptography,
it might be decrypted by strong computational power or a new algorithm in the future. A famous
example is Shor’s algorithm [1] implemented with quantum computer. It is known to solve the
prime-factorization problem in polynomial time to threaten the security of the RSA cryptography,
which is widely used in the present communication system. Such an anxiety for the future devel-
opment of computer science is needless as far as the quantum cryptography is concerned thanks to
its security assured by information theory. Quantum cryptography is composed of two elements:
secret-key cryptography and quantum key distribution (QKD). For secret-key cryptography, the
information-theoretic security is proved if a secret key is used only one time and its length is not
shorter than that of the plain text, which is called one-time pad [2]. The problem is to share a
secret key between distant parties, and this is the purpose of the quantum key distribution.
The first QKD protocol was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 and is called the
BB84 protocol [3]. Dierently from the present cryptography where eavesdropping is generally
undetectable, the intervention of an eavesdropper can be detected in the protocol by monitoring
bit errors between two parties. In 1988, Bennett et al. also proposed the concept of the privacy
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amplification [4]. They show that if the amount of eavesdropper’s information is bounded, a
secure key can be extracted by compressing the shared key by the corresponding amount. This
opens the field of security proof of QKD, in which the amount of eavesdropped information is
theoretically bounded based on the rules of quantum physics. In 1996, the first security proof of
the BB84 protocol is given by Mayers [5], followed by Shor and Preskill [6] based on the ideas
of Lo and Chau [7]. On the other hand, these proofs assume ideal situations where Alice sends a
single photon and Bob also receives it. Furthermore, the proofs were asymptotic analysis where
the key size is assumed to be infinite to eliminate the statistical fluctuation.
For implementations of quantum key distribution, the behaviors of practical devices such as
lasers and detectors deviate from the ideal mathematical model. In particular, the eect of light
sources emitting multiple photons is serious because there is a photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tack [8], in which Eve can obtain the full information of a secret key without disturbing the signal
by using a part of multiple photons. The first security proof considering this eect is conducted
by Inamori et al. in 2001 [9]. Later Gottesmann et al. proposed a quite simple concept of “tag-
ging” to treat the multiple-photon emissions [10]. They pointed out that a round where the sender
emits multiple photons and a round where she emits a single photon can be in principle classified
if the optical phase of each signal is randomized. A round with multiple photons is regarded as
tagged and considered to be insecure, while a round with a single photon is regarded as secure by
applying the security proofs for the single-photon protocol. By combining the tagging idea with
the later security proof which does not require the specific model of the receivers [11, 12, 13],
the security of various practical QKD protocols including the BB84 protocols can be proved with
simple theory [14, 15, 16, 17].
Another theoretical problem in practical situations is the security proof considering the eect
of finite key size. Since the security analysis contains estimations of parameters related to leaked
information, statistical fluctuations due to the finiteness must be taken into account, which is
called finite-key analysis. Although there appeared security proofs with finite-key analysis based
on Mayer’s proof [9] and Shor and Preskill’s proof [18, 19], these earlier results did not follow
the security definition with composability [20, 21], which most of the current security proofs rely
on. On the other hand, several proofs [22, 23] with composable security definition used law of
large numbers for parameter estimations, which resulted in low key generation rate if the size of
exchanged data is limited. It is expected that a simple security analysis with a smaller number
of estimated parameters achieves higher key rate due to the small overhead for finite-size eect.
Many of the current security proofs [24, 15, 16, 17] with composable finite-key analysis use
random sampling theory or Azuma’s inequality [25] as the estimation methods.
As theoretical aspects of QKD develop, many implementations of QKD were conducted in
laboratories, on fields [26, 27, 28] and even in the space [29, 30, 31]. For the implementations in
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laboratories and on fields, a signal light is usually guided by optical fibers, in which the informa-
tion tends to be encoded on the optical phase of weak coherent pulses (WCP). One of the benefits
to use the phase-encoding method is that it can be conducted with simple set up using the current
technology. The simplicity is desired not only because of a lower cost and a higher clock rate,
but also because complicated systems and procedures tend to impose severe restrictions on the
model of the practical apparatus, and to suer from a large overhead involved in the finite-key
analysis. The BB84 protocol with phase encoding (Phase-encoding BB84, PE-BB84 henceforth)
[3, 32], which uses four relative phases f0; 2 ; ; 32 g between two neighboring pulses, is one of the
simplest QKD implementations among phase-encoding protocols. In the PE-BB84 protocol, the
sender and the receiver only need phase modulators and a passive Mach-Zehnder interferometer
with two detectors. With its established security [5, 6, 10, 12], a number of demonstrations have
so far been reported [33, 34, 35].
For long-distance communication, the laser-based BB84 protocol suers from PNS attacks.
It is often used with decoy-state method [36, 37, 38] to add protection against such attacks, but
the decoy-state method sacrifices the simplicity of the PE-BB84 protocol, requiring additional
devices as well as severer physical assumptions on the light source. It is common to assume
Poissonian statistics of the photon number, and an attempt to relax it into conditions on the general
photon number distribution still involves infinite number of inequalities [39]. In contrast, several
protocols have been proposed to achieve protection from PNS attacks without decoy states. The
dierential-phase-shift (DPS) protocol has robustness against PNS attacks while retaining (or
even improving) the simplicity of the PE-BB84 protocol, and the demonstration with a high clock
rate was conducted [40]. In 2014, the round-robin DPS (RR-DPS) protocol was proposed [41]
as a variant of DPS protocol, which is numerically shown to achieve higher key generation rate
compared to the decoy-state BB84 protocol, but its implementations [42, 43, 44, 45] are not
simple because of an additional element which is required in the receiver’s apparatus to measure
relative phases of two pulses with various intervals.
1.2 Contributions of this thesis
For the purpose of achieving a higher key generation rate with a simpler protocol, in this thesis
two contributions are shown in terms of the security of QKD using practical WCP. The first one
is the security proof of the dierential-quadrature-phase-shift protocol (DQPS) protocol [46] in
asymptotic-key regime. This work was published in [47]. The DQPS protocol was proposed
by Iwai and Inoue in 2009 and is regarded as a variant of the DPS protocol as well as the PE-
BB84 protocol. It is implemented with essentially the same set up as the PE-BB84 protocol
without sacrificing its simplicity. The security of the DQPS protocol is proved by modifying the
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tagging idea in this thesis. The result shows that its secure key rate is eight-third as high as that
of the PE-BB84 protocol in the asymptotic limit. Practical aspects of the DQPS protocol is also
investigated, in which the calibration method for light source is shown to be as simple as that of
the PE-BB84 protocol.
The second contribution is the proposition of a new method for finite-key analysis. While
most of the finite-key analysis is based on simple random sampling, the proposed method relies on
Bernoulli sampling, which is associated to binomial distribution. This work was motivated by the
finite-key analysis for the DQPS protocol, but it can be applied to various kinds of protocols, such
as the BB84 protocol, the six-state protocol [48], and high-dimensional QKD protocols [49, 50].
In particular, the method enables simpler analysis with less estimation process for the WCP-
BB84 protocol compared to the analysis with simple random sampling. The required number
of detected signals to generate a secure key reduces to 104 from 107, which was obtained in the
previous work [23]. Furthermore, by applying the analysis to the DQPS protocol, its advantage
of the key rate over the PE-BB84 protocol is confirmed also in the finite-key regime.
1.3 Organization of this thesis
This thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, basic ideas of QKD are introduced. First, we summarize the concepts and
notations used in this thesis. Next, various elements of QKD protocol (devices, procedures) are
shown along with their assumptions. As an example of a QKD protocol, the BB84 protocol is
described. The security definition of QKD is also given in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, the security of the BB84 protocol is proved based on the proof with comple-
mentarity [12]. The useful tools for security proof, source replacement, phase error, and a virtual
protocol are introduced. By using those tools, we prove the security of the BB84 protocol under
the assumption that the number of phase errors are bounded.
In Chapter 4, QKD using WCP are discussed from both theoretical and practical aspects.
First, PNS attacks are described. After GLLP’s tagging idea is introduced, the dependence of
secret-key length on phase errors is derived for WCP-BB84 protocol by using the tagging idea.
Based on the resulting key length in the asymptotic limit, we analyze the eect of PNS attacks on
the WCP-BB84 protocol. For practical aspects, the PE-BB84 protocol is introduced as a specific
form of the WCP-BB84 protocol. Decoy-state method is also discussed with its current practical
problems. Finally, the DPS protocol is introduced with its variant, the RR-DPS protocol.
In Chapter 5, the security of the DQPS protocol is proved in the asymptotic limit. After
describing the protocol and assumptions, the security proof is conducted with construction of a
virtual protocol and an alternative rule of tagging. The result of numerical calculation is shown
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to make comparison to the PE-BB84 protocol in terms of key-generation rate. We discuss the
generality of the proof and simplicity of the DQPS protocol, and a possible improvement for the
proof is suggested.
In Chapter 6, the method for finite-key analysis based on Bernoulli sampling is proposed.
First the sampling problems in security analysis are introduced along with their related statistics.
The proposed method is applied to the ideal BB84 protocol and WCP-BB84 protocol to make
comparison with the conventional method with simple random sampling. The proposed method
is also applied to the DQPS protocol to confirm its advantage over the PE-BB84 protocol in the
finite-key regime. Finally, the obtained results are summarized and outlooks related to this work
are discussed.
In Chapter 7, the summary of my researches and prospects for the future works are presented.

Chapter 2
Basic ideas of quantum key distribution
Quantum cryptography enables communication with information-theoretic security. Although its
security depends on the whole system [28] including one-time-pad communication and secret-key
management, this thesis focuses on “quantum layer” of quantum cryptography, namely, quantum
key distribution (QKD). In this thesis, we treat QKD with two-level system (qubit-based QKD)
rather than qudit-based QKD [49, 50] and continuous-variable QKD [51]. This chapter is for in-
troduction of basic ideas used in QKD. Sec. 2.1 represents the tools and notations used throughout
this thesis. The typical structure and assumptions of QKD protocols are shown in Sec 2.2. The
security definition of QKD protocol is given in Sec 2.3.
2.1 Preliminaries
For later convenience, we introduce several basic concepts and properties in quantum information
theory, and summarize notations frequently used in this thesis.
2.1.1 Tools of quantum information theory
Here we introduce several useful tools of quantum information theory: POVM, CPTP map, trace
distance, and fidelity.
POVM
POVM (positive operator valued measure) is one of the forms representing quantum measure-
ment. POVM represents a set of positive operators f ˆEig satisfying Pi ˆEi = ˆ1 where ˆ1 is the
identity operator. Each element of the set ˆEi is called POVM element. Any physical measure-
ment can be represented with POVM. For a density operator ˆ, the probability that the outcome
7
8 CHAPTER 2. BASIC IDEAS OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
corresponding to ˆEi is obtained is given by Tr(ˆ ˆEi).
CPTP map
CPTP map is short for completely-positive and trace-preserving map. A map E : ˆ 7! E(ˆ) acting
on a density operator ˆ is called a completely-positive map if
(1 
 E)(ˆ0)  0 (2.1)
holds where 1 is the identity map on the auxiliary system and ˆ0 is a density operator on the joint
system. The map E is called a trace-preserving map if
Tr(E(ˆ)) = 1 (2.2)
for any normalized density operator ˆ. Note that any input-output relation which is physically
realizable is a CPTP map. A CPTP map can be expressed with operator-sum representation as
E(ˆ) =
X
i
ˆKiˆ ˆKyi ; (2.3)
where ˆKi is an operator acting on the same Hilbert space as ˆ, and
P
i ˆK
y
i
ˆKi = ˆ1 with the identity
operator ˆ1.
Trace distance
Trace distance represents distance between two quantum states. We define *1) trace distance
between two states ˆ and ˆ as 12 jj ˆ   ˆ jj with trace norm jjAjj := Tr(
p
AAy). The triangle
inequality holds in terms of trace distance:
1
2
jj ˆ   ˆ jj + 1
2
jj ˆ   ˆ jj  1
2
jj ˆ   ˆ jj: (2.4)
Trace distance has a property of monotonicity, that is, for any CPTP map E,
1
2
jj E(ˆ)   E(ˆ) jj  1
2
jj ˆ   ˆ jj (2.5)
is satisfied.
Fidelity
Fidelity is another distance measure for quantum information. We define *2) fidelity of two states
ˆ and ˆ as
F(ˆ; ˆ) :=
 pˆpˆ 2 : (2.6)
*1)The definition is not unique, and sometimes jj ˆ   ˆ jj is called trace distance.
*2)The definition is not unique, and sometimes
 pˆpˆ  is called fidelity.
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Uhlmann’s theorem [52] holds in terms of fidelity:
F(ˆ; ˆ) = max
j i
j h j i j2; (2.7)
where j i and j i are purifications of ˆ and ˆ, respectively. Fidelity also has a property of
monotonicity: For any CPTP map E,
F(E(ˆ);E(ˆ))  F(ˆ; ˆ) (2.8)
holds. Trace distance is upper-bounded by fidelity as
1
2
jj ˆ   ˆ jj  p1   F(ˆ; ˆ): (2.9)
2.1.2 Notations in this thesis
Here, we summarize notations used in this thesis. We adopt an abuse of notation to use the same
symbol for a random variable n˜ and its value n, whenever the distinction is obvious. For example,
we denote Pr(n > 3) instead of Pr(n˜ > 3). We denote by Pr(n) the probability mass function
Pr(n˜ = n). Similarly, we use Pr(n j m) instead of Pr(n˜ = n j m˜ = m).
A bold character, for example V, represents a vector of bit strings where addition of two
vectors is defined by addition modulo 2 for each element. We use the notation jVj as the length of
V, and use wt(V) as weight of V, namely, the number of 1s contained in V. We define the product
of two vectors V  W (where jVj = jWj) as V  W = V1W1 + V2W2 + :::::VjVjWjWj where the plus
sign represents addition modulo 2 (hence V W 2 f0; 1g). For example, for V = (0; 1; 0; 0; 1) and
W = (1; 0; 0; 0; 1), we have jVj = 5, wt(V) = 2 and V W = 1.
We define the following increasing function of x defined for x  0:
h(x) =
8>><>>: xlog2x   (1   x)log2(1   x) (0  x  1=2)1 (x > 1=2): (2.10)
For 0  x  1=2, h(x) is identical to the binary-entropy function.
This thesis mainly deals with the BB84 protocol and the DQPS protocol, both of which use
two bases, one for generating a secret key (data basis) and the other for monitoring leaked infor-
mation (check basis). Throughout this thesis except Chapter 5, we assign the Z basis to the data
basis, and the X basis to the check basis.
We define j0Zi and j1Zi as basis vectors of Z basis on a qubit system, j0Xi := (j0Zi + j1Zi)=
p
2
and j1Xi := (j0Zi   j1Zi)=
p
2 as those of X basis. When the same notations are used for an optical
signal (usually denoted by system S ), it should be understood that they refer to the states in the
subspace of a single photon contained in two modes, such as polarizations. For simplicity, we
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denote j0i 
 j0i as j00i. The ket notation characterized by vector represents jVi :=NjVji=1 jVii. The
four Bell states are represented by ji and j	i where
ji := 1p
2
(j00Zi  j11Zi); (2.11)
j	i := 1p
2
(j01Zi  j10Zi): (2.12)
2.2 QKD protocol
Although there are various types of QKD protocols, they generally have similar components and
procedures. In this section we introduce basic components of QKD with their assumptions and
the procedures in QKD protocol. We also introduce the BB84 protocol as an example of QKD
protocol.
2.2.1 Components and assumptions
We divide QKD components into the sender’s devices, the receiver’s devices, quantum channel
and classical channel to clarify the assumptions usually adopted in QKD protocols. In most
QKD protocols, there appear legitimate parties Alice and Bob who want to share secret keys and
eavesdropper Eve. Throughout this thesis, we assume that Alice is a signal sender and Bob is a
receiver.
Alice’s (sender’s) devices
Alice’s devices are mainly used for preparing quantum states. One of essential devices at Alice’s
site is a light source. From the viewpoint of simplicity and high repetition rate, an attenuated
laser is usually used as a signal source, while QKD with single-photon source has been demon-
strated [53] and sophisticated ideas for sources using spontaneous parametric down conversion
were proposed [54, 55]. Random number generator is also necessary for basis choice, generating
a raw key bit, randomization of optical phase and generating hash functions and so on. Although
we assume that perfect (uniform and independent) random numbers can be prepared, practical
random number generators have imperfections causing non-uniformity of random numbers and
correlations to outside systems. To fill the gap from the practical side, researches on quantum ran-
dom number generator (QRNG) have been conducted. In these days, QRNG using the random-
ness of which-path information of photon is commercially available with the rate 4 Mbits/s [56],
and faster one with 6 Gbits/s was demonstrated based on quantum-phase fluctuations [57]. As
is referred to as “side channel attack” in the current cryptography system, in practice there are
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attacks using unintended information leak (such as feeble electromagnetic wave from devices),
and hence the appropriate countermeasures are required. On the other hand, in this thesis we
assume that internal information of the devices is not leaked outside.
Bob’s (receiver’s) devices
The role of Bob’s devices is to carry out measurement on quantum states to obtain a key bit. A
main device at Bob’s site is a detector. In practice, threshold detectors, which can tell a single
photon or more from vacuum, are often used without sacrificing the security. In several QKD
demonstrations with high clock rate [40, 53], superconducting single photon detectors (SSPDs)
were used. Recently, SSPDs with high detection eciency (93 %), low dark count rate (1 c.p.s)
and low timing jitter (150 ps) were developed [58]. A random number generator is also necessary
if Bob needs basis choice in the protocol. A larger number of side-channel attacks (security loop-
holes) are known for the receiver’s devices [59, 60, 61, 62] than the sender’s devices, which leads
to the idea of measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [63]. In MDI QKD, both Alice and
Bob are senders and the receiver’s devices are possessed by an untrusted party “Charlie”. The
protocols dealt in this thesis are based on conventional Alice’s state preparation and Bob’s mea-
surement. We assume that Bob’s devices are also side-channel free similarly to Alice’s devices.
Quantum channel
Quantum channel is used for communication with quantum states between Alice and Bob. For
practical aspects, optical fibers or free space are suitable as quantum channel for light. Optical
fibers are used for most QKD implementations on the ground [26, 27, 28], while the use of free
space is expected for implementations involving satellites [29, 30, 31, 64]. We impose no as-
sumption on quantum channel and hence Eve can conduct any physical operation on transmitting
signal without constraints on technology. For example, she can use noiseless and lossless channel
in principle.
Classical channel
Classical channel is used for all communication between Alice and Bob except the one with
quantum channel. While the information on classical channel is publicly open, we assume
that the information can not be tampered. This assumption is realized by Wegman-Carter au-
thentication [65], for example, consuming a small number of secret key ( logarithm of the
communication-data size). Thus, Alice and Bob need to share secret keys in advance, which
implies that the role of QKD is not secret-key generation, but secret-key amplification. If we
compromise the information-theoretic security, the authentication is conducted by public-key
cryptography relying on computational-hardness assumptions, which partially makes sense since
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it is sucient that the authentication succeeds at the present time to make the secret key shared
through QKD be secure even in the future.
2.2.2 Procedures
QKD protocols are composed of manipulation of quantum states and classical post processing.
In post processing, the procedures are classified as sifting, parameter estimation, error correction
and privacy amplification. Here we explain each procedure and introduce several related works.
Quantum manipulations
Quantum manipulations include Alice’s preparation of a quantum state, transmission of the state
and Bob’s measurement. Alice prepares a quantum state based on a random bit and basis choice
(if the protocol uses multiple bases) and sends it to Bob through quantum channel. Bob makes
measurement on the state to obtain one of outcomes f0, 1, no-detectiong and additional informa-
tion depending on protocols. We name the series of the above procedures for a single state as a
“round”. Alice and Bob repeat the round many times.
Sifting
In sifting process, Alice and Bob communicate with classical channel to determine whether each
round of the protocol is valid or invalid. For example, a round with no detection at Bob’s site is
invalid, and a round with basis mismatch between Alice and Bob is also regarded as invalid. Some
rounds may be chosen as samples for the following parameter estimation process. Alice and Bob
obtain bit strings called “sifted key” by concatenating the bits on valid and no-sample rounds.
In several works [13, 15, 16], sifting process is conducted at each round of the protocol. On the
other hand, Pfister et al: have recently pointed out [66] that the conventional security proof based
on simple random sampling can not be applied if we disclose the basis choice at each round of
the protocol. Thus, if one prefers tight security analysis currently used, sifting process is desired
to be conducted after all rounds are over in practical QKD protocols.
Parameter estimation
To certify the security of the protocol, we require parameters which characterizes Eve’s interven-
tion on quantum channel. For this, Alice and Bob disclose sample bits through classical channel
to obtain the statistics of bit errors. Based on the resulting statistics, Alice and Bob determine
whether they proceed to the following steps or abort the protocol. For example, if the number of
errors is too large compared to the data size, they abort the protocol.
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Error correction
Even if Eve is absent, Bob’s sifted key is generally dierent from Alice’s one because of the noise
inherent in quantum channel. In error correction process, Alice and Bob correct the obtained
keys to make it coincide with each other’s one through the communication with classical channel.
Based on the estimated bit-error rate on the sifted key, Alice and Bob apply an appropriate error-
correcting code. If multiple bases are used in the protocol and bit errors on sifted key do not
contribute to the security analysis (e.g. in BB84), the estimation of error rate on the sifted key can
be omitted. Instead, they apply an error-correcting code with predetermined communication cost
followed by verification process. In verification process, Alice and Bob compare a small number
of hash values computed from the sifted keys, and if those values are dierent between Alice
and Bob, they abort the protocol. In practice, the low-density parity-check (LDPC) code [67] is
often used for error correction. For fast implementation of LDPC code, the size of a sifted key is
desired to be fixed.
Privacy amplification
Privacy amplification is the process to obtain a secret key decoupling from Eve’s system. The
concept of privacy amplification was proposed and developed by Bennett et al: [4, 68] in early
days. The idea is that if the amount of information leaked to Eve is upper-bounded, the secret
key can be generated by applying an appropriate compressing function on the sifted key, which
shortens the key length by the amount corresponding to the leaked information. The bound on
leaked information is not directly observed and has to be theoretically determined based on esti-
mated parameters. One of compressing functions established for the privacy amplification is the
universal2 hash function [69], and Toeplitz matrix is frequently used in practice due to its small
computational complexity. Recently, Hayashi and Tsurumaru constructed another hash func-
tions [70] which belong to a broader class than universal2 hash function. These functions require
less random seeds as well as enables us to treat their non-uniformity, which is useful considering
the imperfection of random number generators. Although the concept of privacy amplification
was proposed mainly for quantum key distribution, recently it has been applied to other fields
such as randomness extraction [71] for quantum random number generators.
2.2.3 BB84 protocol
As an example of QKD protocol, we introduce the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [3]. In
the protocol, Alice and Bob independently chooses two bases (Z basis and X basis) with a biased
probability. The final key is generated only from Z-basis data, while X-basis data is used for leak
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monitoring to determine the amount for privacy amplification. We say a round is “Z(X)-labeled”
if both Alice and Bob chose Z(X) basis and photon detections are reported at that round. The
number of total rounds is fixed to be nrep, and hence the size of the final key is variable.
The protocol proceeds as follows with predetermined parameters p˜Z, p˜X = 1   p˜Z and nrep.
Following the classification in the previous section, Steps (1)-(4) correspond to quantum manip-
ulations, Steps (5) and (6) represent sifting process and Step (7) is parameter estimation.
(1) Alice chooses Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and p˜X, respectively. She chooses a
uniformly random bit f0; 1g.
(2) Alice prepares one of states fˆZ;0; ˆZ;1; ˆX;0; ˆX;1g based on the selected basis and bit. She sends
the prepared state to Bob over the quantum channel.
(3) Bob chooses Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and p˜X, respectively. He measures a re-
ceived state in chosen basis and obtains the outcome f0, 1, no-detectiong.
(4) They repeat the sequence (1) to (3) (which we call a round) by nrep times.
(5) Bob publicly announces whether each round has resulted in a detection or not. Let ndet be the
number of rounds with detection.
(6) Alice and Bob disclose all of their basis choices. They define sifted keys A;Z and B;Z by con-
catenating the bits for the Z-labeled rounds, and similarly define A;X and B;X for the X-labeled
rounds. Let their sizes be nZ := jA;Z j = jB;Z j and nX := jA;X j = jB;X j.
(7) They disclose and compare A;X and B;X to determine the number of bit errors kX included in
them. Let ! represents the following three observed numbers:
! := (kX; nX; nZ): (2.13)
Through public discussion, Alice and Bob determine whether they abort the protocol or not. If
the protocol does not abort, they determine the final key size l(!) ( 0).
(8) Through public discussion, Bob corrects his keys B;Z to make it coincide with Alice’s key
A;Z and obtains corB;Z (jcorB;Z j = nZ).
(9) Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by shortening A;Z and corB;Z to obtain final keys
finA;Z and finB;Z of size l.
Intuitively, security of the BB84 protocol is ensured by the uncertainty principle: If Eve at-
tempts to access information for Z basis, then information for X basis is disturbed. Although the
BB84 protocol is the first QKD protocol, it is as well the most frequently demonstrated protocol
even in the current QKD implementations. A possible reason for the popularity is the simplicity
of the protocol, but another remarkable property is that the BB84 protocol also has established se-
curity with simple proof, which originates from the symmetry of the Z and X bases. In Chapter 3,
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we show the simple security analysis of the BB84 protocol by using the proof of complementar-
ity [12].
2.3 Security definition
Here we introduce the security criteria with “composability” which are currently accepted in
the field of QKD. The concept of composable security originates in modern cryptography (not
quantum) [72] and was first discussed in the context of QKD by Ben-Or et al: [21, 73], followed
by Renner et al: [20] and Unruh [74]. Roughly speaking, composable security implies that if two
protocols are respectively shown to be almost secure, the protocol combining the two protocols
is also almost secure. This property is important because secret keys generated from a QKD
protocol are used in other protocols, such as one-time pad and authentication of classical channel
(see Sec. 2.2.1).
As is adopted in the current security proofs [13, 75, 15, 16, 24, 76, 17], in this thesis we follow
the composable security definition represented in Ref. [21]. For a bit strings  2 f;; 0; 1; 00; 01; 10;
11; 000; :::g, let us define fjig as a set of orthogonal bases on the space H0 H1 H2  ::::Hnrep
with each dimension of H j being 2 j. Let ˆfinABE be a state after finishing the protocol defined on
the system A (Alice), B (Bob) and E (Eve), which is written as
ˆfinABE :=
X
finA;Z ;
fin
B;Z
Pr(finA;Z ; finB;Z) jfinA;Z ; finB;Zi hfinA;Z ; finB;Z jAB 
 ˆfinE (finA;Z ; finB;Z); (2.14)
where Pr(finA;Z ; finB;Z) represents the probability that Alice and Bob obtain the final key finA;Z and
finB;Z, respectively, and jfinA;Z ; finB;ZiAB := jfinA;ZiA jfinB;ZiB. Let ˆidealAE be an ideal state where Alice’s and
Bob’s final keys are uniform and independent of Eve’s system (except final-key size l):
ˆidealABE :=
X
l
X
: jj=l
Pr(l) 1
2l
j; i h; jAB 
 ˆfinE (l); (2.15)
where Pr(l) represents the probability to obtain the final key of size l and ˆfinE (l) is Eve’s state
conditioned on l, which are related to the parameters in the protocol as
Pr(l) =
X
finA;Z ;
fin
B;Z : jfinA;Z j=jfinB;Z j=l
Pr(finA;Z ; finB;Z); (2.16)
ˆfinE (l) :=
1
Pr(l)
X
finA;Z ;
fin
B;Z : jfinA;Z j=jfinB;Z j=l
Pr(finA;Z ; finB;Z)ˆfinE (finA;Z ; finB;Z): (2.17)
Since it is practically impossible to obtain the final state as in the ideal form Eq. (2.15), we allow
the small probability sec that the protocol is insecure. Such a concept is called sec-security, and
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its exact definition is described as follows.
Definition of sec-security
The protocol is sec-secure if and only if the trace distance between ˆfinABE and ˆidealABE is no larger
than sec:
1
2
jj ˆfinABE   ˆidealABE jj  sec: (2.18)
Typically the value of sec is set to sec  10 10.
For the convenience of security proof, sec-security is usually divided into c-correctness and
s-secrecy [77]. The protocol is called c-correct if and only if
Pr(finA;Z , finB;Z)  c: (2.19)
Define ˆfinAE and ˆidealAE as
ˆfinAE := TrB(ˆfinABE) =
X
finA;Z
Pr(finA;Z) jfinA;Zi hfinA;Z jA 
 ˆfinE (finA;Z) (2.20)
ˆidealAE := TrB(ˆidealABE) =
X
l
X
: jj=l
Pr(l) 1
2l
ji hjA 
 ˆfinE (l): (2.21)
The protocol is called s-secret if and only if
1
2
jj ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE jj  s: (2.22)
By using the triangle inequality Eq. (2.4) in terms of trace distance, one can show that if the
protocol is c-correct and s-secret, the protocol is also sec-secure with sec = c+s (see Ref. [12],
for example). It is useful to quantify c-correctness and s-secrecy separately. Since c-correctness
is ensured in the protocol through the verification process or estimation of bit errors, the target of
security proof is to ensure s-secrecy of the protocol.
Until the concept of composable security was generally accepted, the security of QKD was
typically evaluated by Shannon mutual information I(finA;Z; KE) [78] between Alice’s final key
finA;Z and Eve’s classical strings KE obtained by measurement on her system [9, 18, 19]. However,
small I(finA;Z; KE) does not necessarily means s-secrecy with small s. Ref. [21] shows that s-
secrecy is satisfied if
I(finA;Z; KE)  2 (l+2)2s ; (2.23)
where we fixed the value of l = jfinA;Z j for simplicity. Later, the exponential dependence of the
mutual information on the final key size as in Eq. (2.23) was shown [79] to be necessary as well
as sucient for s-secrecy, which implies that the mutual information is not suitable as security
definition.
Chapter 3
Security proof of the BB84 protocol
So far a large number of security proofs are given for various protocols, but the number of the
security proofs for the BB84 protocol is outstanding compared to those for others. The reason
is supposed to be that it has a beautiful symmetry of two conjugate observables, which enables
a simple proof. Many security proofs for other protocols also use the property of two conju-
gate observables and they are regarded as a variant of the proof for the BB84 protocol. Thus,
understanding the security proof for the BB84 protocol might be essential to address the secu-
rity of general QKD protocols. The first security proof for the BB84 protocol was given by
Mayers [5] although it was complicated. The simple proof using quantum error correction was
proposed by Shor and Preskill in 2000 [6]. Later, the other simple proofs are suggested by Koashi
in 2005 [11] and by Tomamichel et al: in 2012 [13]. In this chapter, the security of the BB84
protocol is shown with a method based on complementarity proposed by Koashi [11, 12]. The
proofs includes finite-key analysis and satisfies the composable security definition [20, 21]. As a
preliminary, three methods (mentioned above except Mayers’) of security proofs currently used
are introduced and compared in Sec 3.1. In Sec. 3.2, tools for security proof are introduced to
use the proof with complementarity, containing replacement of state preparation, phase error and
virtual protocol. By using those tools, the security of the BB84 protocol is shown based on the
proof with complementarity in Sec. 3.3. The result of this chapter is applied to Chapter 5 and 6.
3.1 Three types of security proof
As far as the qubit-based protocols (c f : continuous variable QKD [51]) including the BB84 pro-
tocol are concerned, the security proofs which are valid for Eve’s general attack are mainly clas-
sified into three types: the proof with entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) [7, 6], the proof
with complementarity [11, 12] and the proof with entropic uncertainty principle [13]. We briefly
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introduce those three proofs focusing on what concepts are used and what physical assumptions
on devices are required.
Security proof with EDP
The security proof with EDP was originally proposed by Lo and Chau in 1999 [7]. They prove the
security of the BBM92 protocol [80], in which an entangled photon pair is separately distributed
to Alice and Bob, by using the ideas of entanglement distillation protocol [81, 82, 83]. Later in
2000, Shor and Preskill show that the security of the BB84 protocol is reduced to the proof of the
BBM92 protocol [6]. The proof is based on simple CSS quantum error correction code [84, 85]
and the security is evaluated how good both bit errors and phase errors (mentioned in Sec. 3.2.2)
are corrected. On the other hand, it requires an assumption that Alice and Bob make ideal qubit
measurements. The proof with EDP is used not only for the above two protocols but also for B92
protocol [86, 87], six-state protocol [48, 88], DPS protocol [89, 90] and so on.
Security proof with complementarity
The security proof with complementarity was proposed by Koashi in 2005 [11]. It follows the
spirit of the first proof for the BB84 protocol given by Mayers [5], in which the security is an-
alyzed with uncertainty principle at Alice’s system. While it adopts the similar proof with EDP
by using the idea of phase error correction, the bit error correction is separated from the security
analysis and the security is evaluated how good phase errors are corrected. Compared to the proof
with EDP, the physical assumption at receiver’s devices is relaxed as follows:
Condition of the receiver (): The probability that a signal is detected at the receiver is indepen-
dent of the basis choice.
The proof with complementarity is applied to the BB84 protocol [14], round-robin DPS proto-
col [41] and so on.
Security proof with entropic uncertainty relation
The security proof with entropic uncertainty relation was proposed by Tomamichel et al: in
2012 [13]. Dierently from the previous two proofs considering phase error correction, the secu-
rity proof is denoted in terms of smooth min-entropy. Smooth min-entropy quantifies the amount
of uniform randomness that can be extracted from the quantum system of finite size and it directly
bounds the eavesdropped information in finite-key regime. The security proof is composed of the
uncertainty relation of smooth entropies [91] and quantum leftover hashing lemma [92], which
were also shown by Tomamichel et al:. The assumption for source and receiver is identical to
that of the proof with complementarity. The proof is applied to the BB84 protocol [13, 15], MDI
protocol [63, 16] and continuous-variable QKD [75].
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3.2 Tools of security proof
Here three theoretical tools are introduced to use the security proof with complementarity in
Sec. 3.3. The replacement of state preparation is the idea to assume an auxiliary qubit at Alice’s
site, which is commonly used for the three proofs in the previous section. Phase error and virtual
protocol are used in the proof with EDP and that with complementarity although their meanings
are slightly dierent between the two proofs.
3.2.1 Replacement of state preparation
Most protocols of QKD including the BB84 protocol belong to “prepare-and-measure (PM)”
type, in which Alice prepares a quantum state based on a selecting bit and sends to Bob, and
he makes measurement on the state to obtain a key bit. Another type of QKD protocol is called
entanglement-based protocol, in which an entanglement state is distributed to Alice and Bob and
they make measurement to share key bits. While the PM-type protocol is easier to implement in
general, it is convenient for the security proof to convert the PM-type protocol to entanglement-
based protocol where Alice generates an entanglement state and sends a part of it while keeping
the other part. Suppose that in the PM-type protocol, Alice selects a bit 0,1 with probability 1/2
and that she prepares ˆZ;0 and ˆZ;1 on the system S based on her selecting bit 0 and 1, respectively.
The state preparation of ˆZ;0 and ˆZ;1 is replaced by the procedure that Alice prepares ˆAS on the
system AS satisfying
Tr (jaZi haZ jA ˆAS ) = 12 ˆZ;a (a 2 f0; 1g); (3.1)
followed by making measurement on the system A with Z basis fj0ZiA ; j1ZiAg. The state on the
system AS E after Eve’s interruption does not depend on the timing of Alice’s measurement on the
system A because the system A is protected from Eve. With ES E representing Eve’s interaction
between the accessible system S and her system E, this property is roughly sketched by
jaZi haZ jA ES E(ˆAS 
 ˆE) jaZi haZ jA (3.2)
= ES E (TrA (jaZi haZ jA (ˆAS 
 ˆE))) (3.3)
= ES E
 
1
2
ˆZ;a 
 ˆE
!
: (3.4)
The form of Eq. (3.2) represents the state (not normalized) on the system AS E where the measure-
ment on the system A is conducted after Eve’s intervention and the form of Eq. (3.4) represents
the state where the measurement is conducted before her intervention. Although the above argu-
ment is limited to a single round of the protocol, it can be extended to total rounds where ES E
includes Eve’s coherent interaction among dierent rounds.
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3.2.2 Phase error
Phase error is a convenient concept to express the amount of eavesdropped information, which
is adopted in the security proof with EDP and complementarity. In contrast to the fact that an
observed error in the protocol is called as “bit error”, a phase error is defined through the virtual
process which is not conducted in the protocol. Let ˆintAS be a state which is changed from ˆAS
in Eq. (3.1) after Eve’s intervention on the system S . A phase error is defined as a virtual error
occurring when Alice and Bob make X-basis measurement on ˆintAS on a Z-labeled round. Here,
in the proof with complementarity, Alice’s measurement is an ideal X-basis fj0XiA ; j1XiAg mea-
surement on the system A while Bob’s X-basis measurement on the system S is not limited if
the detection probability is identical to that of Z-basis measurement (In BB84, we use the actual
X-basis measurement which is conducted in the protocol). In the proof with EDP, both Alice
and Bob’s measurements are ideal X-basis measurements, which implies that a phase error is ob-
tained by the projective measurement to obtain the result of j01XiAS or j10XiAS . This corresponds
to another definition of phase error in the proof with EDP, in which a phase error occurs by Bell-
basis measurement to obtain the result j iAS or j	 iAS (Notations of Bell states are shown in
Sec. 2.1.2). This is because we have the relation
j i h jAB + j	 i h	 jAB = j01Xi h01X jAB + j10Xi h10X jAB : (3.5)
Intuitively, Eve’s strong interaction to read Z-basis information leads to a large number of phase
errors because of the uncertainty principle. In the proof with EDP and complementarity, the
security is evaluated how good phase errors (also bit errors for EDP) are corrected through the
virtual protocol which is shown in the following.
3.2.3 Virtual protocol
The definition of the virtual protocol is not uniquely determined, but roughly speaking, it is re-
garded as a tool for security proof satisfying the following property: If the virtual protocol is
secure, then the actual protocol is also secure. Although the concept of the virtual protocol ap-
pears in both proofs with EDP and with complementarity, the requirement for the virtual protocol
is dierent from each other. For the proof with complementarity, Alice and Bob do not need to
share final keys in the virtual protocol but the goal is to generate a secure key at Alice’s site. The
only condition for the virtual protocol is given as follows.
Condition for virtual protocol:
For any Eve’s attack in the actual protocol, the final state of Alice and Eve in the virtual protocol
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is identical to that of the actual protocol which is written as Eq. (2.20).
This condition means that if the virtual protocol is s-secret for any attack in the actual protocol,
the actual protocol is also s-secret. In the virtual protocol, we only need to consider the attack
conducted in the actual protocol. Thus, the use of additional public information is allowed in the
virtual protocol while the public information announced in the actual protocol has to be disclosed
in the virtual protocol. For the proof with complementarity, the virtual protocol includes phase
error correction to obtain a number of X-basis eigenstate j0XiA at Alice’s site, followed by making
Z-basis fj0Zi ; j1Zig measurement on the Alice’s system. Since j0XiA is a separable state as well as
causes the outcome 0,1 with even probability by making Z-basis measurement, the final state is
expected to be close to the ideal state Eq. (2.21) if the success probability of phase error correction
is high.
For comparison, let us mention the proof with EDP. In the proof with EDP, the virtual protocol
is the EDP followed by ideal Z-basis fj0Zi ; j1Zig measurement by Alice and Bob. The goal of the
EDP is to generate maximally entangled state j+iAB between Alice and Bob by correcting bit
errors and phase errors simultaneously (with CSS code, for example). This requires the ideal qubit
measurements at Bob’s site (aecting the definition of phase error) and prevents us to decouple
the analysis of phase error correction from the bit error correction. In practical case where Bob
receives multiple photons, the EDP is incorporated to the squash operation [93, 94], in which the
measurement of the multiple photons is replaced by the equivalent single-photon measurement.
Dierently from the proof with complementarity, the final state of the virtual protocol has to be
that of the actual protocol in terms of the whole system of Alice, Bob and Eve.
3.3 Security proof of the BB84 protocol with complementarity
Here, the security of the BB84 protocol is proved based on the proof with complementarity [12].
We assume that Alice’s and Bob’s apparatuses are ideal, namely, Alice sends a single photon
in the states fˆW;a = jaWi haW jS g (W 2 fZ; Xg; a 2 f0; 1g) in Step (2) of the protocol shown
in Sec. 2.2.3 and Bob conducts ideal measurement with unit eciency described by POVM
fj0Wi h0W jS ; j1Wi h1W jS ; ˆ1S   j0Wi h0W jS   j1Wi h1W jS g in Step (3) corresponding to the outcome
f0,1,no-detectiong. In this case, Bob’s measurement satisfies the condition () in Sec. 3.1.
In Sec. 3.3.1, the actual protocol is described with the replacement of state preparation. After
the main theorem denoting the s-secrecy of the actual protocol is given in Sec. 3.3.2, the virtual
protocol satisfying the condition in 3.2.3 is constructed in Sec. 3.3.3. Finally the main theorem
is proved in Sec. 3.3.4. Since the statement about the fidelity extension in the original paper
(Eq. (18) in Ref. [12]) is not correct from the perspective of composable security definition, it is
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replaced by the lemma 1 in Sec. 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Description of the actual protocol
Here we describe the ideal BB84 protocol in Sec. 2.2.3 in the alternative form based on the
replacement idea introduced in Sec. 3.2.1. In the ideal BB84 protocol, ˆAS = j+i h+jAS satisfies
Eq. (3.1) as well as
Tr (jaXi haX jA ˆAS ) = 12 ˆX;a (a 2 f0; 1g): (3.6)
This means that the state preparation for both Z basis and X basis are replaced by preparation
of ˆAS followed by the measurement on the system A with the corresponding basis. Bob’s mea-
surement on the system S is also replaced by a filtering operation to make sure a single pho-
ton is received and transfer its state to a qubit B, followed by the orthogonal measurement of
B on fj0Wi h0W jB ; j1Wi h1W jBg depending on the chosen basis to determine the outcome 0 or 1.
Let us call it a “valid-detection” when the filtering succeeds, namely, when the outcome is not
“no-detection”. The above replacement implies that the basis choices by Alice and Bob can be
postponed after valid-detection/no-detection is declared by Bob.
For simplicity, we assume that there is an error-correction scheme which ensures c-correctness
of the protocol, and denote the total cost for the error correction by EC. We also assume that the
communication for error correction is encrypted by consuming secret key shared in advance,
which allows us to assume that no public information is announced for error correction. Further-
more, Bob corrects his key to agree on Alice’s one while Alice’s key is unchanged. Then we
see that the error correction scheme is no longer necessary for the virtual protocol to fulfill the
condition in Sec. 3.2.3. The actual protocol to prove the security is described as follows.
Actual Protocol.
(1’) Alice prepares j+iAS .
(2’) Alice sends the part of the state (system S ) to Bob over quantum channel.
(3’) Bob receives the signal and confirms whether it causes a valid-detection or not. If there is a
valid-detection, he keeps the qubit B without measurement.
(4’) They repeat (1’) to (3’) by nrep times.
(5’) Bob publicly announces whether each round has resulted in a valid-detection or not. Let ndet
be the number of rounds with valid-detections.
(6’) For the ndet rounds, Alice and Bob choose Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and p˜X,
respectively. They disclose all of their basis choices and discard the rounds where their choice
is not identical. Let the number of Z-labeled and X-labeled rounds be nZ and nX, respectively.
Alice and Bob make X-basis measurement on the system A and B, respectively, on the X-labeled
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rounds to obtain bit strings A;X and B;X.
(7’) They disclose and compare A;X and B;X to determine the number of bit errors kX contained
in the X-labeled rounds. Let ! represents the following three observed numbers:
! := (kX; nX; nZ): (3.7)
Alice and Bob determine the amount of privacy amplification m(!) based on ! and the cost of
error correction EC through public discussion*1). If nZ   m(!)  EC, the protocol aborts. If
it is not, they determine the final key length as l(!) := nZ   m(!). For privacy amplification,
they randomly select l(!) binary vectors V1;V2; :::Vl(!) of size nZ such that each vector is linearly
independent.
(8’) Alice and Bob make Z-basis measurement on the system A and B, respectively, on Z-labeled
rounds to obtain bit strings A;Z and B;Z as sifted keys.
(9’) Through public discussion, Bob corrects his key B;Z to make it coincide with Alice’s key
A;Z and obtains corB;Z (jcorB;Z j = nZ).
(10’) With A;Z and fVkg, final key of size l(!) is calculated by finA;Z = (A;Z V1; A;Z V2; :::::; A;Z 
Vl(!)).
We define 
 as all public information after step (7’), including !, EC and fVkg. Here, ! and 

are not fixed and treated as random variables. Define Tpass as the set of 
 such that the protocol
does not abort. Let
pabort := 1  
X

2Tpass
Pr(
) (3.8)
be the probability that the protocol aborts, and
ˆabortABE := j;i h;jAB 
 ˆfinE (;) (3.9)
be the state under the condition that the protocol aborts. Since Eve can use the information 

freely, we assume that Eve has a state j
i h
j depending on 
 where h
j
0i = 
;
0 with i; j
being Kronecker delta. The state on the system ABE after step (7’) is described as
ˆABE :=
X

2Tpass
Pr(
)ˆ(
)ABE + pabort ˆabortABE ; (3.10)
where ˆ(
)ABE has a form of
ˆ(
)ABE = ˆ
(
)
ABE0 
 j
i h
j : (3.11)
*1)One of methods to determine the cost for error correction is sampling a small portion of bits on Z-labeled rounds
at random. In this case, Step (7’) contains measurement and announcement of the sampled bits, and the sifted keys
A;Z and B;Z are defined as bit strings on Z rounds in which the sampled bits are removed.
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For later convenience, define the following partial states:
ˆ(
)E := TrAB(ˆ(
)ABE) (3.12)
ˆ(
)AB := TrE(ˆ(
)ABE): (3.13)
We define ˆ(
)AE , ˆ
(
)
BE and ˆabortAE in the same manner. The state ˆABE is changed to ˆfinABE after Step
(10’), which has a form of Eq. (2.14).
3.3.2 Main theorem
Since c-correctness of the protocol is assumed, it is sucient to prove that the protocol is s-
secret to certify the sec (= c + s) -security (see Sec. 2.3). Let ˆfinAE and ˆidealAE be the final state
and the ideal state of the protocol written as in Eq. (2.20) and Eq. (2.21), respectively. The main
theorem is given as follows.
Theorem:
Suppose that the following inequality holds regardless of Eve’s strategy:
Pr(kph > f (!))  PE; (3.14)
where kph is the number of phase errors. If the amount of privacy amplification is set to m(!) =l
nZh( f (!)nZ ) + log2 1PA
m
; then we have
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE   p2pPE + PA; (3.15)
where d e represents ceiling function.
The theorem ensures (p2pPE + PA)-secrecy of the protocol. Although a function f (!) satisfy-
ing Eq. (3.14) is not obvious here, it is obtained by classical sampling theory, which is treated in
Chapter 6.
3.3.3 Construction of virtual protocol
Here we show an example of the virtual protocol satisfying the condition in Sec. 3.2.3. A virtual
protocol is not uniquely determined and convenient one can be chosen. Define the following
operators on the system A:
ˆZ(C) :=
nZO
i=1
ˆCiZ ;
ˆX(C) :=
nZO
i=1
ˆCiX ; (3.16)
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where ˆZ and ˆX are Pauli operators (bit flip operators on X basis and Z basis, respectively)
and Ci 2 f0; 1g is the i-th element of a vector C of size nZ . We see that calculating A;Z  Vk
after the Z-basis measurement is equivalent to obtain the measurement outcome of the observable
ˆZ(Vk). Let E(!)act be an operation defined on Alice’s system, which is equivalent to Alice’s Z-basis
measurement followed by calculating fA;Z Vkg in step (8’), (9’) and (10’) of the actual protocol.
Operation E(!)act : Alice measures l(!) observables f ˆZ(Vk)g1kl(!) on the system A and register
obtained results as finA;Z .
The operation E(!)act 
 1BE on the system ABE satisfies *2)X

2Tpass
Pr(
) TrB

E(!)act 
 1BE(ˆ(
)ABE)

+ pabort ˆabortAE = ˆ
fin
AE (3.17)X

2Tpass
Pr(
) TrB

E(!)act 
 1BE(j0Xi h0X jA 
 ˆ(
)BE )

+ pabort ˆabortAE = ˆ
ideal
AE ; (3.18)
where j0XiA :=
NnZ
i=1 j0XiA;i is an eigenstate of the X basis.
Next we consider the following virtual operation on Alice’s and Bob’s system which is not
included in the actual protocol.
Operation E(!)
vir : Bob makes measurement on his system with X basis and obtain the outcome
XB 2 f0; 1gnZ . He sends XB to Alice through the public channel. Alice randomly chooses m(!)
binary vectors W1;W2; :::Wm(!) such that Vk  W j = 0 holds for all ( j; k). She measures m(!)
observables f ˆX(W j)g on the system A. Based on the measurement outcomes and the classical
information (!; XB), she determines “error vector” Eest of size nZ and applies X-flip operation
ˆZ(Eest).
The goal of operation E(!)
vir is to obtain the eigenstate on X basis j0XiA in order to use the relation
Eq. (3.18). In practice, there is a failure probability to obtain j0XiA, which is analyzed in the next
section. By simple calculation, we see that the condition Vk W j = 0 leads to
h
ˆZ(Vk); ˆX(W j)
i
=
0, which means that the measurement of ˆZ(Vk) and ˆX(W j) commutes. In addition, the X-flip
operation ˆZ(Eest) does not change the measurement outcomes on Z basis and commutes with
the measurement of ˆZ(Vk). Thus, the final state on the system AE is not changed even if the
*2)Assuming the identity map on Eve’s system in Eq. (3.17) and Eq. (3.18) does not lose generality of the security
proof since all public information is disclosed by Step (7’) and any Eve’s operation after Step (7’) only reduces the
trace distance in Eq. (3.28).
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operation E(!)
vir is conducted before the actual operation:
TrB

E(!)act 
 1BE

E(!)
vir 
 1E(ˆ(
)ABE)

= TrB

E(!)act 
 1BE(ˆ(
)ABE)

: (3.19)
For later convenience, let us define E(!;XB)A;vir as Alice’s operation in E(!)vir conditioned on XB. With
this notation, the state on the system AB after the operation E(!)
vir is described as
E(!)
vir (ˆ(
)AB ) =
X
XB
E(!;XB)A;vir

B h(XB)X j ˆ(
)AB j(XB)XiB


 j(XB)Xi h(XB)X jB (3.20)
=
X
XB
Pr(XB) E(!;XB)A;vir

ˆ(
;XB)A


 j(XB)Xi h(XB)X jB ; (3.21)
where
Pr(XB) = TrA

B h(XB)X j ˆ(
)AB j(XB)XiB

; ˆ(
;XB)A :=
B h(XB)X j ˆ(
)AB j(XB)XiB
Pr(XB) : (3.22)
Since E(!;XB)A;vir is only composed of the measurement of f ˆX(W j)g and the flip operation on X basis,
A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir (ˆ(
;XB)A ) j0XiA = A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir (DX(ˆ(
;XB)A )) j0XiA (3.23)
holds where DX is an operation which preserves diagonal element on X basis but changes non-
diagonal element to 0. We see that applying E(!;XB)A;vir on DX(ˆ(
;XB)A ) is identical to a classical parity
check and bit flip on a nZ bit sequence, i.e. classical error correction. This implies that the fidelity
in Eq. (3.23) is given by the success probability of classical error correction which corresponds
to the operation E(!;XB)A;vir .
By using E(!)act and E(!)vir , we define the virtual protocol as follows.
Virtual protocol. Alice and Bob conduct steps (10)  (70) of the actual protocol to obtain ˆ(
)AB .
They operate E(!)
vir on the system AB followed by operating E(!)act .
From Eq. (3.17) and the Eq. (3.19), the final state on the system AE of the virtual protocol is
given by X

2Tpass
Pr(
) TrB

E(!)act 
 1BE(E(!)vir 
 1E(ˆ(
)ABE))

+ pabort ˆabortAE (3.24)
=
X

2Tpass
Pr(
) TrB

E(!)act 
 1BE(ˆ(
)ABE)

+ pabort ˆabortAE (3.25)
= ˆfinAE; (3.26)
which satisfies the condition for the virtual protocol in Sec. 3.2.3.
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3.3.4 Proof of the main theorem
Here we prove the main theorem in Sec. 3.3.2. Since the state on the system E is orthogonal for
dierent 
 (see Eq. (3.11)), Eq. (3.18) and Eq. (3.26) lead to
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE  (3.27)
=
1
2
X

2Tpass
Pr(
)
 TrB E(!)act 
 1BE E(!)vir 
 1E(ˆ(
)ABE)   j0Xi h0X jA 
 ˆ(
)BE   (3.28)
 1
2
X

2Tpass
Pr(
)
 TrB E(!)vir 
 1E(ˆ(
)ABE)   j0Xi h0X jA 
 ˆ(
)E  (3.29)

X

2Tpass
Pr(
)
q
1   F

TrB

E(!)
vir 
 1E(ˆ(
)ABE)

; j0Xi h0X jA 
 ˆ(
)E

; (3.30)
where Eq. (3.29) is obtained by monotonicity of trace distance Eq. (2.5), and Eq. (3.30) is obtained
by the relation between trace distance and fidelity Eq. (2.9). The reason that the trace distance
is replaced by the fidelity is because we want to use the following lemma which connects the
fidelity of the system AE with system A.
lemma1:
For any state ˆAE on the system AE and any pure state j˜0i h˜0jA on the system A ,
F(ˆAE; j˜0i h˜0jA 
 ˆE) 

F(ˆA; j˜0i h˜0jA)
2 (3.31)
holds where ˆE := TrA(ˆAE) and ˆA := TrE(ˆAE).
The proof is shown in Appendix A. Since
TrA

TrB

E(!)
vir 
 1E(ˆ(
)ABE)

= TrAB(ˆ(
)ABE) = ˆ(
)E (3.32)
holds, lemma1 lead to
F

TrB

E(!)
vir 
 1E(ˆ(
)ABE)

; j0Xi h0X jA 
 ˆ(
)E



F

TrB

E(!)
vir (ˆ(
)AB )

; j0Xi h0X jA
2
: (3.33)
Eq. (3.30) is replaced by
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE  (3.34)

X

2Tpass
Pr(
)
r
1  

F

TrB

E(!)
vir (ˆ(
)AB )

; j0Xi h0X jA
2
: (3.35)
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Thus, we only need to evaluate the fidelity of the two states in the system A. From Eq. (3.21), we
have
F

TrB

E(!)
vir (ˆ(
)AB )

; j0Xi h0X jA

=
X
XB
Pr(XB)A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir

ˆ(
;XB)A

j0XiA : (3.36)
Next we evaluate each term of the right-hand side of Eq. (3.36). For convenience, define
ˆP f (!);XB as a projector on the subspace which can be corrected to j0Xi h0X jA (except small proba-
bility) through E(!;XB)A;vir based on a given phase-error bound f (!) and Bob’s measurement outcomes
XB. In mathematical expression,
ˆP f (!);XB :=
X
A2S f (!);XB
jAXi hAX jA (3.37)
S f (!);XB := fA 2 f0; 1gnZ j wt(A + XB)  f (!)g; (3.38)
where wt(X) is weight of a vector X. Recalling that a phase error is defined as a bit error where
Alice and Bob make virtual X-basis measurement on Z-labeled incidents, the state jA0Xi hA0X jA
satisfying wt(A0 + XB) = k causes k phase errors if it is measured on X basis. Thus, the projector
ˆP f (!);XB is interpreted as a projector onto a subspace which causes no more than f (!) phase errors.
Thus, the probability that the number of phase errors kph is more than f (!) is written with the
random variables kph, !, 
 and XB as follows:
Pr(kph > f (!)) =
X


X
XB
Pr(
)Pr(XB) Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!);XB)ˆ(
;XB)A

; (3.39)
where the summation is over all 
 regardless of abort or pass of the protocol. With ˆP f (!);XB , we
evaluate how closely ˆ(
;XB)A is corrected to j0Xi h0X jA through E(!;XB)A;vir :
A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir (ˆ(
;XB)A ) j0XiA (3.40)
= A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir

DX(ˆ(
;XB)A )

j0XiA (3.41)
= A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir

DX

( ˆP f (!);XB + ˆ1   ˆP f (!);XB)ˆ(
;XB)A ( ˆP f (!);XB + ˆ1   ˆP f (!);XB)

j0XiA (3.42)
= A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir

DX( ˆP f (!);XBˆ(
;XB)A ˆP f (!);XB)

j0XiA
+ A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir

DX

( ˆ1   ˆP f (!);XB)ˆ(
;XB)A ( ˆ1   ˆP f (!);XB)

j0XiA (3.43)
 Tr( ˆP f (!);XBˆ(
;XB)A )A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir

DX

ˆ
(
;XB; f (!))
A

j0XiA ; (3.44)
where we used Eq. (3.23) in Eq. (3.41) and used complete positivity of E(!;XB)A;vir (see Eq. (2.1)) in
Eq. (3.44). We defined ˆ(
;XB; f (!))A in Eq. (3.44) as a normalized state
ˆ
(
;XB; f (!))
A :=
ˆP f (!);XBˆ
(
;XB)
A
ˆP f (!);XB
Tr( ˆP f (!);XBˆ(
;XB)A )
: (3.45)
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From what was mentioned after Eq. (3.23) about the operation E(!;XB)A;vir ,
A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir

DX

ˆ
(
;XB; f (!))
A

j0XiA (3.46)
in Eq. (3.44) is regarded as the success probability of classical error correction. Furthermore, this
time the error correction is conducted for the confined set S f (!);XB . There the syndrome of a vector
A 2 S f (!);XB is obtained by calculating (A W1; A W2; ::::; A Wm(!)) followed by applying bit flip
to make A coincide (0; 0; 0::::; 0). From the classical code theory, we introduce the following two
lemmas.
lemma 2 (classical):
With k; n 2 N satisfying k=n  1=2,
nE 2 f0; 1gn j wt(E)  ko  2nh(k=n) holds.
The lemma means that the number of the vector patterns is bounded if its weight has an upper
bound. The proof is equivalent to show nCk  2nh(k=n), which can be seen in Example 12:1:3 in
Ref. [78], for instance.
lemma 3 (classical):
Suppose m random binary vectors (M1; M2; :::; Mm) of size n. For all E 2 S  f0; 1gn, the
probability that there is E0 2 S such that Mi  E = Mi  E0 (for any i) and E , E0 is no more than
2 mjS j.
The similar argument to lemma 3 can be seen in the hashing method of EDP [83]. Let e(E;S )cor be
the probability to fail the error correction for a given set S and vector E 2 S , which equals to the
failure probability to uniquely identify the original vector E in the confined set S based on the
obtained syndrome fMi  Eg. The lemma 3 indicates e(E;S )cor  2 mjS j.
From lemma 2, we havenA + XB 2 f0; 1gnZ j wt(A + XB)  f (!)o  2nZh( f (!)=nZ ): (3.47)
Since XB is known in the virtual protocol,nA 2 f0; 1gnZ j wt(A + XB)  f (!)o  2nZh( f (!)=nZ ); (3.48)
which leads to
jS f (!);XB j  2nZh( f (!)=nZ ) (3.49)
from Eq. (3.38). From lemma 3, we have
e
(A;S f (!);XB )
cor  2 m(!)jS f (!);XB j: (3.50)
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for arbitrary A 2 S f (!);XB . Combining Eq. (3.49) with Eq. (3.50),
e
(A;S f (!);XB )
cor  2nZh( f (!)=nZ ) m(!) (3.51)
holds. Therefore, if we set
m(!) =
&
nZh
 f (!)
nZ
!
+ log2
1
PA
'
; (3.52)
the failure probability of error correction in S f (!);XB is not larger than PA, which leads to
A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir

DX

ˆ
(
;XB; f (!))
A

j0XiA  1   PA: (3.53)
Now we obtained all elements to bound Eq. (3.35). From Eq. (3.44) and Eq. (3.53), we have
A h0X j E(!;XB)A;vir (ˆ(
;XB)A ) j0XiA  (1   PA)Tr( ˆP f (!);XBˆ(
;XB)A ) (3.54)
for all XB. Combining this with Eq. (3.36),
F

TrB

E(!)
vir (ˆ(
)AB )

; j0Xi h0X jA

 (1   PA)
0BBBBBB@X
XB
Pr(XB)Tr( ˆP f (!);XBˆ(
;XB)A )
1CCCCCCA ; (3.55)
which leads to
1  

F

TrB

E(!)
vir (ˆ(
)AB )

; j0Xi h0X jA
2 (3.56)
 2(1   F

TrB

E(!)
vir (ˆ(
)AB )

; j0Xi h0X jA

) (3.57)
 2(1   (1   PA)
0BBBBBB@X
XB
Pr(XB)Tr( ˆP f (!);XBˆ(
;XB)A )
1CCCCCCA) (3.58)
= 2(1   (1   PA)
0BBBBBB@X
XB
Pr(XB)

1   Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!);XB)ˆ(
;XB)A
1CCCCCCA) (3.59)
= 2(1   (1   PA)
0BBBBBB@1  X
XB
Pr(XB)Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!);XB)ˆ(
;XB)A
1CCCCCCA) (3.60)
 2PA + 2
X
XB
Pr(XB)Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!);XB)ˆ(
;XB)A

: (3.61)
By combining this with Eq. (3.35), we have
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE  (3.62)

X

2Tpass
Pr(
)
s
2PA + 2
X
XB
Pr(XB) Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!);XB)ˆ(
;XB)A

(3.63)

s
2PA + 2
X

2Tpass
X
XB
Pr(
) Pr(XB) Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!);XB)ˆ(
;XB)A

(3.64)
 p2
q
PA + Pr(kph > f (!)); (3.65)
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where we used the concavity of square root function in Eq. (3.64) and used Eq. (3.39) in Eq. (3.65).
From the assumption of the main theorem Pr(kph  f (!))  PE, we have
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE   p2pPA + PE: (3.66)
3.3.5 Discussion
Although the proof shown in the previous section basically followed the one in Ref. [12], lemma 1
did not appear there. In Ref. [12], the similar argument is used to connect two fidelities where
Eve’s state of the ideal state (E in Eq. (4) in Ref. [12]) is not related to the actual protocol and
chosen freely to satisfy Eq. (18) in Ref. [12]. However, this might not satisfy the security criteria
with composability. Suppose that a protocol P is conducted before the QKD protocol Q (to prove
the security) where Q uses secret keys generated by P. In general, Eve’s state E defined on Q
depends on the information obtained in P, which includes Alice and Bob’s set up for P. Thus,
E should not be chosen freely for ideal states and in this case we are not sure that composable
security is satisfied.
In the proof discussed in the previous section, we assumed the protocol where the final-key
length l(!) is not fixed and the condition for aborting the protocol is given by nZ   m(!)  EC.
On the other hand, the proof is also applicable to the protocols with fixed final-key length, which
is seen in Ref. [13], for example. The fixed-key-length protocol, in which the data size nZ and
nX have threshold nZ and nX, is finished whenever nZ  nZ and nX  nX are satisfied. (To realize
it, a basis choice is assumed to be disclosed at each round.) If nZ > nZ or nX > nX, the surplus
nZ   nZ bits or nX   nX bits are randomly discarded. For the number of bit errors k0X contained in
the nX rounds, the protocol also has a threshold kX, namely, the protocol aborts when k0X > kX.
With these thresholds, f (!) is fixed to be the predetermined value f (!) where ! = (kX; nZ ; nX),
and the amount of privacy amplification is also fixed to m(!) = nZh( f (!)=nZ) + log2(1=PA) if
the protocol does not abort. The theorem in the previous section is still valid in this case as long
as Eq. (3.14) is satisfied for f (!).

Chapter 4
QKD with weak coherent pulses
After the security of the ideal BB84 protocol was proved by Mayers [5] and Shor and Preskill [6],
the focus on the security proof was shifted to the practical case using conventional lasers and
threshold detectors which can only tell single photon or more from vacuum. In particular, the
security proof for QKD using weak coherent pulses (WCP) was a crucial issue not only because a
single-photon source with high repetition rate is technically hard to realize, but also because there
is a strong attack using multiple photons called photon number splitting (PNS) attack. Although
the proof for the BB84 protocol with WCP (WCP-BB84) was given by Inamori et al: in 2001 [9],
it uses the modified proof of Mayers [5] and inherits its complexity. On the other hand, Gottes-
man, Lo, Lu¨tkenhaus and Preskill (GLLP) proposed a simple idea which can be incorporated to
various proof techniques for ideal QKD assuming single-photon emission. They proposed the
concept of “tagging”, in which a round with multiple-photon emission is classified as “tagged”
(insecure) while a round with single-photon emission is classified as “untagged” (secure). If the
tagging idea is combined with the security proof based on complementarity [12] or entropic un-
certainty relation [13], uncharacterized receiver can be assumed as long as the condition () in
Sec. 3.1 is satisfied. The security of QKD protocols with general source flaws (e.g. modulation of
polarization, optical phase and intensity) were also proved in sophisticated ways [95, 17, 96, 97],
but in this thesis we focus on the practical eect of multiple-photon emission.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Sec. 4.1, PNS attack is introduced. Sec 4.2 briefly
shows the GLLP’s tagging idea and derive the key length of WCP-BB84 protocol in terms of
phase errors on untagged rounds. In Sec. 4.3, we focus on practical aspects of the WCP-BB84
protocol by introducing the phase-encoding BB84 (PE-BB84) protocol which is suitable for im-
plementation with optical fibers, and also by introducing the decoy-state method, a countermea-
sure against PNS attacks. In Sec. 4.4, the DPS protocol is shown as a simple protocol with
robustness against PNS attacks.
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4.1 Photon number splitting attack
Photon number splitting (PNS) attack is an Eve’s strong strategy where she exploits full informa-
tion of the signal with multiple-photon emission without causing any disturbance. It was pointed
out by Brassard et al: in 2000 [8]. The details of PNS attack are as follows. Suppose the protocol
where bit information is encoded on polarization of light. After receiving the signal emitted from
the source, Eve projects the signal state onto the subspaces characterized by the total photon num-
ber m. This projective measurement is regarded as quantum-non-demolition (QND) measurement
which does not disturb the signal’s polarization. Next she performs splitting operation preserving
polarization where n  1 photons are kept at her system and only one photon is sent to Bob. After
Eve learns the basis choices of Alice and Bob which is disclosed on the classical channel, she
makes measurement on the preserved photons with the corresponding basis. Since the n   1 ex-
tracted photons have the same polarization as the other single photon which is sent to Bob, signal
information with multiple-photon emissions is totally leaked without any disturbance.
For later convenience, let us denote PNS attack in a mathematical way. We define the fol-
lowing parameters. Let Q represents the detection rate of the protocol (=rounds with detections
/ total rounds) and eX represents the bit-error rate on the X-labeled rounds. Let p(m) be the prob-
ability that the state emitted from the source was projected to m-photon subspace by Eve. Let
Ym represents the probability that the signal projected to m-photon subspace causes detection at
Bob’s site, and eX;m represents the error rate on the X-labeled rounds where the signal is projected
to m-photon subspace. If Eve conducts PNS attack in the above manner, we have the following
equations in the asymptotic limit:
Q =
X
m0
p(m)Ym (4.1)
QeX =
X
m0
p(m)Ym eX;m: (4.2)
The parameters Q and eX are observed values in the protocol, and the parameter p(m) is determined
by the property of the source and known through its calibration. Here we consider Eve’s strategy
to change Ym and eX;m under the fixed values of Q, eX and p(m). Eve’s optimal attack is to make
multi-photon signals detected perfectly, and use allowed errors to eavesdrop single-photon signal
as much as possible. If we assume that Eve has no technical limit and she can use lossless and
noiseless channel, the optimal choice is
Ym = 1; eX;m = 0 for m  2; (4.3)
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which leads to
p(0)Y0 + p(1)Y1 = Q  
X
m2
p(m) (4.4)
p(0)Y0 eX;0 + p(1)Y1 eX;1 = eX: (4.5)
Eq. (4.4) implies that if Q  Pm2 p(m), no secure key can be extracted.
4.2 GLLP’s tagging idea
The tagging idea (called “tagged signal” in the original paper [10]) is a quite useful method to
prove the security of QKD using WCP, which was proposed by Gottesman, Lo, Lu¨tkenhaus and
Preskill (GLLP). In their idea, a round with multiple-photon emission is regarded as tagged and
that with single-photon emission is regarded as untagged. The tagged rounds are considered to
be totally insecure (considering PNS attack) and they show that the security of the WCP protocol
only depends on the security of the untagged rounds even if Alice and Bob do not know which
rounds are tagged in the actual protocol. This allows various security proofs for the ideal single-
photon protocols to be applied to the practical QKD protocols with WCP. By using this idea,
GLLP showed the asymptotic key rate of the WCP-BB84 protocol, which is slightly better than
that obtained in the previous work of Inamori et al: [9]. In this section, first we introduce the
phase-randomizing operation, which allows us to use the tagging idea. Next the key length of
the WCP-BB84 protocol is derived in terms of phase errors on untagged rounds by applying the
proof in Sec. 3.3. Finally, we evaluate the eect of PNS attacks on the WCP-BB84 protocol by
using the asymptotic key rate.
4.2.1 Phase-randomizing operation
In this subsection, we introduce a sucient condition for the light source to use the tagging idea
and show that it is satisfied by the randomizing operation on the optical phase. Suppose that at
each round of the protocol, Alice prepares an i.i.d state ˆW;a on the system S depending on her
basis choice W (2 fZ; Xg for BB84 protocol) and a selected bit a 2 0; 1. The condition to use the
tagging idea is that ˆW;a is expressed as
ˆW;a = (1   rtag)ˆW;a;unt  rtagˆW;a;tag; (4.6)
which indicates that each round is in principle classified to tagged or untagged. In the following,
we show that this condition is satisfied if the optical phase of each signal is randomized, and if
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the probability that the state before phase randomization ˆW;a has two or more photons is given
by X
m2
Tr( ˆNmˆW;a) = rtag; (4.7)
where we defined ˆNm as the projector onto the subspace with m photons. Suppose that the phase-
shift operator ˆJ() := exp(iPm m ˆNm) is acting on ˆW;a. By defining phase-randomizing operation
as EPR, we have
ˆW;a = EPR(ˆW;a) (4.8)
=
1
2
Z 2
0
ˆJ() ˆW;a ˆJ()yd (4.9)
=
1
2
X
m;m0
Z 2
0
ei(m m
0)
ˆNmˆW;a ˆNm0d (4.10)
=
X
m
ˆNmˆW;a ˆNm: (4.11)
Thus, any optical state is regarded as a classical mixture of photon-number state by randomizing
its optical phase. By reformulating Eq. (4.11),
ˆW;a =
X
m=0;1
(1   rtag)
ˆNmˆW;a ˆNm
1   rtag +
X
m2
rtag
ˆNmˆW;a ˆNm
rtag
(4.12)
holds. Eq. (4.6) is satisfied by taking
ˆW;a;unt =
X
m=0;1
ˆNmˆW;a ˆNm
1   rtag
ˆW;a;tag =
X
m2
ˆNmˆW;a ˆNm
rtag
: (4.13)
It is instructive to learn the negative eect on WCP protocols caused by imperfection of phase
randomization because most of QKD protocols these days adopt phase-randomizing operation to
use the tagging idea for their security proofs [98, 90]. At least for the WCP-BB84 protocol, the
achievable key rate of the protocol without phase randomization is shown to be lower than that
with phase randomization [99], which implies that there is an Eve’s attack to use the coherence
between dierent photon numbers. In practice, randomizing the optical phase in continuous range
[0; 2) as in Eq. (4.9) can be dicult if the resource of random numbers is limited. Recently
Cao et al: [100] have shown the security of QKD with discrete-phase randomization where the
optical phase is randomly chosen from f2=n j 1  n  ng with finite n. Although many QKD
demonstrations realize the random phases by switching on and o a laser repeatedly under the
assumption that the optical phase is randomized once the laser is switched o, it is controversial
whether the phase is truly independent of that of the previous pulse or not [101].
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4.2.2 Security analysis of WCP-BB84 with tagging idea
Here we derive the secure key length of the WCP-BB84 protocol in terms of phase errors by
combining the tagging idea with the complementarity proof introduced in Sec. 3.3. If the bound
of phase errors on untagged rounds is known (derived in Sec. 6), this subsection gives a complete
security proof for the WCP-BB84 protocol. Similarly to the ideal qubit-based protocol, the WCP-
BB84 protocol also follows the procedures described in Sec. 2.2.3, but the latter assumes more
general light sources and measurement apparatuses.
For Alice’s state preparation, we assume that the state prepared by Alice has a form of
Eq. (4.6) and that there is a basis-independent state ˆunt on the system AS satisfying
trA

(jaWi haW jA 
 ˆ1S )ˆunt

=
1
2
ˆW;a;unt; (4.14)
which corresponds to Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.6) in the ideal BB84 protocol. Those assumptions
allow Alice’s basis choice to be postponed after Eve’s intervention as far as untagged rounds are
concerned. Eqs. (4.6) and (4.14) are realized, for example, if Alice uses a laser emitting an ideally
polarized coherent state
jW;aiS :=
X
m
e 
jj2
2
mp
m!
jmW;aiS ; (4.15)
where  is a complex number and jmW;aiS is a photon-number state on the system S with a basis
W and a bit a, and if its optical phase is randomized. From Eq. (4.11), the state after phase-
randomizing operation is
EPR(jW;ai hW;ajS ) =
X
m
e 
m
m!
jmW;ai hmW;ajS ; (4.16)
where we defined a parameter  := jj2 as mean photon number of the coherent light. From
Eq. (4.13), ˆW;a;unt and ˆW;a;tag in Eq. (4.6) are written as
(1   rtag)ˆW;a;unt = e  j0W;ai h0W;aj + e  j1W;ai h1W;aj (4.17)
rtagˆW;a;tag = e
 
1X
m=2
m
m!
jmW;ai hmW;aj (4.18)
with
rtag = 1   e    e : (4.19)
For Bob’s measurement apparatus, we impose either of the following two assumptions.
(i) The probability of detecting a signal at Bob’s receiver is independent of his basis choice.
(ii) The measurement of an input signal on the system S is replaced by an ideal single-photon
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measurement on the system B preceding by a squashing operation [93, 94].
The condition (ii), which is stronger than the condition (i), validates the use of the security proof
with entanglement distillation. The proof with complementarity works under the weaker condi-
tion (i), because it essentially validates the argument given in Sec. 3.3.1. Under the condition
(i), Bob’s measurement on the system S can be replaced by a filtering operation to make sure
a valid-detection and to transfer its state to a system B (not necessarily a qubit), followed by a
measurement on B depending on the chosen basis to determine the outcome 0 or 1. Hence, as in
Sec. 3.3.1, Bob’s choice of basis can be postponed until he declares valid-detection/no-detection.
For the WCP-BB84 protocol, both conditions are satisfied if we assume the following model for
Bob’s apparatus: Bob actively chooses the basis, and uses two threshold detectors corresponding
to the measurement result “0” and “1” after a polarization beam splitter. He assigns random bit if
both detectors report their detections. In addition, the ineciency and dark countings of the de-
tectors are allowed as long as they are equivalently represented by an absorber and a stray photon
source placed in front of Bob’s apparatus.
For the WCP-BB84 protocol, the preparation of the state Eq. (4.6) on basis W is replaced by
that of basis-dependent state on the system AS
ˆW := (1   rtag)ˆunt  rtagˆW;tag; (4.20)
followed by the W-basis measurement on the system A, in which ˆW;tag is a basis-dependent state
satisfying
trA

(jaWi haW jA 
 ˆ1S )ˆW;tag

=
1
2
ˆW;a;tag: (4.21)
This implies that Alice’s state preparation is described as follows. At each round, Alice deter-
mines whether it is tagged or not with probabilities rtag and 1   rtag. If the round is tagged, she
selects a basis and prepares ˆW;tag based on her basis choice, and if not, she prepares the basis-
independent state ˆunt without selecting a basis.
Similarly to the protocol in Sec. 3.3.1, we assume that c-correctness of the protocol is ensured
by an error-correction method with encryption consuming EC pre-obtained secret keys. The
description of the protocol with the replacement of state preparation (which corresponds to the
actual protocol in Sec. 3.3.1) is given as follows.
(1’) Alice determines whether a round is tagged or untagged with probabilities rtag and 1   rtag.
For a tagged round, she selects Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and p˜X, respectively, and
prepares ˆW;tag based on her basis choice. For an untagged round, she prepares ˆunt without se-
lecting a basis.
(2’) Alice sends the part of the state (system S ) to Bob over quantum channel.
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(3’) Bob receives the signal and confirms whether it causes a valid-detection or not. If there is a
valid-detection, he keeps system B without measurement.
(4’) They repeat (1’) to (3’) by nrep times.
(5’) Bob publicly announces whether each round has resulted in a valid-detection or not. Let ndet
be the number of rounds with valid-detections. Let ntot;unt be the number of untagged rounds with
valid-detections.
(6’) For the ntot;unt rounds, Alice chooses Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and p˜X, respec-
tively. For the ndet rounds, Bob chooses Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and p˜X, respectively.
They disclose all of their basis choice and discard the rounds where their choice is not identical.
Let the number of Z-labeled and X-labeled rounds be nZ and nX, respectively. They make X-basis
measurement on the X-labeled rounds to obtain bit strings A;X and B;X. Alice publicly announces
which rounds are untagged.
(7’) They disclose and compare A;X and B;X to determine the number of bit errors kX contained
in the X-labeled rounds. Let ! represents the following three observed numbers:
! := (kX; nX; nZ): (4.22)
Alice and Bob determine the amount of privacy amplification m(!) based on ! and the cost of
error correction EC through public discussion. If nZ m(!)  EC, the protocol aborts. If it is not,
they determine the final key length as l(!) := nZ m(!). For privacy amplification, they randomly
select l(!) binary vectors V1;V2; :::Vl(!) of size nZ such that each vector is linearly independent.
(8’) Alice and Bob make Z-basis measurement on system A and B, respectively, on Z-labeled
rounds to obtain bit strings A;Z and B;Z as sifted keys.
(9’) Through public discussion, Bob corrects his keys B;Z to make it coincide with Alice’s key
A;Z and obtains corB;Z (jcorB;Z j = nZ).
(10’) With A;Z and fVkg, final key of size l(!) is calculated by finA;Z = (A;Z V1; A;Z V2; :::::; A;Z 
Vl(!)).
The number of untagged rounds ntot;unt defined in Step (5’) is not an observed parameter in
practice, but only an “observable-in-principle” parameter. Similarly to this parameter, let nZ;unt
and nZ;tag (:= nZ   nZ;unt) be the number of Z-labeled untagged rounds and tagged rounds, respec-
tively, which are in principle observed in Step (6’). We also define
!˜ = (kX; nX; nZ; nZ;unt): (4.23)
Let nX;unt and nX;tag (:= nX nX;unt) be the number of X-labeled untagged rounds and tagged rounds,
respectively. Then nZ;unt + nX;unt = ntot;unt is satisfied. We also define kX;unt and kX;tag as the number
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of bit errors on X-labeled untagged rounds and tagged rounds, respectively, which are in principle
determined in Step (7’).
Based on those parameters, the theorem similar to the one in Sec. 3.3.2 is given as follows.
Theorem:
Suppose that the following inequality holds regardless of Eve’s strategy:
Pr(kph;unt > f (!˜))  PE (4.24)
Pr(nZ;unt < nZ;unt)  Z;unt; (4.25)
where kph;unt is the number of phase errors on untagged rounds. If the final key length l(!) satisfies
l(!)  min
nZ;untnZ;unt
(
nZ;unt(1   h
 f (!˜)
nZ;unt
!
)
)
  log2 2
PA
; (4.26)
the protocol is s-secret with
s =
p
2
p
PE + PA + Z;unt: (4.27)
Although the bounds f (!˜) and nZ;unt are not obvious here, they are derived in Chapter 6.
The proof of the theorem is quite similar to that in Sec. 3.3.4 but with several modifications.
We assume that the observable-in-principle parameters are also disclosed to Eve in the previous
protocol. Let ˜
 be all disclosed information including !˜. Eq. (3.29) is replaced by
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE  (4.28)
 1
2
X
˜
2 ˜Tpass
Pr( ˜
)
 TrB E(!˜)vir 
 1E(ˆ( ˜
)ABE)   j0Xi h0X jA 
 ˆ( ˜
)E ; (4.29)
where ˜Tpass is a set of ˜
 such that the protocol does not abort. For simplicity, we define
( ˜
) :=
1
2
 TrB E(!˜)vir 
 1E(ˆ( ˜
)ABE)   j0Xi h0X jA 
 ˆ( ˜
)E : (4.30)
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By reformulating Eq. (4.29),
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE  (4.31)

X
˜
2 ˜Tpass
Pr( ˜
) ( ˜
) (4.32)
=
X
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;untnZ;unt
Pr( ˜
) ( ˜
) +
X
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;unt<nZ;unt
Pr( ˜
) ( ˜
) (4.33)
 Pr(nZ;unt  nZ;unt)
X
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;untnZ;unt
Pr( ˜
)
Pr(nZ;unt  nZ;unt)
( ˜
) + Pr(nZ;unt < nZ;unt) (4.34)
 (1   Z;unt)
X
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;untnZ;unt
p( ˜
) ( ˜
) + Z;unt; (4.35)
where the summations are over ˜
 such that ˜
 2 ˜Tpass and nZ;unt  nZ;unt (or nZ;unt < nZ;unt), and we
defined
p( ˜
) := Pr(
˜
)
Pr(nZ;unt  nZ;unt)
s:t:
X
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;untnZ;unt
p( ˜
) = 1: (4.36)
We used ( ˜
)  1 in Eq. (4.34) and also used Eq. (4.25) in Eq. (4.35). Define  ( ˜
) as
 ( ˜
) :=
q
1   F

TrB

E(!˜)
vir 
 1E(ˆ(
˜
)
ABE)

; j0Xi h0X jA 
 ˆ( ˜
)E

: (4.37)
From the relation between the trace distance and the fidelity Eq. (2.9), we have
( ˜
)   ( ˜
): (4.38)
Eq. (4.35) is replaced by
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE  (4.39)
 (1   Z;unt)
X
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;untnZ;unt
p( ˜
)  ( ˜
) + Z;unt: (4.40)
The evaluation of  ( ˜
) is quite similar to that in Sec. 3.3.4. The dierence is that a set of
vectors S f (!);XB in Eq. (3.38) is replaced by another one. Since Alice and Bob tell tagged rounds
from untagged rounds in principle, we divide a vector A of size nZ into untagged part of size nZ;unt
and tagged part of size nZ;tag:
A = Aunt  Atag: (4.41)
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With this notation, we define
˜S f (!˜);XB := fA 2 f0; 1gnZ j wt(Aunt + XB;unt)  f (!˜)g; (4.42)
where the plus sign represents addition modulo 2 of each element. Eq. (4.42) implies that the
vector patterns for the tagged rounds are totally unknown, which corresponds to the assumption
that the information of tagged rounds is fully leaked to Eve. In order to use lemma 3 and to obtain
Eq. (3.50), we require j ˜S f (!˜);XB j. For untagged rounds,Auntwt(Aunt + XB;unt)  f (!˜)  2nZ;unth( f (!˜)=nZ;unt) (4.43)
is satisfied from lemma 2. Thus, we have ˜S f (!˜);XB   2nZ;unth( f (!˜)=nZ;unt)2nZ;tag : (4.44)
By using the argument from Eq. (3.50) to Eq. (3.53), if the amount of privacy amplification m(!)
satisfies
m(!) = max
nZ;untnZ;unt
&
nZ;unth( f (!˜)=nZ;unt) + nZ;tag + log2
1
PA
'
; (4.45)
we have
A h0X j E(!˜;XB)A;vir

DX

ˆ
( ˜
;XB; f (!˜))
A

j0XiA  1   PA (4.46)
for ˜
 satisfying ˜
 2 ˜Tpass and nZ;unt  nZ;unt. By combining this with Eqs. (3.33), (3.36), (3.44)
and (3.61), we have
 ( ˜
) 
s
2PA + 2
X
XB
Pr(XB)Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!˜);XB)ˆ( ˜
;XB)A

: (4.47)
Recall that the evaluation of  ( ˜
) in Eq. (4.40) is limited to f ˜
g satisfying ˜
 2 ˜Tpass and
nZ;unt  nZ;unt. From Eq. (4.24) and Eq. (4.25), we have
Pr(kph;unt > f (!˜) j nZ;unt  nZ;unt) 
PE
1   Z;unt : (4.48)
Let us write down the left-hand side of Eq. (4.48) explicitly. Define ˆ˜P f (!˜);XB based on ˜S f (!˜);XB:
ˆ
˜P f (!˜);XB :=
X
A2 ˜S f (!˜);XB
jAXi hAX jA : (4.49)
Similarly to Eq. (3.39), we have
Pr(kph;unt > f (!˜)) =
X
˜

X
XB
Pr( ˜
)Pr(XB) Tr

( ˆ1   ˆP f (!˜);XB)ˆ( ˜
;XB)A

; (4.50)
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which leads to
Pr(kph;unt > f (!˜) j nZ;unt  nZ;unt) =
X
˜
:nZ;untnZ;unt
X
XB
p( ˜
)Pr(XB) Tr

( ˆ1   ˆP f (!˜);XB)ˆ( ˜
;XB)A

; (4.51)
where the summation in Eq. (4.51) is over ˜
 satisfying nZ;unt  nZ;unt regardless of whether ˜
 2
˜Tpass or not, and p( ˜
) is defined in Eq. (4.36). Since each summand of Eq. (4.51) is non-negative,
the right-hand side does not increase if the summation is further limited to ˜
 2 ˜Tpass. Thus,
Eq. (4.48) and Eq. (4.51) lead toX
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;untnZ;unt
X
XB
p( ˜
)Pr(XB) Tr

( ˆ1   ˆP f (!˜);XB)ˆ( ˜
;XB)A

 PE
1   Z;unt : (4.52)
From Eqs. (4.40), (4.47) and (4.52), we have
1
2
 ˆfinAE   ˆidealAE  (4.53)
 (1   Z;unt)
X
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;untnZ;unt
p( ˜
)
s
2PA + 2
X
XB
Pr(XB)Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!˜);XB)ˆ( ˜
;XB)A

+ Z;unt (4.54)
 (1   Z;unt)
vut 2PA + 2 X
˜
2 ˜Tpass:
nZ;untnZ;unt
X
XB
p( ˜
)Pr(XB)Tr

( ˆ1A   ˆP f (!˜);XB)ˆ( ˜
;XB)A

+ Z;unt (4.55)
 (1   Z;unt)
r
2PA +
PE
1   Z;unt + Z;unt (4.56)
 p2pPA + PE + Z;unt: (4.57)
By using Eq. (4.45) and m(!) = nZ l(!), the protocol is s-secret with s =
p
2
p
PA + PE + Z;unt
if the final-key length l(!) satisfies
l(!) = nZ   max
nZ;untnZ;unt
&
nZ;unth
 f (!˜)
nZ;unt
!
+ nZ;tag + log2
1
PA
'
(4.58)
 min
nZ;untnZ;unt
(
nZ;unt(1   h
 f (!˜)
nZ;unt
!
)
)
  log2 2
PA
: (4.59)
4.2.3 PNS attack vs. WCP-BB84 protocol
In this section, we derive the asymptotic key rate of the WCP-BB84 protocol with tagging idea
as in Ref. [10], and show that the protocol is vulnerable to PNS attack in long-distance commu-
nication. Consider the asymptotic limit nrep ! 1 while the parameters
 :=
nZ;tag
nZ
; Q := nZ
nrep p˜2Z
; eX :=
kX
nX
(4.60)
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are fixed. By using the result of finite-key analysis Eq. (4.59), the asymptotic key rate per round
is given by
R(;eX;unt)asy := p˜2ZQ (1   )(1   h
 
eX;unt
); (4.61)
where eX;unt := kX;unt=nX;unt and  are unknown parameters. Since nX;unt=nX ! 1    holds in the
asymptotic limit, kX;unt  kX leads to
(1   )eX;unt  eX: (4.62)
Then we have
R(;eX;unt)asy  p˜2ZQ (1   )(1   h

eX
1   

) (4.63)
=: R()asy: (4.64)
To bound R()asy with known parameters, we use the inequality
  rtagQ ; (4.65)
which is obtained from Eq. (4.6) and Eq. (4.60). This leads to
R()asy  p˜2ZQ (1  
rtag
Q )(1   h
0BBBBB@ e1   rtagQ
1CCCCCA) (4.66)
=: Rasy: (4.67)
Note that Rasy is the optimal key rate in the form of Eq. (4.61), namely, Eve can in principle
choose parameters which satisfy Rasy = R(;eX;unt)asy . Moreover, those parameters are realized by PNS
attacks introduced in Sec. 4.1. To confirm these, it is sucient to check the equality of Eq. (4.62)
and Eq. (4.65). With eX;tag := kX;tag=nX;tag, we see that
(1   )eX;unt = eX $ eX;tag = 0 $ eX;m = 0 (for m  2): (4.68)
Let p(m) be the probability that the source emits m photons (assuming phase randomization). Let
Y (m) be the probability that a signal emitted with m-photons causes a detection at Bob’s receiver.
Those parameters have identical meaning to those in Sec. 4.1. Since rtag =
P
m2 p(m) holds from
Eq. (4.13), we have
Q = rtag $
X
m2
p(m)Ym =
X
m2
p(m) $ Ym = 1 (for m  2) (4.69)
in the asymptotic limit. Both Eq. (4.68) and Eq. (4.69) are satisfied by Eq. (4.3) with PNS attack.
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To evaluate the eect of PNS attacks on the BB84 protocol, we assume the specific value of rtag
by adopting the model that Alice uses a coherent light source, in which rtag is given by Eq. (4.19).
We derive the dependence of Rasy on total transmittance  (including detector eciency) in the
limit of  ! 0. From Eq. (4.67), the value of rtag=Q has to be kept smaller than 1 to ensure
Rasy > 0. Since Q decreases as  approaches to 0,  ! 0 is required to keep Rasy positive. Thus,
Q and rtag are expressed as
Q = ( + O(2)) (4.70)
rtag =
2
2
+ O(3): (4.71)
Eq. (4.70) and Eq. (4.71) lead to
rtag
Q =
1
2
( + O(2)): (4.72)
If rtag=Q is held fixed as  gets small, the value of  is changed as  = O(). Then the overall key
generation rate Rasy has square dependence on :
Rasy = O(2): (4.73)
This implies that the BB84 protocol is vulnerable to PNS attacks in the long distance communi-
cation.
4.3 Practical aspects of WCP-BB84 protocol
In this subsection, we focus on the practical aspects of the WCP-BB84 protocol. For implemen-
tation of QKD protocols, its simplicity is crucial for several reasons. The first one is straightfor-
ward, that is, we have to reduce the cost of QKD for its commercialization [56]. Another reason
is that practical devices have security loopholes [59, 60, 61, 62, 102], which violates the assump-
tions of the security proof. This means that if complicated devices are used, we have to consider
many countermeasures (from both theoretical and practical sides) against possible attacks. The
BB84 protocol with phase-encoding (PE-BB84) is a specific form of the WCP-BB84 protocol
which can be implemented with simple devices. Since PE-BB84 protocol is vulnerable to PNS
attacks in the long distance, it is often used with the decoy-state method. Although it enables long
distance communication and many demonstrations have already been conducted, several practical
problems still remain. In the following, we introduce the PE-BB84 protocol and the decoy-state
method, and discuss their advantages and problems.
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4.3.1 Phase-encoding BB84 protocol
When QKD is implemented, we typically use free space or optical fibers as quantum channel.
While some simulations and demonstrations of free-space QKD (e.g. satellite QKD) are con-
ducted [64, 29, 30, 31], most of high-speed QKD implementations use the optical fibers to guide
signals stably [26, 27, 28]. In fiber-based QKD, a bit 0,1 tends to be encoded on optical phase
rather than polarization of photons because polarization is less stabler than optical phase in opti-
cal fibers due to their birefringence. Another advantage of phase-encoding method is that the fast
encoding and reading are possible with current techniques (e.g. 1 GHz pulse-repetition rate with
phase modulation in Ref. [35] and 10 GHz in Ref [40]).
Phase-encoding BB84 protocol (PE-BB84 protocol) is composed of simple devices, such as
a typical laser, a phase modulator and a passive Mach-Zehnder interferometer (see also Fig. 4.1).
With established security (the proof for the PE-BB84 is identical to the WCP-BB84), a number
of demonstrations are conducted [33, 34, 35]. In the protocol, double pulses with interval 
are generated at Alice’s site, followed by phase modulation which includes randomization of the
global phase as well as changing the relative phase to encode a bit. At Bob’s site, each pulse is fed
to a delayed interferometer with its delay being equal to . The longer arm of the interferometer
passes through a phase modulator which incurs phase shift B = 0 or 2 . After the interferome-
ter, the pulses are measured by two photon detectors corresponding to bit values “0” and “1”. If
there is a detection from the superposition of the double pulses, we call it as valid detection (see
Fig. 4.2). The description of the PE-BB84 protocol is identical to that in Sec. 2.2.3 except that
Step (1)-(3) have more concrete expressions.
(1) Alice chooses Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and p˜X, respectively. She chooses a
uniformly random bit f0; 1g.
(2) Alice generates double pulses and modulates the relative phase between those pulses as
0; ; =2; 3=2 if her basis and bit are (Z; 0), (Z; 1), (X; 0), (X; 1), respectively. She also changes
the global phase of the double pulses at random.
(3) Bob chooses Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and p˜X, respectively. He sets the phase
shift B = 0 and B = =2 if he selects Z basis and X basis, respectively. If an invalid detec-
tion occurs, Bob declares no-detection. If both detectors have detections at a valid timing, Bob
randomly generates a bit 0 or 1. He obtains the outcome f0, 1, no-detectiong.
Bob’s random-bit assignment in Step 3 is for the sake of satisfying the receiver’s condition
() in Sec. 3.1. Since a valid detection occurs only when the first pulse in the long arm and the
second pulse in the short arm have interference, there are invalid detections with probability 1/2
due to the use of the passive interferometer (see Fig. 4.2). Although invalid detections can be
reduced by using an optical switch, it typically has insertion loss larger than 1/2 (e.g. 4 dB loss
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Figure 4.1: Set up of the BB84 protocol. Alice generates double pulses (in a dashed block in the
figure) and modulates the global phase at random and also modulate the relative phase based on
her basis and bit. Bob changes the phase shift B based on his basis choice. The delay in the long
arm equals to the interval of the double pulse , which enables neighboring pulses to interfere
each other. A detection from the interference between double pulses in a block is regarded as
valid, and outcomes from other detections are invalid.
long arm
short arm
valid
detection timing: 3 2 1
Figure 4.2: Sketch of valid interference at Bob’s site. The double pulses are split and the ones
going through the longer arm are delayed by  from the others going through the shorter arm.
The interference between the first pulse in the longer arm and the second pulse in the shorter arm
is regarded as valid, which occurs at Timing 2 (in the figure) with probability 1/2.
48 CHAPTER 4. QKD WITH WEAK COHERENT PULSES
for 10 ns switching time [103]). Thus, the problem of half invalid detections is essential in the
PE-BB84 protocol, and actually, it is the origin of the advantage of the DQPS protocol over the
PE-BB84 protocol, which is considered in Chapter 5.
4.3.2 Decoy-state method
The decoy-state method is a practical countermeasure against PNS attacks, which was proposed
and developed by Hwang [36], Lo et al: [104] and Wang [37]. They are incorporated to various
protocols, such as the BB84 protocol, the six-state protocol [48], the MDI protocols [63, 105,
16], and high-dimensional protocols [106, 107]. In the decoy-state method, Alice chooses the
intensity (mean photon number) of each signal from a predetermined set fig (0  i  idecoy, i = 0
corresponds to the signal) and monitor the detection rate separately for each intensity. Define
Qi as the observed detection rate for the intensity i. Let p(m)i be the probability that the source
emits m photons under the condition of mean photon number i. With parameters Ym defined in
Sec. 4.2.3, we have the following idecoy + 1 simultaneous equations in the asymptotic limit.8>><>>:Qi =X
m0
p(m)i Ym
9>>=>>; (0  i  idecoy): (4.74)
This implies that if we increase the number of decoy intensity idecoy, the better bound of Ym is
obtained. Recalling the fact that the value of Ym was totally under control of Eve with PNS
attacks (see Eq. (4.3) and Eq. (4.4)), we see that threat of PNS attack can be limited by adopting
decoy states. In practice, it is shown that the BB84 protocol with two decoy states (idecoy = 2)
achieves nonzero key rate over 100 km communication in finite-key regime [15].
Although the decoy-state method seems attractive, there still remain practical problems be-
cause additional operations tend to enlarge the gap between physical models of devices and their
practical behaviours. Let us show two examples for a light source. Although we use weak coher-
ent pulses in QKD implementations, the distribution of p(m) can deviate from Poissonian and it
has to be estimated through the calibration of the light source. Although the security proof with
a general light source using decoy states was conducted [39], it assumes the following infinite
number of inequalities, which cannot be confirmed through calibration:
p(1)L
p(1)U
 p
(m)
L
p(m)U
(for m  2); (4.75)
where p(m)L and p
(m)
U represent the lower and the upper bound of p(m), respectively. Another ex-
ample is that the intensity of a decoy pulse deviates from the predetermined value because the
intensity of the decoy pulse is in the middle of the signal’s intensity and the vacuum, and hence
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it is at the steep slope in the intensity-modulation curve. The deviation over 10% is reported in
Ref. [108], for example.
Even if the above problems are solved from either theoretical or experimental side, the decoy-
state method holds inevitable complexity and disadvantage associated with it. Since it uses
higher-order p(m) to estimate the value of Ym, more complicated calibration method is required
compared to the protocol without decoy states. Since it includes more estimation processes, the
larger overhead is sacrificed by the statistical fluctuation in the finite-key analysis. Thus, for short
distance communication where PNS attacks are not so threatening, the protocol without decoy
states may be preferred from the perspective of simplicity.
4.4 Dierential-phase-shift protocol
The dierential-phase-shift (DPS) protocol is as simple (or simper) protocol as the PE-BB84
protocol, in which only two phases f0; g are used for the relative phase between neighboring
pulses. It was proposed by Inoue et al: in 2002 [89] as a protocol with robustness against PNS
attacks. Although there are several protocols which are expected to be robust against PNS at-
tacks [109, 110, 111], the simplicity of the DPS protocol is outstanding, which enables the
demonstration with a high clock rate of 10 GHz [40]. Since the DPS protocol is an origin of
the dierential-quadrature-phase-shift (DQPS) protocol which is treated in Chapter 5, here we
review the DPS protocol and its security. In this section, the protocol description and the security
analysis of the DPS protocol are briefly introduced based on Ref.[90]. Afterwards, we discuss the
round-robin DPS protocol, which is a variant of the DPS protocol solving the complexity of the
security proof for the DPS protocol.
4.4.1 Protocol description
Here, we describe the DPS protocol based on Ref. [90]. The set up for the DPS protocol is
identical to that of the PE-BB84 protocol with several exceptions (see Fig. 4.3). In the DPS
protocol, sequential pulses are divided by a block of L pulses for the convenience of security
proof. The phase-randomizing operation is applied to the whole block. Dierently from the PE-
BB84 protocol, the relative phase is either 0 or , hence the phase modulator is not necessary at
the receiver’s site. The photon-number resolving detectors were assumed as in Ref. [90]. If there
is a detection from the superposition of the l-th and (l   1)-th original pulses, we call it as valid
detection at l-th timing (1  l  L   1). The protocol is described as follows.
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Figure 4.3: Set up of the DPS protocol. At Alice’s site, pulse trains are generated by a laser
followed by phase randomization as well as phase modulation (PM) with f0; g based on her
random bits. At Bob’s site, each pulse train is fed to a delayed Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
The trains leaving the interferometer are measured by two photon detectors corresponding to bit
values “0” and “1”. Valid timings of detection are labeled by integers 1; 2; ::; L   1, according
to the index of the pulse from the short arm of the interferometer. Detection from interference
between pulses from dierent blocks is regarded as invalid and ignored.
1. Alice generates L random bits al 2 f0; 1g (0; 1; ::; L   1).
2. Alice prepares L optical pulses (system S ) in the state
L 1O
l=0
j( 1)al piS ;l ; (4.76)
where j piS ;l represents a coherent state e =2
P
k
p
kp
k! jkiS ;l of the l-th pulse mode. Alice random-
izes the overall optical phase of the L-pulse train, and sends it to Bob.
3. If there is no detection of photons in the valid timings, Bob sets j = 0. Bob also sets j = 0 if
he detects two photons or more in the whole L + 1 time slots. If detections have only occurred at
a single valid timing, the variable j is set to the index of the timing. If j , 0, Bob determines his
raw key bit b 2 f0; 1g depending on which detector has reported detection at the j-th timing. Bob
announces j through the public channel.
4. If j , 0, Alice determines her raw key bit as a = a j 1 + a j.
5. Alice and Bob repeat the above procedures nrep times.
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6. Alice and Bob randomly select a small portion of the rounds with j , 0, and compare the bit
values over the public channel. They define sifted keys A and B, respectively, by concatenating
the remaining bits with j , 0.
7. Alice and Bob conduct error correction and privacy amplification by discussing over the public
channel and obtain the final key finA and finB .
The plus sign in Step 4 represents addition modulo 2 and corresponds to reading the relative phase
of neighboring pulses.
4.4.2 Security of DPS protocol
Since the DPS protocol does not require multiple bases but uses the set of non-orthogonal states
Eq. (4.76), it seems close to the B92 protocol [86] rather than the BB84 protocol. The remarkable
property of the DPS protocol is that the optical phase of each pulse is not independent of each
other but connected via the relative phases, just as chain. In fact, the robustness of the DPS
protocol against PNS attacks can also be explained intuitively with the property of “coherence
chain”. If Eve splits photons from a multi-photon signal and sends a remaining photon to Bob,
the probability that her detection timing j is identical to Bob’s one is only 1=(L 1). Furthermore,
if she attempts to make the photon detected at the same timing as hers, it disturbs the coherence
chain and causes a bit error between Alice and Bob. Thus, the DPS protocol is expected to be
robust against PNS attacks.
On the other hand, the property of coherence chain introduces diculty in the security proof
for the DPS protocol as well. This is because the coherence chain prohibits us from working
on each pulse separately, and we have to deal with a large Hilbert space at once. In spite of
the complexity, the security of the DPS protocol was proved in 2012 by Tamaki et al: in the
asymptotic limit [90]. They focused on the fact that the phase errors in the DPS protocol are
related to the photon number contained in pulses, and used the technique to estimate the photon-
number information. The proof shows that a key can be generated from two-photon signals,
as well as shows that the dependence of key rate on the channel transmittance  is O(3=2) in
the range of small , which certifies the expected robustness of the DPS protocol against PNS
attacks. On the other hand, the security proof was still complicated and the obtained key rate was
low because of the asymmetric property of the DPS protocol. For example, one of Eve’s optimal
attacks was that she sends Bob a superposition of the states containing photons in l-th timing
whose coecients are not uniform. This is coming from the fact that the detections only with
1  j  L   1 are regarded as valid and the detections at the edge of a block are discarded. The
problem due to the asymmetry led to the idea of the round-robin DPS protocol introduced in the
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following subsection.
4.4.3 Round-robin DPS protocol
The round-robin DPS (RR-DPS) protocol is regarded as the “symmetrized” DPS protocol, which
removes the asymmetry among detection timings by modifying the set up of the protocol [41].
While the DPS protocol uses fixed amount of delay  at the interferometer, the delay is variable
in f; 2; ::::; (L  1)g in the RR-DPS protocol. This additional randomness at Bob’s site pre-
vents Eve from fixing two pulses which cause interference at her will, as well as largely simplifies
the security proof. The security proof adopts a similar idea to that of the DPS protocol, in which
phase errors are related to the photon number contained in the signal pulses. The obtained key
rate is expressed as
Q
 
1   h(ebit)   esrcQ   (1  
esrc
Q )h(
th
L   1)
!
; (4.77)
where ebit is the observed error rate, and esrc and th are connected through the following inequality
in terms of the photon number  in L pulses:
Pr( > th)  esrc: (4.78)
In Eq. (4.77), the second term represents the cost for error correction, and the third and fourth
terms represent the cost for privacy amplification. Eq. (4.77) implies that the amount of privacy
amplification is independent of the observed error rate ebit and only depends on the property of a
light source and the predetermined block size L. This is totally a new concept in the security of
QKD because the security of QKD protocols prior to this protocol was based on the uncertainty
principle and the amount of leaked information is estimated by monitoring signal disturbance (bit
error). It is not certain what kind of principle in quantum mechanics enables such a property,
though the authors implies [41] that it may relate to the information causality [112].
Thanks to the property of ebit-independence, it has high tolerance against noisy environment.
The numerical simulation in Ref. [41] shows that it still generates a key at the error rate ebit 
11%, in which no key can be extracted with the BB84 protocol. On the other hand, the simplicity
of the DPS protocol is sacrificed in the RR-DPS protocol. Although several demonstrations have
already been conducted, implementations of the variable delay with large L (L = 5 [43], L = 65
[45], L = 129 [44]) are not considered to be simple.
Chapter 5
Security of the DQPS protocol
As introduced in the previous chapter, the DPS protocol is composed of simple devices and is
robust against PNS attacks, while the security proof is complicated. In this chapter, we seek after
the benefit of the DPS protocol in a dierent direction, namely, for short-distance communication
in which PNS attacks do not impose a severe problem. We provide a security proof of a variant
of the DPS protocol called dierential quadrature phase shift (DQPS) protocol [46] by applying
the simple proof for the BB84 protocol, and establish its definite advantage over the PE-BB84
protocol. The DQPS protocol can be implemented with essentially the same hardware as the
PE-BB84 protocol, but our security proof shows that its key generation rate is 8/3 as high as that
of the PE-BB84 protocol. The benefit from the simplicity of PE-BB84 protocol is not sacrificed
because the requirement for the properties of the light source and the detection apparatus is shown
to be kept to minimum as in the PE-BB84 protocol. Although the security proof is limited to the
asymptotic regime in this chapter, it is extended to the finite-key case in Chapter 6.
In this chapter, we use several dierent notations from those in the previous chapters. We
call the basis to generate a key “data basis” and call the basis for monitoring signal disturbance
“check basis”. In the BB84 protocol considered in the previous sections, the data basis and the
check basis were called Z basis and X basis, respectively. But here, we do not associate the data
and check bases to qubit bases (such as X and Z) in the description of the DQPS protocol in
Sec. 5.1. Qubits will be introduced in the security analysis in Sec. 5.2. There, we opt to follow
the convention of taking the photon-number states as the standard basis, and hence associate
the fj0i ; j1ig basis of a qubit to the (parity of) photon number. We assume that Alice’s state
preparation on the data basis is replaced by fj+i ; j ig-basis measurement, and also assume that
the measurement to obtain phase error is made by fj ii ; j+iig basis where ji := (j0ij1i)=p2 and
jii := (j0i  i j1i)=p2. When we represent an outcome of the fj+i ; j ig basis measurement by a
bit, it should be understood that state j+i corresponds to bit value 0 and state j i to 1. On the other
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hand, for fj ii ; j+iig-basis measurement, we adopt an unconventional rule that j ii corresponds
to bit value 0 and j+ii to 1 for the convenience of the proof.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we describe details of the DQPS protocol and
assumptions on the light source and the detection apparatus. Sec. 3 gives the security proof of
the protocol, and shows an explicit formula for the key rate. Based on the formula, numerical
results for the secure key rate is shown in Sec. 4. Finally, Sec. 5 deals with discussions including
an analytical expression for the scaling of the optimal key rate and simple o-line calibration
methods for the light source.
5.1 Protocol and assumptions
Here we introduce a DQPS protocol considered in this chapter, which is slightly modified from
the one [46] proposed by Inoue and Iwai (See Fig. 5.1). The protocol uses two bases, data
basis for generating the final key and check basis for monitoring the leak of information. In
the data and check bases, relative phases between adjacent pulses are modulated by f0; g and
f2 ; 32 g, respectively. The protocol regards a train of L pulses as a block, and the working basis
is randomly chosen for each block. The randomization of overall optical phase is also done for
each block of L pulses. Bob’s receiver is composed of delayed interferometer with its delay being
equal to the interval  of adjacent pulses. The longer arm of the interferometer passes through
a phase modulator that incurs phase shift B = 0 or 2 . After the interferometer, the pulses are
measured by two photon detectors corresponding to bit values “0” and “1”. If there is a detection
from the superposition of the l-th and the (l   1)-th original pulses, we call it as valid detection at
l-th timing (1  l  L   1).
The protocol proceeds as follows, which includes predetermined parameters p˜1 > 0, p˜0 B
1   p˜1,  > 0, and nrep. In its description, jj represents the length of a bit sequence .
1. Alice selects a bit c 2 f0; 1g with probability p˜0 and p˜1, which correspond to the choice of data
basis and check basis, respectively. Bob also selects d 2 f0; 1g with probability p˜0 and p˜1.
2. Alice generates L random bits al 2 f0; 1g (0; 1; ::; L   1), and prepares L optical pulses (system
S ) in the state
L 1O
l=0
jeil(al;c) piS ;l ; l(al; c) B al +

2
lc; (5.1)
where jiS ;l represents coherent state e jj2=2 Pk kpk! jkiS ;l of the l-th pulse mode. Alice randomizes
the overall optical phase of the L-pulse train, and sends it to Bob.
3. If d = 0, Bob sets B = 0. If d = 1, he sets B = 2 .
4. If there is no detection of photons in the valid timings, Bob sets j = 0. If the detections have
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only occurred at a single valid timing, the variable j is set to the index of the timing. If there are
detections at multiple timings, the smallest (earliest) index of them is assigned to j. If j , 0, Bob
determines his raw key bit b 2 f0; 1g depending on which detector has reported detection at the
j-th timing. If both detectors have reported at the j-th timing, a random bit is assigned to b. Bob
announces j through the public channel.
5. If j , 0, Alice determines her raw key bit as a = a j 1 + a j where the plus sign represents
addition modulo 2.
6. Alice and Bob repeat the above procedures nrep times. They publicly disclose c and d for each
of the nrep rounds.
7-1. Alice and Bob define sifted keys A1 and B1, respectively, by concatenating their determined
bits with j , 0 and c = d = 1. They publicly disclose A1 and B1.
7-2. Alice defines a sifted key A0 by concatenating her determined bits with j , 0 and c = d = 0.
7-3. Bob defines a sifted key B0 by concatenating his determined bits with j , 0 and c = d = 0.
8. Bob corrects the errors in his sifted key B0 to make it coincide with Alice’s key A0 through
jA0jS EC bits of encrypted public communication from Alice by consuming the same length of
pre-obtained secret key. Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by shortening their keys by
jA0jS PA to obtain the final keys.
In this chapter, we only consider the secure key rate in the asymptotic limit of an infinite sifted
key length. We consider the limit of nrep ! 1 while the following observed parameters are fixed:
Q B jA0j
nrep p˜20
; E0 B
wt(B0   A0)
nrep p˜20
; E1 B
wt(B1   A1)
nrep p˜21
; (5.2)
where the minus sign is a bit-by-bit modulo-2 subtraction. In this limit, S EC is given by a function
of the bit error rate E0=Q. In Sec. 5.2, the asymptotic value of S PA is determined as a function of
Q and E1. The asymptotic key rate per pulse RL is then given by
RL =
p˜20
L
Q(1   S PA(Q; E1)   S EC(E0=Q)): (5.3)
The security of the above protocol is proved in Sec. 5.2 under the following assumptions on
the devices used by Alice and Bob. For clarity, up to Sec. 5.3, we assume that Alice’s laser source
and modulator produces the states in Eq. (1) precisely. The assumption on the laser will then
be relaxed in Sec. 5.4. The randomization of the overall phase in Step 2 is assumed to be done
by choosing a common optical phase shift  randomly from the continuous range of [0; 2), and
applying it to all the L pulses. As is seen in Sec. 4.2.1, this eliminates the coherence among
dierent photon-number states. The state emitted from Alice in Step 2 is thus expressed asX
m
ˆNm
  L 1O
l=0
jeil(al;c) piS ;l heil(al;c)
p
j  ˆNm; (5.4)
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Figure 5.1: Setup for the L-pulse DQPS protocol. At Alice’s site, pulse trains are generated by
a laser followed by phase randomization as well as phase modulation (PM) with f0; g or f2 ; 32 g
according to her random bits and basis choice. At Bob’s site, each pulse train is fed to a delayed
Mach-Zehnder interferometer with phase shift 0 or 2 according to his basis choice. The trains
leaving the interferometer are measured by two photon detectors corresponding to bit values “0”
and “1”. Valid timings of detection are labeled by integers 1; 2; ::; L   1, according to the index
of the pulse from the short arm of the interferometer. Detection from interference between pulses
from dierent blocks is regarded as invalid and ignored.
where ˆNm represents the projector onto the subspace with m photons in the L pulses.
As for Bob’s apparatus, we assume that he uses threshold detectors, and further assume that
the ineciency and dark countings of the detectors are equivalently represented by an absorber
and a stray photon source placed in front of Bob’s apparatus, and hence they are included in the
quantum channel. This allows us to regard each of the detectors in Fig. 5.1 as a perfect threshold
detector, which reports detection if and only if it receives one or more photons. To represent a
relevant consequence of that assumption in a useful form, we introduce POVM elements for Bob’s
procedure in Steps 3 and 4. Let f ˆB(d)j g j=0;:::;L 1 be the POVM for Bob’s procedure of determining
j, when the basis d was selected in Step 1. We further decompose the elements for j , 0 as
ˆB(d)j = ˆB
(d)
j;0 + ˆB
(d)
j;1 , where ˆB
(d)
j;b corresponds to the outcome ( j; b). These operators satisfy
ˆB(d)0 +
L 1X
j=1
( ˆB(d)j;0 + ˆB(d)j;1) = ˆ1: (5.5)
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Under the model of detectors mentioned above, whether there is a detection or not at each timing
does not depend on the phase shift applied on the long arm. Hence, the procedure to determine j
is the same for d = 0 and d = 1, and we have
ˆB(0)j = ˆB
(1)
j (0  j  L   1); (5.6)
which will be used in the security proof given in the next section.
5.2 Security proof
Here we prove the security of the protocol introduced in Sec. 5.1 and determine the amount
of privacy amplification S PA(Q; E1) in the asymptotic limit. Our proof is based on the security
analysis with complementarity as well as the tagging technique with a modification. Before
introducing the detail of the proof, let us discuss the dierence between the original tagging idea
and ours. In the security proof of the PE-BB84 protocol, if a pair of pulses emitted from Alice
contains more than a single photon, that signal is considered to be tagged and totally insecure.
The argument relies on the fact that the state emitted by Alice is expressed as mixture of photon-
number states as in Eq. (4.6) with Eq. (4.13). Intuitively, we might want to use the same idea for
the security proof of the DQPS protocol because a key bit is generated from a pair of pulses like
in the PE-BB84 protocol. However, this turns out to be dicult because in the DQPS protocol,
Alice generates a key bit a = a j 1+a j after Bob’s announcement of detection timing j. Obviously,
the ( j 1)-th and j-th pulses were already received by Bob and it is too late for Alice to conduct a
direct measurement to determine the total photon number, and hence it is impossible to assume the
form of Eq. (4.6), even in principle. In what follows, we will circumvent this issue by introducing
a tagging rule defined through measurements on Alice’s fictitious auxiliary qubits, which remain
at Alice’s site during the whole protocol.
5.2.1 Virtual protocol
For the security proof with complementarity, we consider virtual protocol in which Alice’s sifted
key A0 are obtained from measurements on auxiliary qubits on fj+i ; j ig basis, while Bob, instead
of aiming to learn A0, tries to guess the value of the complementary observable (the outcome of
fj ii ; j+iig-basis measurement) for Alice’s qubits. The virtual protocol is designed to fulfill the
following conditions:
(i) Alice’s procedure of releasing optical pulses, making her public announcement A1, and pro-
ducing the final key is identical to the actual protocol.
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(ii) Bob’s procedure of receiving L pulses and making his public announcement j (for each round)
and B1 in the actual protocol is identical to the corresponding procedure in the virtual protocol.
Apparently, the protocol satisfying the conditions (i) and (ii) also satisfies the condition of the
virtual protocol mentioned in Sec. 3.2.3. Hence, Alice’s final key in the actual protocol is secure
(random and decoupled from Eve’s system) if that in the virtual protocol is secure against Eve’s
general attack.
Now we introduce an virtual entanglement-based protocol satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) by
using the replacement of state preparation (see Sec. 3.2.1). In the protocol, Alice correlates an
auxiliary qubit to each optical pulse, and prepare a state by making measurement on fj+i ; j ig
basis. A controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate ˆU ( j)CNOT appearing in the protocol below is defined on
fj0i ; j1ig basis by ˆU ( j)CNOT jxiA; j jyiA; j 1 = jxiA; j jx + y mod 2iA; j 1 (x; y 2 f0; 1g). The detail of the
virtual protocol is described below, where a step including a dierent procedure from the actual
protocol is marked with an asterisk (*).
Virtual protocol:
1. Alice selects a bit c 2 f0; 1g with probability p˜0 and p˜1, which correspond to the choice of data
basis and check basis, respectively. Bob also selects d 2 f0; 1g with probability p˜0 and p˜1.
2. Alice prepares L auxiliary qubits (system A) and L optical pulses (system S ) in state
j	(c)iAS B
L 1O
l=0
j (c)iAS ;l (5.7)
depending on her basis choice, where
j (c)iAS ;l B
1p
2
(j+iA;l jei 2 lc piS ;l + j iA;l j ei

2 lc
p
iS ;l): (5.8)
She measures the total photon number m in the L pulses with the projective measurement f ˆNmg,
and sends the L pulses to Bob.
3. Bob sets B = 2 regardless of the value of d.
4. If there is no detection of photons in the valid timings, Bob sets j = 0. If the detections have
only occurred at a single valid timing, the variable j is set to the index of the timing. If there are
detections at multiple timings, the smallest (earliest) index of them is assigned to j. If j , 0, Bob
determines his raw key bit b 2 f0; 1g depending on which detector has reported detection at the
j-th timing. If both detectors have reported at the j-th timing, a random bit is assigned to b. Bob
announces j through the public channel.
5-1. If j = 0, proceed to Step 6. Otherwise, Alice operates a CNOT gate ˆU ( j)CNOT on the ( j  1)-th
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qubit (target) and the j-th qubit (control).
5-2. Alice measures all the qubits but the j-th one on fj0iA;l ; j1iA;lg basis to obtain the outcomes
zl (l , j).
5-3. Alice measures the j-th qubit on fj+iA; j ; j iA; jg basis and determines her raw key bit a
accordingly.
6. Alice and Bob repeat the above procedures nrep times. They publicly disclose c and d for each
of the nrep rounds.
7-1. Alice and Bob define sifted keys A1 and B1, respectively, by concatenating their determined
bits with j , 0 and c = d = 1. They publicly disclose A1 and B1.
7-2. Alice defines a sifted key A0 by concatenating her determined bits with j , 0 and c = d = 0.
7-3. Bob defines a sifted key B0 by concatenating his determined bits with j , 0 and c = d = 0.
He publicly discloses B0.
8. Alice conducts privacy amplification by shortening her key by jA0jS PA to obtain the final key.
The above protocol satisfies the condition (ii) because of the following reasons. Since Step 3
is identical to the actual protocol for d = 1, so is Bob’s announcement of B1. The change in Step
3 does not aect the announcement of j in each round due to Eq. (5.6). Note that the change in
Step 7-3 is an additional announcement which is not disclosed in the actual protocol. In order
to see that the condition (i) holds, we will modify the virtual protocol in such a way that Alice’s
procedure dictated in (i) is unchanged. Since the outcomes fzlg in Step 5-2 are neither announced
nor used in determining the final key, we can omit this step. Since a CNOT gate on fj0i ; j1ig
basis is equivalent to a CNOT gate on fj+i ; j ig basis with target and control exchanged, Steps
5-1 and 5-3 are equivalently done by measuring all the L qubits on fj+i ; j ig basis to obtain
L bits a0; a1; ::; aL 1 as the outcome, and then setting a = a j 1 + a j. Since the fj+i ; j ig-basis
measurement on all the qubits does not require the knowledge of j, we may assume that it is done
in Step 2. Then, using the relation
A;l hj j (c)iAS ;l =
1p
2
jei 2 lc pi ; (5.9)
we see that the L-bit sequence a0; a1; ::; aL 1 is random and conditioned on its value the emitted
state is identical to Eq. (5.4). Hence, it is equivalent to Steps 2 and 5 of the actual protocol.
Finally, Steps 7-3 and 8 are the same as in the actual protocol as far as Alice is concerned.
Therefore, the virtual protocol satisfies the condition (i), as well as (ii), which means that the
security of the virtual protocol implies the security of the actual protocol.
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5.2.2 Alternative definition of tagging
To prove the security of the virtual protocol, we focus on the tagging technique for the PE-BB84
protocol, in which the incidents with multi-photon emission in double pulses are tagged and
considered to be insecure. In a similar vein, we might want to tag the events where the ( j   1)-th
and j-th pulses include multiphotons upon emission. However, the number of emitted photons in
the two pulses is not well-defined due to the phase coherence with other pulses. Instead, we define
a rule to classify tagged (t = 1) and untagged (t = 0) incidents in terms of variables well-defined
in the virtual protocol: X
l, j
zl = m ! t = 0;
X
l, j
zl < m ! t = 1: (5.10)
Let A0;unt be the concatenation of all the untagged bits in A0, and define the ratio of tagged
incidents as
 B 1   jA0;untjjA0j : (5.11)
From Eq. (4.45) and the argument in Sec. 4.2.2, if the phase-error rate for untagged portion is
bounded by (Q; E1;), A0 can be made to be secure in the asymptotic limit by reducing its
length by jA0jS PA satisfying
S PA(Q; E1)  max

 
 + (1   )h ((Q; E1;)) : (5.12)
Let us discuss the implication of the condition Eq. (5.10) for the tagging, and derive important
relations that will be used in the subsequent proof of security. According to Eq. (5.8), it is not
dicult to see that A;l h0j j (c)iAS ;l includes only even number of photons, and A;l h1j j (c)iAS ;l does
odd number of photons. For convenience, let us define projectors related to such a property by
ˆAS :=
L 1O
l=0
ˆ(l);
ˆ(l) := ˆP(j0iA;l)
0BBBBB@X
n:even
ˆP(jniS ;l)
1CCCCCA + ˆP(j1iA;l) 0BBBBB@X
n:odd
ˆP(jniS ;l)
1CCCCCA ; (5.13)
where ˆP(ji) = ji hj. Notice that the initial state in Eq. (5.7) satisfies
ˆAS j	(c)iAS = j	(c)iAS : (5.14)
Thanks to the correlation specified by ˆAS , the measured quantities fzlg are related to the parity
of the photon numbers in the system S . To see this, let us define the projector corresponding to
the state of ml photons in the l-th pulse by
ˆNfmlg B
L 1O
l=0
ˆP(jmliS ;l): (5.15)
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Alice’s procedure of determining fzlg (l , j) at Steps 5-1 and 5-2 will be associated with the
projector defined by
ˆF( j)fzlg B ˆU
( j)y
CNOT
0BBBBBB@ ˆ1A; j 
 O
l, j
ˆP(jzliA;l)
1CCCCCCA ˆU ( j)CNOT
=
h
ˆP(j0iA; j 1 jz j 1iA; j) + ˆP(j1iA; j 1 j1   z j 1iA; j)
i O
l, j 1; j
ˆP(jzliA;l): (5.16)
Then, it is easy to confirm that
( ˆF( j)fzlg 
 ˆNfmlg) ˆAS , 0 only if
zl = ml mod 2 (l , j   1; j) and z j 1 = m j 1 + m j mod 2:
(5.17)
Since ˆNm ˆNfmlg = 0 unless
P
l ml = m, we have
( ˆF( j)fzlg 
 ˆNm ˆNfmlg) ˆAS , 0 only if
zl  ml (l , j   1; j); z j 1  m j 1 + m j and
X
l
ml = m:
(5.18)
If we confine ourselves to the case with
P
l, j zl = m, the condition in the above equation is satisfied
only by zl = ml (l , j   1; j) and z j 1 = m j 1 + m j. We thus conclude that
( ˆF( j)fzlg 
 ˆNm) ˆAS = ( ˆF
( j)
fzlg 
 ˆ
( j)
fzlg) ˆAS for
X
l, j
zl = m; (5.19)
where
ˆ
( j)
fzlg :=
ˆP(j0iS ; j 1 j0iS ; j)
O
l, j 1; j
ˆP(jzliS ;l) for z j 1 = 0 (5.20)
ˆ
( j)
fzlg := [ ˆP(j0iS ; j 1 j1iS ; j) + ˆP(j1iS ; j 1 j0iS ; j)]
O
l, j 1; j
ˆP(jzliS ;l) for z j 1 = 1: (5.21)
This may lead to an interpretation that, whenever the event is untagged, every pulse should have
contained no more than one photon upon emission, and the ( j   1)-th and the j-th pulse pair
contained no more than one photon in total. On the other hand, we should also take notice that
Alice’s measurement of fzlg (l , j) in the virtual protocol can be carried out only after the pulse
train was measured by Bob and the value of j was announced. Hence the above interpretation has
an ambiguity in the operational sense, which is why we only use strict mathematical statements
of Eqs. (5.14) and (5.19) in the subsequent proof and do not rely on the interpretation.
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5.2.3 Phase-error rate for untagged portion
Our next goal is to determine the upper bound of the phase-error rate for untagged portion
(Q; E1;) following the definition in the security proof with complementarity (see Sec. 3.2.2).
To represent the phase error explicitly, let us introduce the following procedure instead of the
Steps 5-3 and 7-2.
5-3. If c = 1, Alice measures the j-th qubit on fj+iA; j ; j iA; jg basis and determines her raw key
bit a accordingly. If c = 0, Alice measures the j-th qubit on fj iiA; j ; j+iiA; jg basis and determines
her raw key bit a accordingly.
7-2. Alice defines a sifted key A0 by concatenating her determined bits with j , 0 and c = d =
0.
Let A0;unt and B0;unt be the concatenations of all the untagged bits in A0 and B0, respectively.
Phase errors for untagged portion are given as bit errors between A0;unt and B0;unt and the number
of the phase errors is given by wt(B0;unt   A0;unt). Suppose that we have a bound on phase error
rate unt(Q; E1;), which asymptotically satisfies
unt(Q; E1;) 
wt(B0;unt   A0;unt)
jA0;untj
: (5.22)
Notice that the measurement on Alice’s qubits for extracting A0 or A0 can be postponed until
after Step 7-3, namely, after she learns the values of Q; E1; and B0;unt. Then, an extreme case
of unt(Q; E1;) = 0 will mean that the state of jA0;untj untagged qubits before the measurement
is exactly a fj ii ; j+iig-basis eigenstate specified by B0;unt, and hence A0;unt, which is an outcome
of fj+i ; j ig-basis measurement, is secure (random and decoupled from Eve’s system).
It can be shown that unt is connected to the check-basis error rate E1 of the actual protocol
through a fair sampling. For given values of c and j, Alice’s procedure of determining fzlg and a at
Steps 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3 corresponds to the projection onto the state jA(c; j)
a;fzlgiA, which is defined
by
jA(c; j)
a;fzlgiA B
1p
2
ˆU ( j)yCNOT
0BBBBBB@ j0iA; j   ( 1)a i c+1 j1iA; j O
l, j
jzliA;l
1CCCCCCA : (5.23)
Since these states satisfy
ˆF( j)fzlg jA
(c; j)
a;fzlgiA = jA
(c; j)
a;fzlgiA ; (5.24)
Eqs. (5.19) and (5.24) lead to
A hA(c; j)a;fzlgj ˆNm ˆAS = A hA
(c; j)
a;fzlgj ˆ
( j)
fzlg
ˆAS for
X
l, j
zl = m: (5.25)
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From Eq. (5.14), we have
A hA(c; j)a;fzlgj ˆNm j	(c)iAS = A hA
(c; j)
a;fzlgj ˆ
( j)
fzlg j	(c)iAS for
X
l, j
zl = m: (5.26)
The basis-choice dependence of states jA(c; j)
a;fzlgiA and j	(c)iAS can be represented by
jA(c; j)
a;fzlgiA =

ˆP(j0iA; j) + i c ˆP(j1iA; j)

jA(0; j)
a;fzlgiA (5.27)
and
j	(c)iAS =
0BBBBB@ L 1O
l=0
i lmˆlc
1CCCCCA j	(0)iAS ; (5.28)
where mˆl :=
P
m m ˆP(jmil) is the photon number operator for the l-th pulse. Since the range of the
projector ˆ( j)fzlg includes only zero- or one-photon states for each mode, we have
[( ˆP(j0iA; j) + ( i)c ˆP(j1iA; j)) 
 ˆ( j)fzlg] ˆAS = ( i)cmˆ j ˆ
( j)
fzlg
ˆAS : (5.29)
Combining Eqs. (5.14), (5.27), (5.28) and (5.29), we obtain
A hA(c; j)a;fzlgj ˆ
( j)
fzlg j	(c)iAS = A hA
(0; j)
a;fzlgj ( i)mˆ jc
0BBBBB@ L 1O
l=0
i lmˆlc
1CCCCCA ˆ( j)fzlg j	(0)iAS : (5.30)
Using the definition of Eqs. (5.20) and (5.21), it is easy to confirm that
( i)cmˆ j
0BBBBB@ L 1O
l=0
i lmˆlc
1CCCCCA ˆ( j)fzlg = i ( j 1)z j 1c
0BBBBBB@ Y
l, j 1; j
i lzlc
1CCCCCCA ˆ( j)fzlg (5.31)
holds. Therefore, we have
A hA(0; j)a;fzlgj ˆ
( j)
fz j 1g j	(0)iAS = ( i)u( j)A hA
(1; j)
a;fzlgj ˆ
( j)
fz j 1g j	(1)iAS ; (5.32)
where u( j) B Pl, j 1; j lzl + ( j   1)z j 1 and this leads, with Eq. (5.26), to
A hA(0; j)a;fzlgj ˆNm j	(0)iAS = ( i)u( j)A hA
(1; j)
a;fzlgj ˆNm j	(1)iAS for
X
l, j
zl = m: (5.33)
This relation may suggest that for untagged incidents, the state of pulses transmitted from Alice
would be independent of the value of c, and hence the c = d = 1 incidents would be regarded as
a fair sampling. Again, this interpretation suers from ambiguity since the protocol assumes that
Alice’s qubits are measured only after the optical pulses are received by Bob and the value of j
is announced. Therefore we need a mathematical proof for the fairness of the sampling, which is
given in Appendix B. The proof confirms that
wt(B0;unt   A0;unt)
wt(B1;unt   A1;unt) =
 
p˜0
p˜1
!2
(5.34)
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holds in the limit of nrep ! 1. Then we have
wt(B0;unt   A0;unt)
jA0;untj
=
 
p˜0
p˜1
!2
wt(B1;unt   A1;unt)
jA0;untj

 
p˜0
p˜1
!2
wt(B1   A1)
jA0;untj
=
E1
Q(1   ) : (5.35)
Thus, (Q; E1;) = E1=(Q(1 )) is an upper bound on the phase error rate satisfying Eq. (5.22).
From Eq. (5.12), we conclude that asymptotically a privacy amplification with a ratio
S PA(Q; E1)  max

 
 + (1   )h
 E1
Q(1   )
 (5.36)
is enough to make the sifted key A0 secure.
5.2.4 Upper bound on tagged ratio
Since the argument of the max in Eq. (5.36) is an increasing function of , S PA will be determined
through finding an upper bound on . According to the definition of Eq. (5.11), what we need
is a lower bound on jA0;untj, which is determined as follows. If we denote by n(condition) the
number of rounds satisfying the condition in the nrep rounds repeated in the virtual protocol, we
have jA0j = n(c = d = 0; j , 0) and jA0;untj = n(c = d = 0; j , 0; t = 0), where t = 0 is equivalent
to
P
l, j zl = m according to Eq. (5.10). Under a given attack strategy of Eve, the statistics of
n(c = d = 0; j , 0) and n(c = d = 0; j , 0; t = 0) is unchanged if we omit Step 5-3 and stop the
protocol at Step 6. We may further equivalently replace Steps 5-1 and 5-2 with a procedure of
measuring the L qubits on the fj0iA;l ; j1iA;lg basis to obtain the outcomes z00;    z0L 1, followed by
substitutions zl := z0l (l , j  1; j) and z j 1 := z0j 1 + z0j mod 2 in case of j , 0. Let us define a set
of values of L nonnegative integers as
 (m) :=
8>><>>:(k0;    ; kL 1)
 kl 1 + kl  1(1  l  L   1); L 1X
l=0
kl = m
9>>=>>; ; (5.37)
and operators associated with it by
ˆ
(m)
A :=
X
fz0l g2 (m)
L 1O
l=0
ˆP(jz0liA;l); ˆ(m)S :=
X
fmlg2 (m)
L 1O
l=0
ˆP(jmliS ;l): (5.38)
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We see that (z00;    z0L 1) 2  (m) implies
P
l, j zl = m regardless of the value of j, as long as j , 0.
Hence we have
n(c = d = 0; j , 0; t = 0)
 n(c = d = 0; j , 0; (z00;    z0L 1) 2  (m))
= n(c = d = 0; j , 0)   n(c = d = 0; j , 0; (z00;    z0L 1) <  (m))
 n(c = d = 0; j , 0)   n(c = d = 0; (z00;    z0L 1) <  (m)): (5.39)
The number n(c = d = 0; (z00;    z0L 1) <  (m)) is independent of Eve’s strategy, and it follows the
binomial distribution with success probability p˜20rtag with
rtag B 1  
X
m
AS h	(0)j ˆ(m)A 
 ˆNm j	(0)iAS : (5.40)
Since z0l = ml mod 2 and (m0; : : : ;mL 1) 2  (m) imply (z00;    z0L 1) 2  (m), we have ˆ(m)S ˆAS =
( ˆ(m)A 
 ˆ(m)S ) ˆAS . On the other hand, z0l = ml mod 2 and
P
l z
0
l =
P
l ml imply z0l = ml, which leads
to ( ˆ(m)A 
 ˆNm) ˆAS = ( ˆ(m)A 
 ˆ(m)S ) ˆAS . We thus obtain
( ˆ(m)A 
 ˆNm) ˆAS = ˆ(m)S ˆAS : (5.41)
Combined with Eq. (5.14), we obtain
rtag = 1  
X
m
AS h	(0)j ˆ(m)S j	(0)iAS ; (5.42)
which gives us a clear interpretation of quantity rtag being the probability that the L-pulse train
emitted from Alice contains at least two photons in the same pulse or in neighboring pulses. As
a function of , it is calculated as
rtag = 1  
dL=2eX
m=0
e Lm
(L + 1   m)!
m!(L + 1   2m)! : (5.43)
In the asymptotic limit of nrep ! 1, Eq. (5.39) implies
n(c = d = 0; j , 0; t = 0)
nrep
 n(c = d = 0; j , 0)
nrep
  p˜20rtag; (5.44)
which means that jA0;untj=nrep  jA0j=nrep   p˜20rtag. Using Eqs. (5.2) and (5.11), we have
  rtagQ : (5.45)
Hence, choosing
S PA(Q; E1) =
rtag
Q +
 
1   rtagQ
!
h
 
E1
Q   rtag
!
(5.46)
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makes the virtual protocol, and hence the actual protocol, secure. An achievable asymptotic key
rate per pulse is thus given by
RL =
p˜20
L

(Q   rtag)(1   h
 E1
Q   rtag

)   QS EC(E0=Q)

(5.47)
whenever the right side is positive.
5.3 Key rates
We show results of numerical calculation of the key rate per pulse RL given by Eq. (5.47) to
compare the conventional passive PE-BB84 protocol (L=2) and the DQPS protocol (L  3). In
Fig. 5.2, dependence of RL on overall transmission  (including detector eciency) is shown for
L = 2; 4; 20. We adopted S EC(E0=Q) = h(E0=Q) and p˜0 = 1. The solid curves represent the key
rate RL under the assumption that a dark count probability is pdark = 0:5  10 5 per pulse per
detector. We assume Q = 1   e (L 1) + 2(L   1)pdark, reflecting the fact that there are (L   1)
valid timings per block of pulses. We also assume that the error rate depends on pdark and  in
addition to a loss-independent rate 3%, namely, E0 = E1 = 0:03(1   e (L 1)) + (L   1)pdark. The
key rate RL was then optimized over  for each value of . We see that except for a very low
loss, a larger value of L leads to a higher rate and achieves a longer distance. The dotted curves
represent the key rate for pdark = 0. From these curves, we see that, RL for dierent values of L
are all proportional to 2 in the limit of small , but its coecient increases as L gets larger. For
example, at 20 dB loss, we found that R20=R2  2:67, which clearly shows an advantage of the
DQPS protocol over the PE-BB84 protocol when we use essentially the same hardware. We also
see that even in the limit of no loss ( ! 1), the DQPS protocol with L = 4 is superior to the
PE-BB84 protocol.
5.4 Discussion and conclusion
Figure 2 shows that the optimized key rates are proportional to 2 in the limit of  ! 0, with its
coecient dependent on the block size L. In the special case where the bit error rate is zero, we
can analytically determine the coecient as a function of L. For L2  1, the parameter rtag in
Eq. (5.43) is approximated as rtag = 3L 22 2. For L  1, the parameter Q is approximated as
Q = (L   1). Hence, for L2  1, the key rate RL = (Q   rtag)=L is optimized at  = opt B
L 1
3L 2 to attain the optimal value R
opt
L B
(L 1)2
2L(3L 2)
2
. In the limit of a large block size, we have
RoptL!1 = 
2=6 and RoptL!1=R
opt
2 = 8=3. The result seems interesting in the sense that the secure key
rate for a large value of L is more than twice as large as that of L = 2 while the inherent loss in
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Figure 5.2: Secure key rate per pulse RL as a function of the overall channel transmission .
The solid curves represent the key rate under the assumption that a dark count probability is
pdark = 0:510 5 per pulse per detector, and the dotted curves represent the key rate with pdark = 0.
For both solid and dotted curves, the top, the middle and the bottom curve (at a high dB loss)
represent the rates for L = 20, L = 4 and L = 2, respectively. The bit error rate of the sifted key
depends on pdark and  in addition to a 3% loss-independent error. The block size L is chosen to
be 2, 4, and 20, where L = 2 corresponds to the PE-BB84 protocol and the other values to the
DQPS protocol.
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the passive interferometer itself is 1/2 for L = 2. On the other hand, it does not mean that the key
rate exceeds the case of L = 2 without the interferometer loss, namely, implementation with an
ideal active optical switch. Since RoptL / 2 holds in the limit of small , the key rate of an ideal
active protocol is 4 times the rate of the passive one for L = 2. If the loss in the optical switch is
taken into account, the passive DQPS protocol is more ecient than the active PE-BB84 protocol
when the loss of optical switch is larger than  20%.
While we have assumed so far that the initial pure state represented in Eq. (5.1) is prepared
by Alice, the proof can be extended to a general light source, which is shown in Appendix C. The
proof there assumes that the phase modulator (PM in Fig. 5.1) works perfectly, and that every
L-pulse train from the source is independent and represented by the same density operator ˆS
(not necessarily identical for each pulse). For the general light source described above, the secure
key rate is still given by Eq. (5.47) with
rtag = 1  
X
m
tr

ˆ
(m)
S ˆS

: (5.48)
Even when the state ˆS of the L pulse train is unknown, an upper bound on rtag can be deter-
mined from an o-line coincidence measurement on the light source using a few detectors. As
shown in Appendix D, the calibration method reveals an upper bound that is close to the true
value of rtag, as long as the state from the source is close to a coherent state with its mean photon
number   L 1=2.
For long distance communication, the DQPS protocol can be improved by using decoy-state
method, in which intensities of L pulses are randomly changed block by block. However, it is
less eective as L gets larger. This is because only the statistics of the total number of photons
emitted in the L pulses are obtained and no further information on their distribution over the L
pulses is available. As a result, the improvement is limited to the events where a single photon
has been emitted in the L pulses. Thus, for long distance communication, a secret key is extracted
only from such single-photon events. When Alice uses a laser source, the maximum probability
that a single photon is contained in L pulses is 1=e regardless of L. Bob’s detection has a loss of
1=L due to detection at invalid timings in Fig. 5.1. Therefore, the eciency of key generation per
pulse is / (L   1)=L2, which shows that the key rates of L > 2 is smaller than that of L = 2 in the
limit of long distance.
On the other hand, for short distance communication, the DQPS protocol is expected to com-
pensate for several disadvantages of the decoy-state BB84 protocol mentioned in Sec. 4.3.2. First,
the decoy-state BB84 protocol uses the knowledge on the probability of higher photon numbers
from the light source, which will require complicated devices for calibration while the DQPS
protocol requires as simple devices as the BB84 protocol. Second, the decoy-state BB84 protocol
relies on an involved parameter estimation, which leads to a large overhead from the finite-key
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size eect. In comparison, the simplicity of the key rate formula (5.47) of the DQPS protocol
suggests a small overhead from the finite-key size eect, which is actually confirmed in Chap-
ter 6. From the above insights, the DQPS protocol is expected to be useful for the practical cases
where one prefers a simple setup or short time operation for short distance communication.
Another possible improvement of our result may be obtained from the expected robustness
of general DPS protocols against PNS attacks. As is seen in Sec. 4.4.2, in the DPS protocols
(including the DQPS protocol), Eve’s attempts to control the timing of detection j tends to violate
the coherence chain and increase the probability of a bit error, which is expected to result in the
robustness against PNS attacks. While the robustness can be seen as a  32 -dependence of the key
rate in a security proof of the DPS protocol [90], our key rate of the DQPS protocol scales as 2.
This is because our proof assumed the pessimistic assumption that Eve is able to control the value
of j without causing any bit error. If we analyze the security based on the proof technique for
the DPS protocol [90], our protocol may benefit from the robustness against PNS attacks without
using decoy states.
As a conclusion, we have proved the security of dierential quadrature phase shift (DQPS)
quantum key distribution protocol, which can be implemented with almost the same setup as the
phase-encoding (PE) BB84 protocol. The proof is based on the a careful adaptation of the tagging
idea and the complementarity argument. We found that the key generation rate exceeds that of
the PE-BB84 protocol for any channel transmission, and is 8/3 as high as the rate of the PE-BB84
protocol in the limit of small transmission.

Chapter 6
Simple method of finite-key analysis for
WCP-QKD
In contrast to the asymptotic analysis conducted in Chapter 5, security analysis of QKD should
take into account statistical fluctuations due to the finite size of communication data, which re-
quires so-called “finite-key analysis”. Although the secure key generation rate of the DQPS
protocol was higher than that of the PE-BB84 protocol in the asymptotic analysis, it is not ob-
vious whether the advantage is still retained in the finite-key regime since the security proof of
the DQPS protocol is not as straightforward as that of the BB84 protocol. This motivates us to
conduct finite-key analysis for the DQPS protocol. Interestingly, on the way to address this prob-
lem, we discovered a new method for finite-key analysis which is suitable not only for the DQPS
protocol but also for other QKD protocols using WCP, enabling a smaller number of estimated
parameters. The method is based on Bernoulli sampling, which is related to binomial distribution,
in contrast to the currently used method based on the simple random sampling, which is associ-
ated with hypergeometric distribution. For WCP-BB84 protocol, a higher key generation rate is
obtained with the proposed method compared to the conventional method with simple random
sampling. Furthermore, the required number of detected signals to generate a secret key reduces
drastically from the previous works. By applying the proposed method to the DQPS protocol,
we show that the advantage of the DQPS protocol over the PE-BB84 protocol still remains in the
finite key regime.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Sec. 6.1, we briefly introduce basic ideas in the sam-
pling problem which are necessary for finite-key analysis, simple random sampling and Bernoulli
sampling, and also mention related works. In Sec. 6.2, we propose a method of finite-key analy-
sis based on Bernoulli sampling, and applies it to the ideal BB84 protocol where Alice and Bob
can manipulate perfect single-photon states. The proposed method is then applied to the BB84
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protocol with WCP as well as the DQPS protocol in Sec. 6.3. Finally, we give discussion and
conclusion in Sec. 6.4. The results of this chapter complete the security proof for the BB84 pro-
tocol in Sec. 3.3 and Sec. 4.2.2 by explicitly determining the bounds on the numbers of phase
errors and untagged rounds.
6.1 Sampling problem in finite-key analysis
The statistical fluctuations in the finite-key analysis appear in the estimation of the number of
phase errors and the estimation of the number of untagged incidents, for example. To obtain
concise analysis and also to avoid the eect of unnecessary fluctuations, a simple method with a
smaller number of estimation processes is preferred. Although several proofs [17, 113, 114] use
Azuma’s inequality [25] to treat specific protocols, a number of recent finite-key analyses [13,
15, 16, 24, 76] are based on the method with simple random sampling, which is used to model
n1 draws, without replacement, from a finite population of size n2 that contains k2 errors. The
probability that the number of errors in the sample is k1 obeys hypergeometric distribution
HG(k1; n1; k2; n2) :=

k2
k1

n2 k2
n1 k1

n2
n1
 : (6.1)
In several finite-key analyses [24, 76] based on simple random sampling, eorts were made to
find bounds on hypergeometric distribution which are related to binomial distribution in order to
simplify numerical calculation.
In order to mitigate the ineciency arising from basis mismatch between the sender and
the receiver, the BB84 protocol is often implemented with biased basis choice [115], in which
the minor basis is used solely for monitoring leaked information in the major basis. The BB84
protocols and the DQPS protocol we have investigated in Chaps. 3-5 include such a bias in the
form of the basis choice probabilities p˜Z and p˜X (or p˜0 and p˜1). In such cases, the whole data
from the rounds in the monitoring basis is regarded as a sample, with each round selected with
a constant probability dictated in the protocol as that of the basis choice. This suggests that the
data from the monitoring basis is related to Bernoulli sampling, in which each element of the
population of size n2 is sampled with fixed probability p˜1. The number of samples n1 obeys
binomial distribution
BI(n1; n2; p˜1) :=
 
n2
n1
!
p˜n11 (1   p˜1)n2 n1 : (6.2)
If the BB84 protocol with biased basis choice essentially includes the property of the binomial
distribution, analysis based on the conventional simple random sampling may introduce unneces-
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sary complexity and possibly leads to a lower key rate. This is the intuitive advantage expected in
using the Bernoulli sampling for finite-key analysis, which is certified in the following chapters.
6.2 Analysis for the ideal BB84 protocol
Here we consider finite-key analysis for the ideal BB84 protocol. The protocol follows the de-
scription in Sec. 2.2.3 and assumptions in Sec. 3.3. For convenience, we define several variables
and parameters as
ntot := nZ + nX; (6.3)
and
pZ :=
p˜2Z
p˜2Z + p˜
2
X
;
pX :=
p˜2X
p˜2Z + p˜
2
X
: (6.4)
6.2.1 Formalism for key length
We show a formalism for key length in terms of phase errors by using the result of 3.3. From
Sec. 3.2.2, a phase error is defined as a bit error which occurs when Alice and Bob conduct virtual
X-basis measurement on a Z-labeled round after Step (7’) in Sec. 3.3.1. An important property
which will be used in the next subsection is that the measurement for a phase error on a Z-labeled
round and the measurement for a bit error on an X-labeled round are identical, and hence they
only diers in the labeling.
Let kph be a random variable which represents the number of phase errors on nZ Z-labeled
rounds. Once we have a good upper bound on kph, a secure key length can be calculated as
follows. Suppose that we have a function f (kX; nX; ntot) which satisfies
Pr(kph > f (kX; nX; ntot))  PE (6.5)
regardless of Eve’s attack strategy. From the theorem in Sec. 3.3.2, by setting
s =
p
2
p
PE + PA; (6.6)
the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if the final key length lfin satisfies
lfin  nZ(1   h
 f (kX; nX; ntot)
nZ
!
)   log2 2
PA
  EC(c); (6.7)
where EC(c) is the cost of error correction to achieve c-correctness.
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6.2.2 Bounds on phase errors
In this subsection, we discuss the specific methods to obtain f (kX; nX; ntot) in Eq. (6.5) including
a method based on the Bernoulli sampling, and a more conventional method based on the sim-
ple random sampling. We also introduce a third, rather convoluted method, which will help to
elucidate the dierence between the former two methods.
Before discussing each of the methods, we first derive general statistical properties. Since
the Z-labeled phase error and the X-labeled bit error are obtained by identical measurements, the
procedure to obtain those errors is equivalent to the following steps after Step (5’) in Sec. 3.3.1:
(a) Alice and Bob further discard each of the remaining rounds with probability 1   p˜2Z   p˜2X.
(b) They make X-basis measurements on the remaining ntot rounds and obtain ktot errors. (c)
Finally, they label each of the ntot rounds as Z or X with probability pZ and pX (see Eq. (6.4)),
respectively, and obtain kph phase errors in Z-labeled rounds and kX = ktot   kph bit errors in
X-labeled rounds*1). In this procedure, since kX errors are sampled from ktot errors with a fixed
probability pX, it follows a binomial distribution if ktot and ntot are fixed:
Pr(kX j ktot; ntot) = BI(kX; ktot; pX): (6.8)
On the other hand, the step (c) of the above procedure is equivalently denoted as follows: Alice
and Bob draw a number nX based on the binomial distribution BI(nX; ntot; pX), and then select nX
random rounds among the ntot rounds to label as X, thereby determining kX. This implies that the
number kX obeys hypergeometric distribution if nX, ktot and ntot are fixed:
Pr(kX j nX; ktot; ntot) = HG(kX; nX; ktot; ntot): (6.9)
In order to use the properties derived above, it is convenient to reformulate Eq. (6.5) as fol-
lows. From Eq. (6.5), we haveX
ktot;ntot
Pr(kph > f (kX; nX; ntot) j ktot; ntot)Pr(ktot; ntot)  PE: (6.10)
Since Pr(ktot; ntot) can be under control of Eve, we seek for f (kX; nX; ntot) satisfying
Pr(kph > f (kX; nX; ntot) j ktot; ntot)  PE (6.11)
for any ktot and ntot, which is a sucient condition for Eq. (6.5). For later convenience, we
equivalently describe Eq. (6.11) asX
kX ;nX ;kX<ktot  f (kX ;nX ;ntot)
Pr(kX; nX j ktot; ntot)  PE: (6.12)
*1)If one uses sampled bits on Z-labeled rounds to determine the cost for error correction (see Actual protocol in
Sec. 3.3.1), it should be done as a Bernoulli sampling with a probability . Since these sampled bits are discarded,
the probabilities pZ and pX defined in Eq. (6.4) should be modified as pZ = p˜
2
Z (1 )
p˜2Z (1 )+ p˜2X
and pX =
p˜2X
p˜2Z+ p˜
2
X
, respectively.
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The first method to determine f (kX; nX; ntot), whose utility we will emphasize throughout this
chapter, is based on Bernoulli sampling using the property of binomial distribution Eq. (6.8). This
method adopts f (kX; nX; ntot) = fBI(kX) where
fBI(kX) := min
(
ktot
CBI(kX; ktot; pX)  PE)   kX   1 (6.13)
CBI(kX; ktot; pX) :=
X
k0XkX
BI(k0X; ktot; pX): (6.14)
The proof that fBI(kX) satisfies Eq. (6.11) is as follows. Define kX(ktot) := maxfkX j ktot > fBI(kX)+
kXg. Then we have X
kX ; ktot> fBI(kX)+kX
BI(kX; ktot; pX)  CBI(kX(ktot); ktot; pX): (6.15)
Since CBI(kX; ktot; pX) is a decreasing function of ktot, from Eq. (6.13) we have CBI(kX; ktot; pX) 
PE for any pair (kX; ktot) satisfying ktot  fBI(kX)+kX+1. Since ktot  fBI(kX(ktot))+kX(ktot)+1 holds
by definition of kX(ktot), we have CBI(kX(ktot); ktot; pX)  PE. By connecting this to Eq. (6.15), we
have X
kX ; kX<ktot  fBI(kX)
BI(kX; ktot; pX)  PE (6.16)
for any ktot. From Eqs. (6.8) and (6.16), we haveX
kX ;nX ; kX<ktot  fBI(kX)
Pr(kX; nX j ktot; ntot)
=
X
kX ; kX<ktot  fBI(kX)
Pr(kX j ktot; ntot)
 PE; (6.17)
which is identical to Eq. (6.12) with f (kX; nX; ntot) = fBI(kX). Therefore, we have
Pr(kph > fBI(kX) j ktot; ntot)  PE: (6.18)
As a result of the Bernoulli-sampling method, the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if the final
key length lfin satisfies
lfin  l(BI) := nZ(1   h
 fBI(kX)
nZ
!
)   log2 2
PA
  EC(c); (6.19)
where s is given by Eq. (6.6).
76 CHAPTER 6. SIMPLE METHOD OF FINITE-KEY ANALYSIS FOR WCP-QKD
The second method is based on simple random sampling, applying the property of the hyper-
geometric distribution Eq. (6.9), which is already seen in Ref. [13, 15, 16, 24], for example. This
method adopts f (kX; nX; ntot) = fHG(kX; nX; ntot) where
fHG(kX; nX; ntot) := min
(
ktot
CHG(kX; nX; ktot; ntot)  PE)   kX   1
CHG(kX; nX; ktot; ntot) :=
X
k0XkX
HG(k0X; nX; ktot; ntot): (6.20)
The proof that fHG(kX; nX; ntot) satisfies Eq. (6.11) is similar to the proof for fBI(kX). Recall that
the proof for fBI(kX) did not use the explicit form of BI(k0X; ktot; pX) but only used the decreasing
property of CBI(kX; ktot; pX) as a function of ktot. Since CHG(kX; nX; ktot; ntot) is also a decreasing
function of ktot, we have X
kX ; kX<ktot  fHG(kX ;nX ;ntot)
HG(kX; nX; ktot; ntot)  PE (6.21)
for any nX, ktot and ntot, which is analogous to Eq. (6.16). From Eqs. (6.9) and (6.21), we haveX
kX ;nX ; kX<ktot  fHG(kX ;nX ;ntot)
Pr(kX; nX j ktot; ntot)
=
X
kX ;nX ; kX<ktot  fHG(kX ;nX ;ntot)
Pr(kX j nX; ktot; ntot)Pr(nX j ktot; ntot)
 PE; (6.22)
which is identical to Eq. (6.12) with f (kX; nX; ntot) = fHG(kX; nX; ntot). Therefore, we have
Pr(kph > fHG(kX; nX; ntot) j ktot; ntot)  PE: (6.23)
As a result of the method with simple random sampling, the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if
the secret key length lfin satisfies
lfin  l(HG) := nZ(1   h
 fHG(kX; nX; ntot)
nZ
!
)   log2 2
PA
  EC(c) (6.24)
where s is given by Eq. (6.6).
To understand the relation between the two methods with Bernoulli sampling and simple
random sampling, we introduce another method which uses full knowledge of the distribution
Pr(kX; nX j ktot; ntot) appearing in Eq. (6.12). The argument before Eq. (6.8) also implies that
the number mX := nX   kX of X-labeled rounds without bit error obeys binomial distribution
BI(mX; ntot   ktot; pX), and that mX and kX are independent conditioned on ktot and ntot. We thus
obtain
Pr(kX; nX j ktot; ntot) = BI(kX; ktot; pX)BI(nX   kX; ntot   ktot; pX): (6.25)
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The argument leading to Eq. (6.9) gives another expression for the distribution as
Pr(kX; nX j ktot; ntot) = HG(kX; nX; ktot; ntot)BI(nX; ntot; pX): (6.26)
As a result, Eq. (6.12) is expressed in the following two equivalent ways:X
kX ;mX ;kX<ktot  f (kX ;kX+mX ;ntot)
BI(kX; ktot; pX)BI(mX; ntot   ktot; pX)  PE:
(6.27)
or X
kX ;nX ;kX<ktot  f (kX ;nX ;ntot)
HG(kX; nX; ktot; ntot)BI(nX; ntot; pX)  PE: (6.28)
Since fBI(kX) satisfies Eq. (6.16), Eq. (6.27) holds if f (kX; kX + mX; ntot) = fBI(kX). Similarly,
since fHG(kX; nX; ntot) satisfies Eq. (6.21), Eq. (6.28) holds if f (kX; nX; ntot) = fHG(kX; nX; ntot).
On the other hand, the condition of Eqs. (6.27) and (6.28) do not imply Eq. (6.16) or Eq. (6.21).
Therefore, there could be a better bound compared to fBI(kX) and fHG(kX; nX; ntot) based on Eq. (6.27)
or Eq. (6.28). In general, it is very complicated to determine the optimal function f (kX; nX; ntot)
for the final key length lfin, since it will depend on the explicit functional dependence of lfin on
f (kX; nX; ntot).
The dierence between the two equivalent conditions Eqs. (6.27) and (6.28) is the choice of
two variables from three no-independent random variables kX, nX and mX. When (kX; nX) are
chosen in Eq. (6.28), the distribution of kX, HG(kX; nX; ktot; ntot) is dependent on the value of nX.
On the other hand, Eq. (6.27) implies that two variables (kX;mX) are independent of each other.
This suggests that the underlying statistics in the BB84 protocol with biased basis choice are
understood in terms of independent binomial distributions.
Let us mention the dierence from the other works [24, 76] which deal with relations between
bounds on binomial distribution and ones on hypergeometric distribution since the former are
easily treated with existing mathematical packages. Ref. [24] uses the property, which dates
back to Hoeding [116], that expectation of a convex function over hypergeometric distribution
is no larger than that over binomial distribution. In [76], Ahrens map [117] was used to show
that hypergeometric distribution is bounded by a permutated binomial distribution within a factor
of
p
2. In contrast to these works, in our case the probability distribution Eq. (6.8) reflects the
binomial distribution inherent in the BB84 protocol with biased basis choice.
6.2.3 Numerical examples
Here we numerically compare the final key lengths derived from the three methods in the last
subsection in the simplest cases. We calculate the key lengths for the case where no error is
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Figure 6.1: Secure key ratio of the qubit-based BB84 protocol to the asymptotic limit as a function
of total rounds of the protocol nrep. We assume no errors (kX = 0) and no loss (ntot = nrep). The
security parameters are set to c = 10 15 and s = 10 10. The top, middle and bottom curves repre-
sent the ratios l(opt)=nrep, l(HG)=nrep (method with simple random sampling) and l(BI)=nrep (Bernoulli-
sampling method), respectively. In the limit of nrep ! 1, each curve converges to l=nrep = 1.
observed (kX = 0) and every signal is detected (ntot = nrep). The cost of error correction is set to
EC(c) = log2(1=c). We also assume nZ = nrep p˜2Z and nX = nrep p˜2X.
If we do not care about the key length for kX > 0, the optimal choice of f (kX; nX; ntot) satisfying
Eq. (6.28) (or Eq. (6.27)) is given by f (kX; nX; ntot) = ntot   nX for kX  1 and f (0; nX; ntot) =
f (kX=0)opt (nX; ntot) with
f (kX=0)opt (nX; ntot) := min
(
ktot
G(nX; ktot; ntot)  PE)   1
G(nX; ktot; ntot) :=
X
nXn0Xntot ktot
HG(0; n0X; ktot; ntot)BI(n0X; ntot; pX): (6.29)
The proof is analogous to the one for fBI(kX) or fHG(kX; nX; ntot). Since G(nX; ktot; ntot) is a decreas-
ing function of ktot, by using an argument similar to the one leading to Eq. (6.16), we haveX
nX ; ktot> f (kX=0)opt (nX ;ntot)
HG(0; nX; ktot; ntot)BI(nX; ntot; pX)  PE: (6.30)
This is identical to Eq. (6.28) since kX < ktot   f (kX; nX; ntot) is never satisfied for kX  1. The key
length when kX = 0 was observed is then given by
l(opt) := nZ(1   h
0BBBBB@ f (kX=0)opt (nX; ntot)nZ
1CCCCCA)   log2 2PA   EC(c): (6.31)
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In Fig. 6.1, we show the secure key ratios to the asymptotic case l(BI)=nrep, l(HG)=nrep and
l(opt)=nrep as functions of total rounds of the protocol nrep. For each nrep, the value of p˜X was
optimized to maximize the key length. In the limit of nrep ! 1, each curve converges to l=nrep =
1. The security parameters are set to c = 10 15 and s = 10 10, PE = 1=4  10 20 and PA =
1=4  10 20. We see that although the key rate l(opt) is the best, the three methods achieve almost
the same key length.
6.3 Analysis for WCP-based protocol
Here, we apply the analyses introduced in the previous section to the protocols using WCP. We
consider the WCP-based BB84 protocol in the subsections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, and move to the DQPS
protocol in subsection 6.3.3.
6.3.1 The WCP-BB84 protocol
The WCP-BB84 protocol follows the procedures described in Sec. 2.2.3 and assumptions in
Sec. 4.2.2. Here, we prove the security of the WCP-BB84 protocol using the theorem in Sec. 4.2.2.
From Sec. 3.2.2, a phase error in a Z-labeled round was defined as an error occurring when Alice
makes an ideal X-basis measurement on the system A and Bob makes the actual X-basis measure-
ment on the system S (the measurement conducted on X-labeled rounds in the actual protocol).
Let kph;unt be the total number of phase errors on the untagged Z-labeled rounds. Suppose that an
upper bound of kph;unt is given as a function of kX, nX, ntot and nZ;unt:
Pr(kph;unt > f (kX; nX; ntot; nZ;unt))  PE; (6.32)
where nZ;unt is the number of untagged and Z-labeled round defined in Sec. 4.2.2. We also suppose
that there is a probabilistic lower bound nZ;unt which satisfies
Pr(nZ;unt < nZ;unt)  Z;unt: (6.33)
According to the theorem in Sec. 4.2.2, by setting
s =
p
2
p
PE + PA + Z;unt; (6.34)
the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if
lfin  min
nZ;untnZ;unt
(
nZ;unt(1   h
 f (kX; nX; ntot; nZ;unt)
nZ;unt
!
)
)
  log2 2
PA
  EC(c) (6.35)
is satisfied.
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Under the assumptions for the source and measurement apparatus, the basic distributions used
in the previous section, Eqs. (6.8) and (6.9), are still valid if we confine ourselves to the untagged
rounds. Although the fact may be intuitively obvious for the WCP-BB84 protocol by seeing the
equivalent protocol in Sec. 4.2.2, here we give its mathematical justification since it helps when
we treat the DQPS protocol in Sec. 6.3.3. We define a set of integers labeling the rounds in the
protocol as Nrep := f1; 2; ::::nrepg. As subsets of Nrep, let us define the set of the integers labeling
the rounds where Alice (Bob) chooses X basis as XA (XB) regardless of detection. Define those
labeling the untagged and detected rounds asNunt. LetKunt be a subset ofNunt labeling the rounds
which have errors when Alice and Bob conduct virtual X-basis measurements regardless of their
basis choice. For any subset M, let M := Nrep nM. With these notations,
kph,unt = jXA \ XB \ Kuntj;
nZ,unt = jXA \ XB \ Nuntj: (6.36)
We define other random variables as follows:
kX;unt : = jXA \ XB \ Kuntj;
nX;unt : = jXA \ XB \ Nuntj;
ktot;unt : = kX;unt + kph;unt;
ntot;unt : = nX;unt + nZ;unt: (6.37)
Since bases are selected at Step (6’) in the protocol in Sec. 4.2.2, at which Nunt and Kunt have
already been determined, we have
Pr(XA \ Nunt =MA;XB \ Nunt =MB j Kunt;Nunt) = (MA;Nunt)(MB;Nunt) (6.38)
for all MA  Nunt and MB  Nunt, where we defined
(M1;M2) = p˜jM1 jX p˜jM2nM1 jZ : (6.39)
By simple calculation of the probability theory, we have
Pr(kX;unt j ktot;unt; ntot;unt) = BI(kX;unt; ktot;unt; pX) (6.40)
and
Pr(kX;unt j nX;unt; ktot;unt; ntot;unt) = HG(kX;unt; nX;unt; ktot;unt; ntot;unt); (6.41)
which means that Eqs. (6.8) and (6.9) essentially hold true for the untagged rounds.
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Now we derive a key rate formula for the WCP-BB84 protocol based on Eq. (6.40), as was
done with the Bernoulli-sampling method for the ideal protocol in Sec. 6.2.2. First, we seek for
f (kX; nX; ntot; nZ;unt) which satisfies Eq. (6.32). Analogous to the derivation of Eq. (6.18) from
Eq. (6.8), Eq. (6.40) leads to
Pr(kph;unt > fBI(kX;unt) j ktot;unt; ntot;unt)  PE (6.42)
for any ktot;unt and ntot;unt, and hence we have
Pr(kph;unt > fBI(kX;unt))  PE: (6.43)
Since kX;unt is not an observed value, we use the obvious bound
kX;unt  kX: (6.44)
Using the inequality
CBI(kX + 1; ktot + 1; pX)
= CBI(kX; ktot; pX) + (1   pX)BI(kX + 1; ktot; pX)
 CBI(kX; ktot; pX) (6.45)
in Eq. (6.13), we have fBI(kX)  fBI(kX + 1), implying that fBI(kX) is an increasing function.
Hence, Eqs. (6.43) and (6.44) lead to
Pr(kph;unt > fBI(kX))  PE; (6.46)
which means that fBI(kX) fulfills Eq. (6.32).
Next, we determine nZ;unt which satisfies Eq. (6.33). To determine a lower bound of nZ;unt, we
consider an upper bound of nZ;tag := nZ   nZ;unt. Let NZ;tag be the number of rounds where Alice
chooses Z basis, Bob chooses Z basis and the light source emits a tagged signal (two photons or
more). As those conditions are independent of each other as seen from Eq. (4.6), we have
Pr(NZ;tag) = BI(NZ;tag; nrep; rtag p˜2Z): (6.47)
Since nZ;tag is the number of detected rounds among the NZ;tag rounds,
nZ;tag  NZ;tag (6.48)
holds. Eqs. (6.47) and (6.48) lead to
Pr(nZ;tag > n)  1  CBI(n; nrep; rtag p˜2Z) (6.49)
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for any n. Thus, we have
Pr(nZ;tag > g(rtag p˜2Z ; Z;unt))  Z;unt; (6.50)
where
g(x; y) := min

n
1  CBI(n; nrep; x)  y : (6.51)
Let nZ;unt be
nZ;unt := nZ   g(rtag p˜2Z ; Z;unt): (6.52)
By using nZ;tag = nZ   nZ;unt, Eq. (6.50) leads to
Pr(nZ;unt < nZ;unt)  Z;unt: (6.53)
Combined with Eqs. (6.35), (6.46) and (6.53), the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if
lfin  l(BI)WCP := nZ;unt(1   h
0BBBB@ fBI(kX)
nZ;unt
1CCCCA)   log2 2
PA
  EC(c); (6.54)
where s is given by Eq. (6.34). Together with Eqs. (6.13), (6.14), (6.51) and (6.52), Eq. (6.54)
constitutes the main result of Sec. 6.3.1.
For the purpose of comparison, here we also discuss what the key rate formula looks like if
we start from Eq. (6.41), based on simple random sampling. As we have derived Eq. (6.23) from
Eq. (6.9), Eq. (6.41) leads to
Pr(kph;unt > fHG(kX;unt; nX;unt; ntot;unt) j ktot;unt; ntot;unt)  PE; (6.55)
which, in turn, leads to
Pr(kph;unt > fHG(kX;unt; nX;unt; ntot;unt))  PE: (6.56)
Similarly to fBI(kX), we can prove that fHG(kX; nX; ntot) is an increasing function of kX. Since kX;unt
is upper-bounded by Eq. (6.44), Eq. (6.56) leads to
Pr(kph;unt > fHG(kX; nX;unt; ntot;unt))  PE: (6.57)
In contrast to Eq. (6.46), it requires an additional estimation process for nX;unt to obtain fHG(kX;
nX;unt; ntot;unt). A lower bound defined by nX;unt := nX   g(rtag p˜2X; X;unt) satisfies
Pr(nX;unt < nX;unt)  X;unt: (6.58)
Since nX;unt is known in principle in the actual protocol (Step (6’) in Sec. 4.2.2), the trace distance
between the final state and the ideal state is written as a sum of the part for nX;unt < nX;unt and
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the one for nX;unt  nX;unt as in Eq. (4.33). Hence, combined with Eqs. (6.35), (6.53), (6.57) and
(6.58), by setting
s =
p
2
p
PE + PA + Z;unt + X;unt; (6.59)
the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if
lfin  l(HG)WCP := minnZ;untnZ;unt (kX; nX;unt; nZ;unt)
(kX; nX;unt; nZ;unt) := ˜(kX; nX;unt; nZ;unt)   log2
2
PA
  EC(c)
˜(kX; nX;unt; nZ;unt) := nZ;unt(1   h
 fHG(kX; nX;unt; nX;unt + nZ;unt)
nZ;unt
!
): (6.60)
The reason that the minimization of nZ;unt appears is because ˜(kX; nX;unt; nZ;unt) is not monotone-
increasing function of nZ;unt. For example, with PE = 1=16  10 20, we numerically confirmed
that ˜(0; 25000; 25318)  24631 and ˜(0; 25000; 25319)  24623. This means that the protocol
with final key length l = (kX; nX;unt; nZ;unt) is not necessarily secure.
As can be seen from the comparison between Eqs. (6.54) and (6.60), the method with simple
random sampling is much more complicated than the Bernoulli-sampling method, involving an
additional estimated parameter and a minimization. Moreover, as shown in Sec. 6.3.2, it tends
to give a key rate lower than the Bernoulli-sampling method, probably because of the use of
pessimistic bound on nX;unt.
6.3.2 Numerical examples
Here, we show two examples of numerical calculation for the WCP-BB84 protocol. We assume
that the light source emits a pulse whose photon-number distribution is Poissonian with mean ,
namely, rtag is given by Eq. (4.19). Like Fig. 6.1 for the ideal protocol, we first calculated the
simplest case where no error is observed (kX = 0) and no loss occurs (ntot = nrep(1   e )), which
is shown in Fig. 6.2. The cost of error correction was set to EC(c) = log2(1=c). We assumed
nZ = ntot p˜2Z and nX = ntot p˜2X. The values of p˜X and  were optimized for each value of nrep. For
calculation of l(BI)WCP, the security parameters were set to c = 10 15, s = 10 10, PE = 1=16 10 20,
PA = 1=1610 20 and Z;unt = 1=210 10. The result is shown as the red curve in Fig. 6.2, where
the key length Eq. (6.54) is normalized by the optimized asymptotic key rate of 1=e per signal at
 = 1 and p˜X ! 0. We see that a final key can be extracted when the total rounds nrep is more than
 103:7 while the threshold is nrep  103:2 for the ideal protocol using the same parameters (see
also Fig. 6.1). For comparison, we also calculated the value of (kX; nX;unt; nZ;unt)=(nrep=e) under
the same condition, which is shown as the blue curve in Fig. 6.2. The security parameters were
the same as the red curve, except for Z;unt = X;unt = 1=4  10 10. The quantity (kX; nX;unt; nZ;unt)
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of estimation methods for the WCP-BB84 protocol. Upper curve
(Bernoulli-sampling method): Secure key ratio to the asymptotic limit l(BI)WCP=(nrep=e) as a func-
tion of total rounds of the protocol nrep. Lower curve (method with simple random sampling): An
upper bound on the derived secure key ratio l(HG)WCP=(nrep=e). We assume no error (kX = 0) and no
loss (ntot = nrep(1 e )). The security parameters are set to c = 10 15 and s = 10 10. In the limit
of nrep ! 1, each curve converges to lWCP=(nrep=e) = 1.
is an upper bound of l(HG)WCP derived in Eq. (6.60). The figure shows that the key length l(BI)WCP from
Bernoulli sampling is higher than l(HG)WCP from simple random sampling. A possible reason is that
the estimation of nX;unt, which is a pessimistic bound of nX;unt, is not required in determining
fBI(kX).
In Fig. 6.3, we show a result in more practical situations based on Eq. (6.54) to make com-
parison to the previous finite-key analysis for the WCP-BB84 protocol [23]. The figure shows
the dependence of secure key rate l(BI)WCP=nrep on the channel transmission c. In each curve, the
number of Bob’s detected signals ndet is fixed as ndet = 104; 105; 106 and 107. The parameters
were chosen to be the same as [23]: Quantum eciency of both detectors is d = 0:1 and a
dark count probability per pulse is pdark = 10 5 per detector. In addition to errors from dark
counts, there is a 0:5% loss-independent bit error. The security parameters were set to c = 10 10,
s = 10 5, PE = 1=1610 10, PA = 1=1610 10, and Z;unt = 1=210 5. Total transmission rate is
Q = 1 (1 2pdark)e cd , and error rate is given by E=Q where E = 0:005(1 e cd )+pdarke cd .
Based on the parameters above, we assume EC(c) = 1:05h(E=Q) + log2(1=c), nrep = ndet=Q,
nZ = ndet p˜2Z , nX = ndet p˜
2
X and kX = nXE=Q. To save the computation time, we used Cherno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Figure 6.3: Secure key rate per signal of the WCP-BB84 protocol l(BI)WCP=nrep as a function of
channel transmission c. The parameters are set to be the same as Ref. [23]. Quantum eciency
of detectors: d = 0:1. Dark count probability per pulse per detector: pdark = 10 5. Loss-
independent bit error: 0:5%. Error correction cost: EC(c) = 1:05h(E=Q) + log2(1=c). The
security parameters: c = 10 10 and s = 10 5. From the top to the bottom curve, the number of
detected signals are ndet = 107; 106; 105 and 104, respectively. The required number of detected
signals to generate a final key is less than 104, while it was  107 in the previous result [23].
bound [118]
CBI(kX; ktot; pX)  D
 
kX
ktot
; ktot; pX
!
(6.61)
for (kX; ktot; pX) satisfying kX  ktot pX, where
D(x; y; z) :=
0BBBBB@ zx
!x 1   z
1   x
!1 x1CCCCCAy : (6.62)
In Fig. 6.3, we see that a key can be extracted even when ndet = 104. This is a significant
improvement from the result of [23], in which the required number of detected signals to generate
a final key is ndet  107.
6.3.3 The DQPS protocol
In this section, we conduct finite-key analysis of the DQPS protocol based on the property of
binomial distribution Eq. (6.40). The precise description of the protocol and physical assumptions
for the security proof follow those in Chapter 5 except several notations. In order to establish
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the analogy to the WCP-BB84 protocol analyzed in the previous section, we identify Alice’s
fj+i ; j ig measurement with Z-basis measurement, and fj ii ; j+iig measurement with X-basis
measurement. Accordingly, we replace the notations as follows:
p˜0 ! p˜Z (6.63)
p˜1 ! p˜X (6.64)
A0; B0 ! A;Z; B;Z (6.65)
A1; B1 ! A;X; B;X: (6.66)
The alternative tagging rule proposed in Chapter 5 allows the variables kph;unt and nZ;unt to be
defined in the same way as in the WCP-BB84 protocol, and the argument up to Eq. (6.35) holds
for the DQPS protocol as well. The remaining tasks are to find a function f satisfying Eq. (6.32)
and to find a bound nZ;unt satisfying Eq. (6.33), both of which require slightly dierent approaches
from the WCP-BB84 protocol.
Since our tagging definition for the DQPS protocol involves Bob’s detection timing j, we
cannot decompose the emitted states as in Eq. (4.6). As a result, we cannot rewrite the protocol to
postpone the basis selection as in the one shown in Sec. 4.2.2. Hence we need to justify Eq. (6.38)
on a dierent ground. This was essentially done in Chapter 5 along with appendix B, namely, in
Eq. (B.4), which reads
Pr(c; a; b; j; t) = Pr(c)(gt; j(c); a; b; j; t): (6.67)
The random variables c; a; b; j and t are bit strings of length nrep. Let us rewrite them by various
sets introduced in Sec. 6.3.1. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between XA and c, and
gt; j(c) is a function of fXA \ Nunt;Nuntg, we have
Pr(XA; a; b; j; t) = Pr(XA) ˜(XA \ Nunt;Nunt; a; b; j; t): (6.68)
By using the fact that Kunt and Nunt are functions of a; b; j and t, namely, they are written as
Kunt = FKunt( j; t) and Nunt = FNunt(a; b; j; t), define
0(XA \ Nunt;Kunt;Nunt) :=
X
a;b; j;t
˜(XA \ Nunt;Nunt; a; b; j; t); (6.69)
where the summation is over fa; b; j; tg satisfying FKunt( j; t) = Kunt and FNunt(a; b; j; t) = Nunt.
From Eq. (6.68), we have
Pr(XA;Kunt;Nunt) = Pr(XA)0(XA \ Nunt;Kunt;Nunt); (6.70)
which leads to
Pr(XA;Kunt;Nunt) = (XA;Nrep)0(XA \ Nunt;Kunt;Nunt): (6.71)
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Since (M;Nrep) defined in Eq. (6.39) satisfies
(M;Nrep) = (M\Nunt;Nunt)(M\Nunt;Nunt) (6.72)
for any M  Nrep, from Eq. (6.71) we have
Pr(XA \ Nunt =MA j Kunt;Nunt)
= (MA;Nunt)(Kunt;Nunt) (6.73)
for any MA  Nunt, where
(Kunt;Nunt)
:=
P
M0ANunt (M0A;Nunt)0(M0A;Kunt;Nunt)
Pr(Kunt;Nunt) : (6.74)
Since the sum of (MA;Nunt) over MA is unity, Eq. (6.73) leads to (Kunt;Nunt) = 1. Thus, we
have
Pr(XA \ Nunt =MA j Kunt;Nunt)
= (MA;Nunt): (6.75)
In the DQPS protocol, the assumption on Bob’s apparatus Eq. (5.6) allows his basis choice to
be postponed after he confirms photon detection, which means that the choice of XB can be
conducted after Kunt and Nunt are determined. Hence, we have
Pr(XA \ Nunt =MA;XB \ Nunt =MB j Kunt;Nunt)
= (MA;Nunt)(MB;Nunt); (6.76)
which is identical to Eq. (6.38). Similarly to the WCP-BB84 protocol, Eq. (6.40) holds, which
leads to Eq. (6.43):
Pr(kph;unt > fBI(kX))  PE: (6.77)
The task of finding a bound nZ;unt satisfying Eq. (6.33) is done as follows. In Chapter 5, a
modified protocol having exactly the same Pr(nZ;tag) as the original protocol was introduced, in
which a random variable N (denoted as n(c = d = 0; (z00:::z0L 1) <  (m)) in Eq. (5.39) of Chapter 5)
satisfying N  nZ;tag is defined. The variable obeys binomial distribution BI(N; nrep; rtag p˜2Z), where
rtag is a property of the light source defined as Eq. (5.43) (or Eq. (5.48) for general light sources).
This implies that Pr(nZ;tag) in the original protocol has the following property: There exists a
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function P(nZ;tag; N) satisfying
Pr(nZ;tag) =
X
N
P(nZ;tag; N)
P(nZ;tag; N) = 0 for nZ;tag > NX
nZ;tag
P(nZ;tag; N) = BI(N; nrep; rtag p˜2Z): (6.78)
This leads to
Pr(nZ;tag > n)  1  CBI(n; nrep; rtag p˜2Z) (6.79)
for any n, which is identical to Eq. (6.49). Then, following the same argument as the WCP-BB84
protocol, we see that
Pr(nZ;unt < nZ;unt)  Z;unt (6.80)
holds with
nZ;unt := nZ   g(rtag p˜2Z ; Z;unt): (6.81)
From Eqs. (6.35), (6.77) and (6.80), we arrive at a key rate formula which is identical to
Eq. (6.54): The L-pulse DQPS protocol is c-correct and s-secret if the final key length lfin satis-
fies
lfin  lDQPS := nZ;unt(1   h
0BBBB@ fBI(kX)
nZ;unt
1CCCCA)   log2 2
PA
  EC(c); (6.82)
where s is given in Eq. (6.34). Together with Eqs. (5.43), (6.13), (6.14), (6.51) and (6.81),
Eq. (6.82) constitutes the main result of Sec. 6.3.3.
In Fig. 6.4, we show numerical results of secure key rate per pulse lDQPS=(nrepL) as a function
of overall transmittance  := cd to compare the DQPS protocol (L > 2) and the PE-BB84
protocol (L = 2). The solid curves represent the key rate with fixed pulse number nrepL = 107,
and the dashed curves represent the one for the asymptotic case, which is obtained in Chapter 5.
We assumed that Alice generates a weak coherent pulse of mean photon number , namely, rtag
is given by Eq. (5.43). We assume dark count rate per pulse per detector pdark = 0:5  10 5 and
a loss-independent bit error rate 3%. We also assumed that Q = 1   (1   2(L   1)pdark)e (L 1),
reflecting the fact that there are L   1 valid timings in a block. Error rate is given by E=Q
where E = 0:03(1   e (L 1)) + pdarke (L 1)(L   1). Based on these parameters, we assume
EC(c) = 1:1h(E=Q) + log2(1=c), nZ = nrepQp˜2Z , nX = nrepQp˜2X and kX = nXE=Q. The values
of p˜X and  are optimized to maximize the key length. In the asymptotic limit, the parameter
optimization leads to p˜X ! 0, nZ;unt ! nrep(Q   rtag) and fBI(kX)=nZ;unt ! E=(Q   rtag) while Q
and E are fixed. In finite-key cases, the Cherno bound is used to calculate the key rate. The
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Figure 6.4: Secure key rate per pulse of the DQPS protocol lDQPS=(nrepL) as a function of overall
transmission . Solid curves are the results of the finite key analysis with total pulse number
nrepL = 107 and dashed curves are the results of the asymptotic case (nrepL ! 1), which are
obtained in Chapter 5. For both solid and dotted curves, the top, middle and bottom curves
represent the key rate for L = 20, L = 4 and L = 2, respectively. The parameters are set as
follows. Dark count rate per pulse per detector: pdark = 0:5  10 5. Loss-independent bit error:
3%. Cost for error correction: EC(c) = 1:1h(E)+ log2(1=c). The security parameter: c = 10 15
and s = 10 10. We see that the key rate of the DQPS protocol (L > 2) is higher than that of the
PE-BB84 protocol (L = 2) for both the asymptotic and finite-key cases.
security parameters are set to be the same as those in Fig. 6.2. We see that the advantage of
the DQPS protocol over the PE-BB84 protocol is maintained even if we include the eect of the
finiteness of the key.
6.4 Concluding remarks
6.4.1 Summary of results
In this chapter, we proposed a method of finite-key analysis based on Bernoulli sampling instead
of simple random sampling. For the BB84 protocol using biased basis choice, the data gathered
on one of the basis is solely used for estimation of the disturbance in the other basis, which enables
us to regard the former as a sample drawn from the population via Bernoulli sampling. As a result,
we obtained finite-sized key-length formulas based on the binomial distribution parametrized by
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the probability of the basis choice in the protocol. The appearance of the binomial distribution
in our case is a direct consequence of the inherent statistics of the protocol, and it should be
dierentiated from the previous works which uses a binomial distribution to derive an upper
bound on the hypergeometric distribution arising from simple random sampling.
The new method is particularly suited for the BB84 protocol with WCP. It enables simpler
analysis compared to the method with simple random sampling since only the latter requires
the estimation of the sample size (nX;unt). We may expect that this additional pessimistic bound
makes the conventional method less ecient, which is corroborated by a numerical example
showing that the key rate for the WCP-BB84 protocol obtained with our method is higher than
that with simple random sampling. To make comparison with the previous finite-key analysis for
the WCP-BB84 protocol [23], we calculated the key rate as a function of channel transmission
and the number of detected signals, in the same practical parameter settings. The result shows
that, while ndet  107 signals are necessary for producing a key in Ref. [23], our method only
needs ndet  104 with the same parameters. In addition, the improved number 104 clarifies that
the use of WCP instead of an ideal single photon causes only a small change in the finite-size
eect. This was also confirmed in the numerical simulation assuming the perfect channel, in
which the required number of rounds to generate a key is nrep  103:7 for the WCP-BB84 protocol
and is nrep  103:2 for the single-photon BB84 protocol.
Finally, we applied the Bernoulli-sampling method to the DQPS protocol, which was recently
proved to be secure in the asymptotic regime. Although the asymptotic proof is based on the
tagging of the insecure rounds as in the WCP-BB84 protocol, the definition of the tagged round
is much more convoluted and makes sense only after the signal was detected by Bob. Nonetheless,
our finite-key analysis has led to a key rate formula closely analogous to the one for the WCP-
BB84 protocol. Numerical calculation shows that the DQPS protocol retains higher key rates
than the PE-BB84 even in the finite-key regime of nrep = 107.
6.4.2 Discussion
It is expected that our method can also be applied to protocols with decoy states [36, 37, 38]. Since
the existing analyses [15, 16, 24, 76] with decoy states involve the estimation of the sample size
nX;unt, the present method may provide a simpler analysis compared to the conventional methods
with simple random sampling. It should be mentioned that some of the finite key analyses [15,
16] assumed the announcement of basis choice after each round to make the sample size fixed,
which were later pointed out [66] to open a security hole against a sifting attack. This illustrates
an importance of simpler and more straightforward methods, and we believe that the method
proposed here will contribute in this regard.
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Figure 6.5: Procedures of “0-filling” idea for error correction of fixed data size nZ . If the sifted
key size nZ is larger than nZ , the protocol aborts. If nZ  nZ is confirmed, nZ   nZ 0s are added
to the sifted key in trivial positions (e.g. the edge of the key). After error correction, privacy
amplification is conducted to shorten the key to the size l(BI)(nZ), which is obtained in the security
proof and independent of nZ .
Another interest is practical use of our method. In practice, the length of sifted key is desired
to be predetermined for the sake of fast error correction, using LDPC code, for example. On
the other hand, our method is valid for the protocol where the number of round is fixed and the
length of sifted key varies (obeying binomial distribution). Although this may seem to weaken
the utility of our method, here we propose a possible idea to amend it (see Fig. 6.5). Suppose
that the input-data size for error correction is fixed to nZ . In the proposed idea, we determine the
number of total rounds nrep so that the length of obtained sifted key nZ is smaller than nZ with high
probability, and we add the nZ   nZ 0s to the sifted key in order to obtain the bit strings of size nZ.
After the error-correcting process is finished, we shorten the bit strings in privacy-amplification
process by the length of nZ nZ in addition to non-trivial amount estimated with security analysis.
This method is possible without using any secret keys or random numbers, which is in contrast
to the recently-proposed method [66] where nrep is determined so that nZ is larger than nZ with
high probability followed by discarding nZ   nZ bits at random. The security of our method is
intuitively explained by the tagging idea. That is, if the insecure (tagged) rounds are in principle
identified, the size of secret key is determined by the security of the other (untagged) rounds.
Obviously, the position of insecure rounds (0s) in the bit strings of size nZ are identified in our
idea. Although more rigorous argument is expected in the future, we believe that the utility of the
Bernoulli-sampling method is ensured by the proposed idea.

Chapter 7
Conclusion and outlook
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, the security of QKD protocols using weak coherent pulses (WCP) was studied. We
focused on the DQPS protocol, which is a variant of the DPS protocol and is also regarded as a
variant of the PE-BB84 protocol. Although the conventional tagging technique used for the BB84
protocol cannot be applied to the DQPS protocol because of its property of coherence chain, the
alternative rule of tagging was constructed through the outcomes of Alice’s virtual measurement
on ancillary qubits. By using this technique and the security proof of the BB84 protocol with
complementarity, the security of the DQPS protocol was proved, and its key generation rate was
shown to be 8/3 times as high as that of the PE-BB84 protocol in the asymptotic limit. We
also showed that the set up for calibration of light source, which tends to be complicated in the
decoy-state method, is kept to be minimum in the DQPS protocol as in the BB84 protocol.
In order to consolidate the advantage of the DQPS protocol over the PE-BB84 protocol, we
worked on the finite-key analysis for the WCP-QKD protocols. A new method of the finite-key
analysis was proposed based on the Bernoulli sampling related to binomial distribution, which is
in contrast to the currently used method based on simple random sampling associated with hy-
pergeometric distribution. Not only the expected advantage of the DQPS protocol was confirmed
even in the finite-key regime with the proposed method, the method was shown to be suitable
for the WCP-BB84 protocol. For the WCP-BB84 protocol, security analysis with estimation of
a smaller number of parameters is possible by using the Bernoulli-sampling method, which leads
to a higher key rate compared to the method with simple random sampling. Furthermore, the re-
quired number of detected signals reduces to 104, which is drastic improvement from the number
107 required in the previous work for the WCP-BB84 protocol.
For further development of QKD systems, the simplicity is crucial from both practical and
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theoretical aspects. The complicated devices lead to higher cost for their installation, and also
enlarge the gap between the physical models assumed in the security proof and their actual be-
haviors. The DQPS protocol is beneficial in this sense, for it has essentially the same set up as the
PE-BB84 protocol including calibration of light source, which only requires a typical laser, phase
modulators, a passive interferometer and detectors. For the theoretical aspect, the security anal-
yses of the QKD protocols should be simple and clear since its correctness can not be directly
certified by experiment (unlike conventional physics theory), and users of QKD are supposed
to rely on the security proofs. In the proposed method based on Bernoulli sampling, binomial
distribution parametrized by the probability of basis choice is used instead of hypergeometric
distribution, which enables simpler analysis with smaller number of estimations. This method
is expected to be applied to the decoy-state method, which has more complicated analysis with
larger number of estimating parameters than the WCP-BB84 protocol and the DQPS protocol.
7.2 Related works and future outlook
One of the motivations that I focused on the DQPS protocols was to seek for a more ecient
protocol than the BB84 protocol. Although the advantage of the DQPS protocol over the PE-
BB84 protocol was shown, further improvement for the security analysis is expected to show
its robustness against PNS attacks which was certified in the DPS protocol. Another protocol I
worked on was high-dimensional (HD) protocol (qudit-based protocol) although the details were
not mentioned in this thesis. HD protocols enable energy-ecient communication, and they are
expected to have high-error tolerance [49, 50]. Recently, the entanglement-based HD protocol,
which uses time (photon position) and frequency as two bases, were proved to be secure [106,
107] based on the security analysis for continuous variable QKD as well as were demonstrated
with high key generation rate [119]. I analyzed the security of a prepare-and-measure-type HD
protocol, which uses information of discrete time and frequency, based on the security proof
with complementarity to evaluate its tolerance to practical errors. The result was not positive at
least in my case, that is, no higher-error tolerance was confirmed compared to the two-dimension
protocol (BB84 protocol) if we assume practical errors, mainly because the use of a larger number
of temporal modes results in more errors caused by dark counts of detectors. On the other hand,
some of my collaborators recently showed that the round-robin DPS (RR-DPS) protocol, which
uses many temporal modes with symmetrization, has robustness against PNS attacks as well as
high error tolerance that a secret key can be generated even with 50 % errors in principle.
Although the RR-DPS protocol has such an unusual property, it is not fully understood what
kind of principle of quantum physics contributes to it. The high error tolerance is not confirmed
in the DPS protocol with current complicated security proof resulting in low key generation rate,
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while it has a room for improvement. A similar situation applies to another protocol using the
property of coherence chain, the coherent-one-way (COW) protocol [111], in which the robust-
ness against PNS attacks is not confirmed against standard predictions but possible improvements
of hardware and proof are suggested [98]. The security analysis of the DQPS protocol can be an
important step to address the above involved problems. For example, our result implies that if
one wants to confirm the robustness against PNS attacks in the non-symmetrized protocol such
as the DPS protocol and the DQPS protocol, it is essential to use bit errors reflecting disturbance
of coherence chain in the security proof (as is done in the security proof for the DPS protocol).
Several theoretical interests still remain:
 Is the symmetrization of the temporal mode necessary to confirm the high error tolerance?
 Although the protocols with coherence chain (DPS, DQPS, RR-DPS, COW) assume that se-
quential pulses are separated by blocks, is it essentially possible to remove the assumption? If it
is true, are some interesting properties (PNS robustness, high error tolerance or others) confirmed
as a result of security proof?
Tackling those problems may not only lead to improvements of those protocols in terms of key
generation eciency, but also clarify the mechanism of how quantum properties contribute to
the essential bound on leaked information, which can help us to understand the relation between
quantum physics and information theory more deeply.

Appendix A
Proof of lemma 1
With ancillary system Q and R, let us introduce j	iAEQR and jiAEQR as purified state of ˆAE and
j˜0i h˜0jA 
 ˆE, respectively, which are written as
j	iAEQR :=
X
i0
j˜iiA j iiEQ j0iR (A.1)
jiAEQR := j˜0iA jiEQR ; (A.2)
where fj˜iiAgi0 is an orthogonal set. By using Uhlmann’s theorem Eq. (2.7),
F(ˆAE; j˜0i h˜0jA 
 ˆE)
= max
ji: TrQR jihj=j˜0ih˜0jA
ˆE
AEQR h	jiAEQR2 (A.3)
= max
ji: TrQR jihj=ˆE
EQ h 0j R h0j jiEQR2 : (A.4)
If we set jiEQR =
P
i0 j iiEQ jiiR with an orthogonal set fjiiRgi0, we have
TrQR(ji hjEQR)
=
X
i; j
TrQR

j ii h jjEQ jii h jjR

(A.5)
=
X
i
TrQ

j ii h ijEQ

(A.6)
= ˆE: (A.7)
Then from (A.4),
F(ˆAE; j˜0i h˜0jA 
 ˆE)

Xi EQ h 0j R h0j j iiEQ jiiR

2
(A.8)
=
EQ h 0j 0iEQ2 (A.9)
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holds. On the other hand, we have
F(ˆA; j˜0i h˜0jA)
= A h˜0jTrEQR

j	i h	jAEQR

j˜0iA (A.10)
=
X
i; j
A h˜0jTrEQR

j˜ii h ˜jjA j ii h jjEQ j0i h0jR

j˜0iA (A.11)
= TrEQ(j 0i h 0jEQ) (A.12)
= EQ h 0j 0iEQ : (A.13)
Eq. (A.9) and Eq. (A.13) lead to
F(ˆAE; j˜0i h˜0jA 
 ˆE) 

F(ˆA; j˜0i h˜0jA)
2
: (A.14)
Appendix B
Untagged check-basis outcomes as an
unbiased sample
Here, we prove Eq. (5.34) in the main text by showing that the untagged rounds with c = 1
is uniformly extracted from the whole untagged events. For fixed c; j (, 0) and m, define a
projector ˆT (c; j;m)a;t B
P
fzlg jA(c; j)a;fzlgiA hA
(c; j)
a;fzlgj where the summation is over fzlg satisfying
P
l, j zl = m
for t = 0 and Pl, j zl < m for t = 1. The projector ˆT (c; j;m)a;t can be regarded as the POVM element
for the measurement on system A to determine a and t through Steps 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 with
the rule of Eq. (5.10). Although the protocol does not define the values of a, b, and t in case
of j = 0, it simplifies the notations if we also define those values to be a = b = t = 0 for
j = 0, and define ˆT (c;0;m)a;t accordingly. We label each of the nrep rounds by r = 1; 2; : : : ; nrep, and
use cr; ar; br; jr;mr; tr to denote the values of c; a; b; j;m; t in the r-th round. Let c; a; b; j; m; t be
vectors with nrep elements corresponding to r = 1; 2; : : : ; nrep. With these notations, the procedure
of determining these vectors in the virtual protocol (with replacement 5-3) is summarized as
follows.
i) Alice selects c randomly, prepares ˆAS (c) B
Nnrep
r=1 ˆAS (cr) with ˆAS (cr) B j	(cr)iAS h	(cr)j,
and measures m by a projection measurement.
ii) Eve’s attack on nrep copies of system S followed by Bob’s measurement determines j and b.
For a given attack strategy by Eve, this whole procedure on nrep systems should be represented by
POVM with elements f ˆD j;bg.
iii) Given c, j, and m, Alice measures nrep copies of system A to obtain a and t, which is
represented by the POVM elements f ˆT (c; j;m)a;t B
Nnrep
r=1
ˆT (cr ; jr ;mr)ar ;tr g.
The joint probability that c; a; b; j; t are obtained is written as
Pr(c; a; b; j; t) =
X
m
Pr(c) tr

( ˆT (c; j;m)a;t 
 ˆD j;b)( ˆNmˆAS (c) ˆNm)

: (B.1)
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Let gt; j(c) be a function for fixed t and j defined as gt; j(c) = (c1; c2; ::cnrep) where cr = cr (tr=1 or
jr = 0) and cr = 0 (tr=0 and jr , 0). From Eq. (5.33), for tr = 0 and jr , 0 we have
trA

( ˆT (0; jr ;mr)
ar ;0 
 ˆ1S )( ˆNmrˆAS (0) ˆNmr )

= trA

( ˆT (1; jr ;mr)
ar ;0 
 ˆ1S )( ˆNmrˆAS (1) ˆNmr )

; (B.2)
since ˆAS (cr) = j	(cr)iAS h	(cr)j. Thus, for c; c0 satisfying gt; j(c) = gt; j(c0) = cconst, we have
trA

( ˆT (c; j;m)a;t 
 ˆ1S )( ˆNmˆAS (c) ˆNm)

= trA

( ˆT (c0; j;m)a;t 
 ˆ1S )( ˆNmˆAS (c0) ˆNm)

: (B.3)
Therefore, Eq. (B.1) is written in the form
Pr(c; a; b; j; t) = Pr(c)(gt; j(c); a; b; j; t); (B.4)
which leads to, for a given value of cconst, we obtain
Pr(c; a; b; j; t)P
c0:gt; j(c0)=cconst Pr(c0; a; b; j; t)
=
Pr(c)(cconst; a; b; j; t)P
c0:gt; j(c0)=cconst Pr(c0)(cconst; a; b; j; t)
=
Pr(c)P
c0:gt; j(c0)=cconst Pr(c0)
(B.5)
for c satisfying gt; j(c) = cconst. Eq. (B.5) shows that for the rounds with t = 0 and j , 0, the
probability of obtaining c = 0; 1 is p˜0, p˜1 and is independent of the value of a; b; j. Therefore, in
the limit of nrep ! 1,
n(c = 0; t = 0; a , b; j , 0)
n(c = 1; t = 0; a , b; j , 0) =
p˜0
p˜1
(B.6)
holds, where n(condition) denotes the number of rounds satisfying the condition in the nrep
rounds. Finally, notice that Bob conducts check-basis measurement regardless of the value of
d in the virtual protocol, and hence d is independent of the other variables. Therefore, we have
n(c = d = 0; t = 0; a , b; j , 0)
n(c = d = 1; t = 0; a , b; j , 0) =
 
p˜0
p˜1
!2
; (B.7)
which corresponds to Eq. (5.34).
Appendix C
Security proof for DQPS with a general
light source
Here we show that the security proof in Sec. 5.2 can be extended to the use of a general light
source. Suppose that the laser in Fig. 5.1 emits a train of L pulses in a general mixed state ˆS . We
assume that every train from the laser is independent and has the same state ˆS . We also assume
that the subsequent phase modulation is ideal. The state after the phase modulation, which was
given in Eq. (5.1) in the description of the actual protocol, is now given by0BBBBB@ L 1O
l=0
exp
 
il(al; c)mˆl1CCCCCA ˆS 0BBBBB@ L 1O
l0=0
exp
    il0(al0 ; c)mˆl01CCCCCA ; (C.1)
and the one after the randomization of the overall optical phase is (see Sec. 4.2.1)
X
m
ˆNm
0BBBBB@ L 1O
l=0
exp
 
il(al; c)mˆl1CCCCCA ˆS 0BBBBB@ L 1O
l0=0
exp
    il0(al0 ; c)mˆl01CCCCCA ˆNm (C.2)
instead of Eq. (5.4).
The security proof in Sec. 5.2 used the assumption of pure coherent states Eq. (5.1) in several
occasions, which are listed as follows:
i) The state preparation in the virtual protocol [Eq. (5.7)], and its relation [Eq. (5.9)] to the actual
protocol.
ii) The parity correlation [Eq. (5.14)] between the auxiliary qubits and the photon numbers in
pulses.
iii) The derived properties [Eqs. (5.26), (5.28), (5.30), (5.32), (5.33) and (B.2)] for proving that
the sampling is unbiased as in Eq. (5.34).
iv) The expressions [Eqs. (5.40) and (5.48)] for the parameter rtag.
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In what follows, we describe how each of the above arguments are rephrased in terms of the
general state ˆS .
i) In the virtual protocol, we assume that Alice prepares the following state on system AS ,
ˆAS (c) B ˆR(c)ˆS ˆR(c)y; (C.3)
instead of Eq. (5.7). Here ˆR(c) is defined by
ˆR(c) B
L 1O
l=0
h 1p
2

j+iA;l exp i2 lcmˆl + j iA;l exp i( + 2 lc)mˆli: (C.4)
Then it is straightforward to confirm that0BBBBB@ L 1O
l=0
A;l hj
1CCCCCA ˆAS (c) 0BBBBB@ L 1O
l0=0
jiA;l0
1CCCCCA
=
1
2L
0BBBBB@ L 1O
l=0
exp
 
il(al; c)mˆl1CCCCCA ˆS 0BBBBB@ L 1O
l0=0
exp
    il0(al0 ; c)mˆl01CCCCCA ;
(C.5)
where  of the l-th qubit should be chosen according to the bit al. This is the general-state
expression for Eq. (5.9), which leads to the equivalence of state preparation between the actual
and the virtual protocol.
ii) As ˆR(c) is written in Z basis as
ˆR(c) =
L 1O
l=0
h1
2
i lcmˆl

j0iA;l   ˆ1S ;l + ( 1)mˆl + j1iA;l   ˆ1S ;l   ( 1)mˆli
=
L 1O
l=0
h
i lcmˆl

j0iA;l
X
ml:even
ˆP(jmliS ;l) + j1iA;l
X
ml:odd
ˆP(jmliS ;l)
i
;
(C.6)
we have
ˆAS ˆR(c) = ˆR(c); (C.7)
which is a generalization of Eq. (5.14). It immediately implies that ˆAS ˆAS (c) ˆAS = ˆAS (c),
which indicates a property of state ˆAS that the measurement outcome on Z basis fj0iA;l ; j1iA;lg
always coincides with the parity of photon number in the l-th pulse.
iii) From Eq. (C.6), we have
ˆR(c) =
0BBBBB@ L 1O
l=0
i lcmˆl
1CCCCCA ˆR(0): (C.8)
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Comparing Eqs. (5.14) and (5.28) to Eqs. (C.7) and (C.8), we see that the derived properties of
Eqs. (5.26), (5.30), and (5.32) for j	(c)iAS should also hold for ˆR(c). As a result, we obtain
A hA(0; j)a;fzlgj ˆNm ˆR(0) = ( i)u( j)A hA
(1; j)
a;fzlgj ˆNm ˆR(1) for
X
l, j
zl = m (C.9)
as a generalization of Eq. (5.33). From Eq. (C.9), we have
A hA(0; j)a;fzlgj ˆNmˆAS (0) ˆNm jA
(0; j)
a;fzlgiA = A hA
(1; j)
a;fzlgj ˆNmˆAS (1) ˆNm jA
(1; j)
a;fzlgiA for
X
l, j
zl = m;
(C.10)
which assures that Eq. (B.2) is also true when ˆAS (c) is given by Eq. (C.3). Hence, Eq. (5.34)
holds.
iv) For the initial state given by Eq. (C.3), the definition of the parameter rtag of Eq. (5.40) is
replaced by
rtag = 1  
X
m
tr

( ˆ(m)A 
 ˆNm)ˆAS (0)

: (C.11)
Together with Eqs. (5.41) and (C.7), we have
rtag = 1  
X
m
tr

( ˆ1A 
 ˆ(m)S )ˆAS (0)

= 1  
X
m
tr

ˆ
(m)
S ˆS

: (C.12)

Appendix D
Calibration of light sources
Here we discuss how we may determine an upper bound on the parameter rtag, which is given by
Eq. (C.12), from an o-line experiment on the light source. We use a beam splitter characterized
by transmittance T and reflectance R and two threshold detectors with quantum eciencies (1)det
and (2)det, as in Fig. 3. No precise values of these parameters are needed, and we assume that there
are known lower bounds 1  T(1)det and 2  R(2)det. For simplicity, we neglect the eect of dark
countings of the detectors. We assume that the dead time of the detectors are shorter than the pulse
interval such that they are ready for every incident pulse. For an L pulse train emitted from the
source, we record the timings of detection at the two detectors, and define a double coincidence
event to be the case when both detectors have reported detections within a pair of neighboring
pulses.
Since a state in the range of ˆ1 Pm ˆ(m)S contains at least two photons in a pair of neighboring
pulses, such a state has a probability of resulting in a double coincidence event no smaller than
212. Thus, if we repeat the measurement ntest times and find that double coincidence events
have occurred ndouble times, an upper bound on rtag is given by
rtag B
ndouble
ntest
1
212
 rtag; (D.1)
in the asymptotic limit of large ntest. Although the tightness of the upper bound rtag varies depend-
ing on the state ˆS in general, we may show that it can be quite tight when the state is close to
an ideal coherent state. Suppose that 1 and 2 are equal to the actual eciencies, and each pulse
is exactly in the coherent state with amplitude . For every pulse, detector 1 and 2 independently
report detection with probability p(click)k = 1   e k  k (k = 1; 2). Since there are L + 2(L   1)
dierent combinations of timings leading to double coincidence, we have
ndouble
ntest
 (3L   2)p(click)1 p(click)2  122(3L   2); (D.2)
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Figure D.1: O-line calibration setup to determine an upper bound on rtag for a general light
source, when the dead time of detectors is shorter than pulse interval . R and T represent
reflectance and transmittance of the beam splitter, respectively. (1)det and 
(2)
det represent detection
eciencies of detector 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure D.2: O-line calibration setup to determine an upper bound on rtag for a general light
source, when the dead time of detectors is longer than pulse interval. An optical linear absorber
with transmittance abs is set in front of beam splitters. R(1), R(2), T (1) and T (2) represent reflectance
and transmittance of the two beam splitters. (1)det, 
(2)
det and 
(3)
det represent detection eciencies of
threshold detector 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
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which leads to
rtag  
2(3L   2)
2
: (D.3)
On the other hand, direct calculation shows that, in the limit of L2 ! 0,
rtag = 
2 3L   2
2
+ 3
 10L + 12
3

+ 4
 9L2 + 82L   120
8

+ O(L25 + L36)
= 2
3L   2
2
  3L
9
8L +
10
3

+ O(L25 + L36); (D.4)
which leads to
rtag   rtag
rtag
 
3
4
L +
20
9

+ O(L3 + L24): (D.5)
Hence, the bound rtag is a good approximation of rtag for   L 1=2 .
In a more practical case where the dead time (dead) of the detectors is longer than the pulse
interval (dead > ), there is a possibility that the presence of two photons is masked by an earlier
detection of a third photon. In such a case, we may use a setup in Fig. 4 with three detectors
and a linear absorber with transmittance abs. Assume that we know lower bounds, ˜abs  abs,
˜1  T (1)T (2)(1)det, ˜2  T (1)R(2)(2)det and ˜3  R(1)(3)det. Define a triple coincidence event to be the
case when all three detectors has reported detections within the whole train of L pulses. Let q3 be
the probability that the L pulse train leaving the linear absorber contains three or more photons.
If we repeat the measurement ntest times and triple coincidence events have occurred ntriple times,
we have
q3  ntriple
ntest
1
6˜1˜2˜3
(D.6)
in the limit of large ntest. Suppose that one records the number n(obs)double of double coincidence
events in the same ntest runs, which is defined as the case when detectors 1 and 2 have reported
detections within a pair of neighboring pulses. Since the eect of the dead time can be simulated
with a fictitious detector with no dead time by ignoring detection events that occurred when the
real detector would have been dead, we may consider the number n(true)double of double coincidence
events defined from these fictitious detectors. Since the two definitions of a double coincidence
event diers only when three or more photons are incident on the two detectors, we have
n
(true)
double
ntest
 n
(obs)
double
ntest
+ q3 (D.7)
in the limit of large ntest. On the other hand, as in Eq. (D.1), n(true)double satisfies
rtag  rtag =
n
(true)
double
ntest
1
212
(D.8)
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by taking 1 = ˜abs˜1 and 2 = ˜abs˜2. We thus obtain an upper bound from Eqs. (D.6)-(D.8) as
rtag  r tag B
n(obs)double
ntest
+
ntriple
ntest
1
6˜1˜2˜3
 1
2˜1˜2˜2abs
: (D.9)
We show that r tag also approximates rtag well when the light source emits coherent pulses.
Suppose that ˜1, ˜2, ˜3 and ˜abs are equal to the actual eciencies. Since n(obs)double  n(true)double holds,
we have
r tag  rtag +
ntriple
ntest
1
6˜1˜2˜3
1
2˜1˜2˜2abs
: (D.10)
From Eq. (D.5), we have
r tag   rtag
rtag
 
3
4
L +
20
9

+
ntriple
ntest
1
6˜1˜2˜3
1
2˜1˜2˜2abs
1
rtag
+ O(L3 + L24) (D.11)
for L2 ! 0. Since L pulses incident on detector k lead to one or more detections at probability
p(click)k = 1   e ˜k ˜absL  ˜k˜absL, we have
ntriple
ntest
 ˜1˜2˜3(˜absL)3: (D.12)
Thus, we obtain
r tag   rtag
rtag
 
3
4
L +
20
9

+
(˜absL)3
12˜1˜2˜2abs
1
rtag
+ O(L3 + L24)
= 
3
4
L +
20
9

+ 
˜absL2
18˜1˜2
+ O(L3 + L24):
(D.13)
Therefore, r tag becomes a good approximation of rtag when   L 1=2 and the absorber is chosen
to satisfy ˜abs  L 2.
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